





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THE  
COMMENTARIES  
OF THE GREAT  
AFONSO DALBOQUERQUE,  
SECOND VICEROY OF INDIA.

TRANSLATED FROM THE  
PORTUGUESE EDITION OF 1774,

With Notes and an Introduction,

BY

WALTER DE GRAY BIRCH, F.R.S.L.,

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VOL. III.

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*ELOGIO por Fr. Xav. de Oliveira.*

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
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# LIST OF CONTENTS.

	PAGE
PORTRAIT OF DOM VASCO DA GAMA, SIXTH VICEROY OF INDIA, from MS. Sloon. 197, f. 18 . . . . .	<i>Frontispiece</i>
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	i
CHRONOLOGY OF PART III . . . . .	xliii
<hr/>	
TITLE TO THE EDITION OF 1774—PART III . . . . .	xlvii
TITLES OF THE CHAPTERS CONTAINED IN THE THIRD PART . . . . .	xlix
<hr/>	
COMMENTARIES OF AFONSO DALBOQUERQUE—PART III . . . . .	1-264
“ <i>Letter which the great Afonso Dalboquerque wrote to         the Hidalcão as soon as Goa had been taken</i> ” . . . . .	20
“ <i>Speech of the great Afonso Dalboquerque before the         second storming of Malaca</i> ” . . . . .	115
“ <i>Instructions to the Portuguese Ambassador setting out         to Siam</i> ” . . . . .	156
“ <i>Oration of Camillo Portio to Pope Leo X, upon the         Conquest of Malaca</i> ” . . . . .	172
“ <i>Letter of the great Afonso Dalboquerque to the King         of Portugal concerning the Maintenance of Portu-         guese Power in Goa</i> ” . . . . .	258
“ <i>Articles which the King sent to Afonso Dalboquerque         concerning Goa</i> ” . . . . .	263
<hr/>	
MAP OF THE MALAY PENINSULA AND ADJACENT PARTS, from the <i>Portolano</i> of DIEGO HOMEM, A.D. 1558 . . . . .	<i>To face p. 1</i>

# CONTENTS.

PEDIGREE OF THE KINGS OF MALACA . . . . .	83
BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF MALACA, from CORREA'S <i>Leulas da India</i> To face p. 122	
PLAN OF THE FORTIFICATIONS OF MALACA, from MS. Sloan. 197, f. 382 . . . . .	To face p. 137
SCHEME OF THE PORTUGUESE COINAGE OF MALACA . . . . .	140
PROBABLE PLAN OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS OF AFONSO DALBOQUERQUE AGAINST ROÇALCAO . . . . .	224
PORTRAIT OF DIOGO LOPES DE SIQUEYRA, FOURTH VICEROY OF INDIA, from MS. Sloan. 197, f. 15 . . . . .	To face p. 254
<hr/>	
APPENDIX . . . . .	265

## INTRODUCTION.

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. . . . . o grande Cavalleiro,  
Que ao vento vélas deu na occidua parte,  
E lá, onde infante o Sol dá luz primeiro,  
Fixou das Quinas santas o Estendarte.  
E com afronta do infernal guerreiro,  
(Mercê do Ceo) ganhou por força, e arte  
O aureo Reino, e trocou com pio exemplo  
A profana mesquita em sacro templo.

\* \* \* \* \*  
O tempo chega, Affonso, em que a santa  
Sião terá por vós a liberdade,  
A Monarquia, que hoje o Ceo levanta,  
Devoto consagrando a eternidade.  
O, bem nascida generosa planta,  
Que em flor fructo ha de dar á Christandade,  
E materia a mil cysnes, que, cantando  
De vós, se hirão comvosco eternizando.

De Christo a injusta morte vingou Tito  
Na de Jerusalem total ruina :  
E a vós, a quem Deos deu hum peito invitto,  
Ser vingador de sua Fé destina.  
Extinguir do Agareno o falso rito  
He de vosso valor a empreza dina:  
Tomai pois o bastão de empreza grande  
Para o tempo que o Ceo marchar vos mande.

MALACA CONQUISTADA

*pelo grande Affonso De Albuquerque.*

*Poema de Francesco de Sa' de Meneses.*

---

THE Third Part of the COMMENTARIES OF THE GREAT  
AFONSO DALBOQUERQUE, a translation of which is given  
in this volume, maintains the interest in the Portu-  
guese hero which was awakened by the previous

volumes. To the conquest of Ormuz and Goa, already published, we have here in continuation the second conquest of Goa, and the extension of the Portuguese empire to the Malay peninsula.

The volume opens with the return of Afonso Dalboquerque to Cananor, from which port he set sail with twenty ships, and put into Onor for supplies and water. Here he learned the imposing strength of the Hidalcão (about eight thousand Turks, Rumes, and Moors against seventeen hundred Portuguese), from Timoja and the friendly king of Gargopa, and then proceeded by way of Anjadiva to the river of Goa. A council was hereupon held, which resulted in an unanimous determination to attack the city at once, without relying upon the aid promised by the native chiefs. The forces were divided, but not without much opposition on the part of the captains, into three companies: one, commanded by Manuel da Cunha and Manuel de Lacerda, to attack the stockades near the citadel; another, under the leadership of Diogo Mendez de Vasconcelos, to storm the palisades near the sea; and a third, under the command of the Viceroy himself, to take the stockades in flank.

On the following morning, the 25th of November, 1510, with an effigy of their national patron, St. James the greater, carried in the van, a general assault was carried out, the stockades entered, and all who resisted the onward progress of the besiegers put to the sword; while of those who fled away in their panic over the numerous fords and passes an immense number were drowned. In this brilliant en-

gagement seven of the Portuguese officers were killed, among whom the author of the *Commentaries* especially signalises D. Jeronymo de Lima, André de Afonseca, Antonio Graces, and Alvaro Gomez, while on the side of the enemy not less than two thousand, about one-fourth of the whole native strength, were estimated to have perished.

In the sack which ensued, besides the miscellaneous plunder, none of which Afonso Dalboquerque cared to appropriate, a considerable quantity of artillery, munitions, and horses were taken, and in accordance with the bloodthirsty laws which appear to have regulated such occasions, not only in India, but in other countries claiming to be far more civilised at the period, no quarter was given; none of the hated sect of Mahomet were spared; men, women, and children were mercilessly put to death; and as a punishment for the treachery of which the Moors had been guilty when Afonso Dalboquerque took the city for the first time, for four days incessantly the Portuguese and Hindoos poured out the blood of the Moors who were found therein; and it was ascertained that of men, women, and children the number killed exceeded six thousand.<sup>1</sup> On this occasion the Viceroy is stated to have perpetrated a very horrible act of vengeance against the enemy; a mosque was filled with Moors taken captive by the Hindoos and then set on fire; and among the people who thus perished was a deserter who had gone over to the Hidalcão and turned Mahometan when Goa was taken for the first time.

<sup>1</sup> Page 16.



No time was lost by Afonso Dalboquerque in fortifying the city, every one, from the highest to the lowest, had to take his share of duty, and the walls, towers, and ditches were completed in a marvellously short space of time, "where it now stands", for the plan of which the reader is referred to vol. ii, p. 88.<sup>1</sup> During the excavations a bronze crucifix was dug up in the course of demolishing some old foundations. Curiously enough, Correa<sup>2</sup> mentions a similar discovery in November 1512 in these terms: "Tambem o Gouernador n'estas naos mandou a ElRey huma caixinha de prata, e dentro metido hum corpo de crucifício, que foy achado per hum homem cauando pera fazer hum poço, e o achou tendo feito coua de tres braças, que se achou no inuerno, que foy d'esta maneyra: que cauando hum pobre homem pera fazer hum poço, tendo altura de tres braças, achou hum corpo de crucifício de grandura menos de hum palmo, aberto por detrás, muyto gastado, e o rosto bom e barbas, e o braço direito polo cotouello sómente, e o esquerdo inteiro e o corpo e pernas e pés enteiros, e feito de hum metal que ouriues e lapidairos nunca souberão conhecer, nem com o buril o poderão descobrir, que nada entrava n'elle: o que fez grande espanto no Gouernador e todos os fidalgos, que caso podia ser em tal lugar terra de mouros de tantos annos,

<sup>1</sup> One of the most exhaustive works on Portuguese Goa is that entitled, "An Historical and Archæological Sketch of the City of Goa, preceded by a short Statistical Account of the Territory of Goa, written by authorisation of the Government, by José Nicolau da Fonseca, President of the 'Sociedade dos Amigos das Letras'" Bombay, 1878, 8vo.

<sup>2</sup> *Lendas da Índia*, I, ii, p. 328.

sem auer memoria que nunca n'ella ouvesse christãos.” “The governor, Afonso Dalboquerque, also sent to the king in these ships a small casket of silver, and within it the figure of our Saviour from a crucifix, which had been found by a poor man who was digging the foundation for a well. This man found it when he had dug down as deep as three fathoms, and it was in the winter under the following circumstances. There was a poor man digging the foundation for a well, and at the depth of three fathoms he found the figure from a crucifix of the height of less than a palm, hollow behind, very worn, but the countenance and beard well preserved ; the right arm broken off at the elbow, the left whole, the body, legs, and feet uninjured, made of a metal unknown to the goldsmiths and lapidaries, for it could not be scratched with the point of a graver. This excited great wonder in the governor and *Fidalgos* how it could have chanced to get into such a place, for so many years the country of Moors, in which there was no remembrance of there ever having been any Christian inhabitants.”

In return for this victory Afonso Dalboquerque made several presents to the convent of Palmela, the head of the military order of Santiago, and to the church of the same saint in Gallicia a lamp, and money to be invested for the supply of oil for the lamp. A similar gift of a lamp and provision for its oil was made by the viceroy on a later occasion, when he narrowly escaped death from a cannon ball.

The news of the fall of Goa effected a rapid change in the attitude of the Indian princes towards the Portu-

guese. The king of Cambaya set free D. Afonso de Noronha, nephew of Afonso Dalboquerque, and offered the site for a fortress at Diu, and the preparation of a Turkish fleet to operate against the Portuguese was countermanded by the Grand Sultan of Cairo. The letter sent by Dalboquerque to the Hidalcão announcing the capture of Goa, and offering the monopoly of the important trade in horses, also plainly shows the rapid exaltation of Portuguese *prestige* in consequence of this event. Not long after this, Meliqueaye, (perhaps the Portuguese equivalent of Melek Yahya,) was sent by the Hidalcão against the island, but he and his numerous army were routed without much difficulty, and the erection of the fortress, the colonisation of the newly acquired territory by Hindoo families (a race to whom Afonso Dalboquerque, throughout his career, always manifested great kindness), and the consolidation of the government of the province, for province indeed it was, proceeded rapidly and without interruption.

The advent of the royal Hindoo Merlao (or Milrrhau, as he is called in the latter part of this volume) enabled Afonso Dalboquerque to gratify the native Hindoos and Nequibares, and at the same time to ingratiate himself with them, by conferring upon him the farmer-generalship of the newly acquired territory for about thirty thousand pounds—a considerable sum in those days, and a welcome addition to the revenues of Portugal. But these matters did not cause the Viceroy to forget the other parts of his Indian jurisdiction, and in accordance with Royal instructions he dispatched

Diogo Fernandez de Béja with a fleet of three ships to dismantle the fortress of Socotra.<sup>1</sup>

The fall of the important city of Goa brought the Çamorin of Calicut to the feet of Afonso Dalboquerque for the time, and his offers of peace resulted in the mission of Simão Rangel, but on the arrival of that ambassador at the Çamorin's court that prince had somewhat recovered from his alarm, and his artifices succeeded in protracting negotiations, which were not to be crowned with success for a long time yet to come,

<sup>1</sup> The island was taken possession of by the Portuguese in 1507, but passed from the possession of Portugal to that of the Sultan of Keshin, a small territory on the opposite Arabian coast. This island is off the gulf of Aden, situated about 150 miles N.E. from Cape Guardafum, and extends about seventy or eighty miles from west to east, with an average width of fifteen or twenty miles. It contains 1,300 square miles, consisting chiefly of a table land, which is between 700 or 800 feet above the level of the sea. North and south of the table land are two plains. The northern plain is not so low as the southern, nor so level, the surface being intersected by flat valleys in many places. The western districts of this plain, though less sterile than the southern plain, are more adapted for pastures than for cultivation. The eastern districts have a superior soil, which is a reddish earth, covered in certain seasons with abundant grass, and well adapted for the cultivation of grain, fruit, and vegetables. In most of the northern plains water is found at a depth of from 8 feet to 10 feet below the surface. The climate is sultry. During the north-east monsoon there is an almost daily fall of rain. The island is exposed both to the north-west and north-east monsoons, rendering the anchorages unsafe. There are about 5,000 inhabitants, consisting of two distinct races—namely, Arabs who have settled on the island, and the aboriginal inhabitants, who are Bedouins, wandering from one part of the island to another with their flocks and herds. The principal commercial products are aloes of the finest quality, the dragon's-blood tree, tamarinds,

and Afonso Dalboquerque contented himself with a blockade of Calicut by a small and probably inefficient fleet, which was compelled by the disastrous turn of affairs at Goa to hasten to the relief of the besieged garrison there.

Another Indian potentate, whose policy was manifestly disturbed by the Portuguese successes, was the King of Narsinga, to whom Fray Luiz had been accredited by Afonso Dalboquerque in the previous year.<sup>1</sup> This king hastened, after some tergiversation, to conclude an alliance with the Portuguese commander, but Fray Luiz did not live to return, being murdered at the reported instigation of the Hidalcão.

After putting the local government of the city and island of Goa into a satisfactory condition, dedicating the principal church to the patronage of St. Catherine,

tobacco, and various fruits and gums, besides some cotton and indigo. Sheep and goats in the western districts constitute the principal wealth of the inhabitants; the oxen are small. The civet cat and chameleon are found all over the island. Turtles are found on the southern coast. Fish abound on several parts of the coast, and many families live on the produce of their fishing. The capital is Tamarida, with only 100 inhabitants, built not far from the northern shores.

As the island lies almost directly in the line of our communication with India from the Red Sea, it has acquired additional importance by the construction of the Suez Canal, and this consideration has, without doubt, determined the action of the Indian Government, which, in 1876, entered into a treaty by which, for a small subsidy, the Sultan engaged never to cede Socotra to any foreign power, nor to allow any settlement to be made on it without the consent of the British Government. The Indian Government has lately re-occupied the island, and the British flag was rehoisted there not long ago.

<sup>1</sup> See vol. II, ch. xvii.



on whose auspicious feast day he had gained the victory, appointing various officers, munitioning the fortress, assisting by beneficent measures the colonisation of the lands, and re-establishing the currency, it was Afonso Dalboquerque's intention to have proceeded without delay to the Red Sea; but two events had transpired which caused him to change his mind, and this change was productive of unexpectedly great and glorious achievements, which added new lustre to the already brilliant career of the Viceroy.

One of these was the circumstance of the continued captivity of Ruy de Araujo and his companions in Malaca against the advice of Ninachatu (or Ninapam, as Correa calls him), the Hindoo adviser of the king of that country, the other the natural desire of Diogo Mendez de Vasconcelos, who had come from Portugal under special orders to effect the release of these prisoners, to make his way thither without delay, although Afonso Dalboquerque, in the exercise of his undoubted authority, desired to put off this undertaking for a more convenient opportunity, when a more imposing force than that which Diogo Mendez de Vasconcelos commanded could be mustered for the service. The determined intention and endeavour of Diogo Mendez to separate from the fleet of his superior officer, in direct opposition to orders, did not succeed at the time, yet this act undoubtedly operated with some weight in influencing the subsequent movements of Afonso Dalboquerque, who, finding the winds adverse to his intended voyage to the Red Sea, reversed his course, and after a brief stoppage at Cochim, shaped

his way as straight as he could for Malaca, and brought up his fleet at Pedir, on the northern coast of Sumatra.

At this port the hopes of the Portuguese were raised in a remarkable degree by the unexpected meeting with João Viegas and eight other members of the little band under the headship of Ruy de Araujo, that had escaped from their durance at Malaca. These men pointed out to Afonso Dalboquerque the complicity of the Moor Naodabegea or Naodabeguea in the plot to destroy Diogo Lopez de Sequeira and his retreat to Pacé, a neighbouring port at which the Portuguese fleet touched, and made ineffectual efforts to get him into the hands of the commander. But on the advance of the fleet towards the waters of Malaca the Moor was overtaken in a *pangajaoa*, and after a sharp encounter, in which the enemy were worsted, the curious spectacle of the fugitive Naodabegea, severely wounded and nearly dead, but without any blood flowing from his mangled body, presented itself to the astonished eyes of the Portuguese. This apparently unaccountable circumstance was explained by the finding of a bracelet made of the bones of the animal called *cabal*, a word which appears to be related somewhat too transparently with that signifying *horse* in many European languages. The peculiar power possessed by this bracelet of preventing the flow of blood from any wounds which the wearer should experience recalls the incident of the magic scabbard of King Arthur's sword, *Excalibur*. In the *Morte d'Arthur* we read: "'Well,' said the damsel, 'go ye into yonder barge, and row yourself unto the sword, and take it

and the scabbard with you'..... So King Arthur and Merlin alighted, tied their horses to two trees, and so they went into the barge. And when they came to the sword that the hand held, King Arthur took it up by the handles, and took it with him.....and so came to the land and rode forth. King Arthur looked upon the sword and liked it passing well. 'Whether liketh you better,' said Merlin, 'the sword or the scabbard?' 'Me liketh better the sword,' said King Arthur. 'Ye are more unwise,' said Merlin, 'for the scabbard is worth ten of the sword, *for while ye have the scabbard upon you ye shall lose no blood, be ye never so sore wounded, therefore keep well the scabbard always with you.*'" This strangely gifted bracelet was sent by Afonso Dalboquerque to the King of Portugal, but was lost on the voyage, with other unwonted evidences of his prowess, and rare trophies of Portuguese valour over the unknown races of the Eastern world.

After the incident of capturing a junk, on board of which was the King of Pacé, who was evidently making the best of his way to Malaca to warn the king of the propinquity of the hostile Armada, Malaca was reached, and negotiations were immediately commenced for the restitution of the Portuguese captives, and for satisfaction of the insult done to that nation by their detention; but this only resulted in the king temporising with Afonso Dalboquerque while he secretly made extensive preparations to withstand his demands. At this point the author of the *Commentaries* breaks off for the moment the thread of his narrative, and devotes a chapter to a historical digression upon the

site and foundation of the kingdom and city of Malaca, and another chapter to a description of the customs and government of the city. We may here, in like manner for the moment so far digress, as to glance at the impression made by Malaca, in its present phase of existence, upon the learned Mr. Wallace, in his most interesting work on the Malay Archipelago. Writing in 1869 the author says:—

“At present<sup>1</sup> a vessel over a hundred tons hardly ever enters its port, and the trade is entirely confined to a few petty products of the forests, and to the fruit which the trees planted by the old Portuguese now produce for the enjoyment of the inhabitants of Singapore. Although rather subject to fevers, it is not at present considered very unhealthy.

“The population of Malacca consists of several races. The ubiquitous Chinese are perhaps the most numerous, keeping up their manners, customs, and language; the indigenous Malays are next in point of numbers, and their language is the *Lingua-franca* of the place. Next come the descendants of the Portuguese—a mixed, degraded, and degenerate race, but who still keep up the use of their mother-tongue, though ruefully mutilated in grammar; and then there are the English rulers, and the descendants of the Dutch, who all speak English. The Portuguese spoken at Malacca is a useful philological phenomenon. The verbs have mostly lost their inflections, and one form does for all moods, tenses, numbers, and persons. *Eu vai* serves for ‘I go’, ‘I went’, or ‘I will go’. Adjectives, too, have been deprived of their feminine and plural terminations, so that the language is reduced to a marvellous simplicity, and, with the admixture of a few Malay words, becomes rather puzzling to one who has heard only the pure Lusitanian.

<sup>1</sup> Alfred R. Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago*. London, 8vo., 1869, pp. 41, 42.

"In costume, these several peoples are as varied as in their speech. The English preserve the tight-fitting coat, waistcoat, and trousers, and the abominable hat and cravat; the Portuguese patronise a light jacket, or, more frequently, shirt and trousers only; the Malays wear their national jacket and *sarong* (a kind of kilt), with loose drawers; while the Chinese never depart in the least from their national dress, which indeed it is impossible to improve for a tropical climate, whether as regards comfort or appearance. The loosely-hanging trousers, and neat, white half shirt half jacket, are exactly what a dress should be in this low latitude."

The testimony also of the gifted author of a recent work upon the Straits of Malacca may be here perused with advantage, for its characteristic touches upon the state of the settlement in 1875. Mr. J. Thomson says :—

"I paid a passing visit<sup>1</sup> to Malacca, but finding it neither an interesting nor a profitable field, I made but a short stay in the place. Malacca is a quaint, dreamy, Dutch-looking old town, where one may enjoy good fruit, and the fellowship and hospitality of the descendants of the early Portuguese and Dutch colonists.

"Should any warmhearted bachelor wish, he might furnish himself with a pretty and attractive looking wife from among the daughters of that sunny clime; but let him make no long stay there if indisposed to marry, unless he can defy the witchery of soft dark eyes, of raven tresses,

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<sup>1</sup> J. Thomson, F.R.G.S., *The Straits of Malacca, Indo-China, and China*. London, 1875, 8vo., pp. 52, 53. For further information upon Malacca and the adjacent countries and islands, the reader may consult with advantage the work by J. H. Moor, on *The Indian Archipelago*, Singapore, 1837, 4to.; Newbold, *British Settlements of Malacca*, 1839; Crawford, *Dictionary of the Indian Archipelago*.



and of sylph-like forms. It is a spot where leisure seems to sit at every man's doorway ; drowsy as the placid sea, and idle as the huge palms whose broad leaves nod above the old weather-beaten smug-looking houses. Here Nature comes laden at each recurring season with ripe and luscious fruits, dropping them from her lap into the very streets, and bestrewing the byeways with glorious bananas on which even the fat listless porkers in their wayside walks, will hardly deign to feed. It is withal a place where one might loiter away a life, dreamily, pleasantly, and uselessly. These are but passing impressions, and Malacca may yet, after all, develop into something in every way worthy of the straits which bear its name."

In this chapter also the author of the *Commentaries* has put on record some early and interesting information concerning the inhabitants of Lequea, or the Loo-choo Islands, who are there called Gores and maintained considerable trade with the Malay settlements in the peninsula. These islands have lately become somewhat prominent in Asiatic politics, in consequence of the disagreement between China and Japan, produced by the forcible seizure of them by the latter power.

The *Politische Correspondenz* gives an official review of the dispute between China and Japan regarding the Loo-choo Islands, in a letter from Shanghai dated July 18, 1879. It says :—

"The Japanese Government took possession with a military force of the Loo-Choo Islands last April, and transported its Governor, who called himself a King, and yearly paid tribute both to China<sup>1</sup> and Japan, to Yeddo. He

---

<sup>1</sup> With respect to the relations of the Loo-Choo Empire to China, it is proved from Chinese historical works that even in the earliest times, during the reigns of the Emperors of the dynasty

here received the rank and income of a Japanese Prince. At the same time he was replaced by a Japanese Governor, and the whole country placed under Japanese control; the paying of tribute to China was stopped, and the Chinese system of a calculation of time was replaced by the Japanese calendar.<sup>1</sup> All these changes were so well prepared, so quickly carried out, that they were only known after they had actually taken place, although at the time doubted. Everybody was curious to know what steps the Chinese would take in the matter.

"The little Loo-Choo Empire extends between 20 and 30 degrees of latitude, in a north-eastern direction, from the northern end of Formosa to the southern end of Japan. It is composed of over three hundred little islands, and divided into three large groups, called Tshung-shan, Shan-nan, and Shan-peï. This geographical arrangement is also the political arrangement, as the three groups form the three provinces of the Empire, which are again divided into thirty-five districts, and these into 378 parishes. The capital town, at the same time the former residence of the Prince, is Ewang, on the Tshung-shan. Of the number of the inhabitants nothing positive is known, but they are a peace-loving people, cultivating their land and carrying on cattle breeding. Their habits and dress are similar to those of the Chinese. They write in Chinese characters, but the common dialect is similar to the Japanese. Regarding the real history of the people nothing at all is known.

"The Loo-Choo Islands were the causes of continual

Han, the Princes of the Loo-Choo Islands paid their tribute to China. In the nineteenth year of the reign of the Emperor Kanghi (1681), the tribute to be sent was settled as follows:—12,600 catties of sulphur, 3,000 muschels, and 30,000 catties of copper. One cattie is 1 1-3lb. English.

<sup>1</sup> Since 1372 of the Christian calculation, the Chinese calendar has been in use on the Loo-Choo Islands, the years being named and numbered according to the Chinese Emperors.

quarrel between China and Japan in earlier times, the latter having repeatedly tried to annex this little island-empire. In the nineteenth year of the reign of the Emperor Wan-li (1592), a number of the inhabitants of the Loo-Choo islands were delegated to China to complain of Japan's attempts to annex the islands by force. These efforts, as well as others made in 1606, were frustrated. Yang-Tsung Ye, the Chinese Commander-in-Chief of the province Chekiang, brought (also in Wan-li's reign in 1613) the Prince of the Loo-Choo Islands, who governed then, and who had been forcibly carried off by the Japanese, back again into his kingdom.

"It is not to be doubted that, although the Chinese are able to prove historically a certain Suzerainty over the Loo-choo Islands, the Japanese can also do the same; in fact, both Empires have hitherto considered the Loo-Choo islands a state dependent on them; both the Emperors of China and of Japan style themselves Suzerain of the Loo-Choo Islands, and it will have to be proved which of the two is able to prove supremacy and to keep it.

"When the news of the seizing of the Loo-Choo islands by Japan reached Peking, great surprise and dissatisfaction was shown among the supporters of the Government. A few days earlier the new Japanese Ambassador at Peking had presented his credentials without taking advantage of the occasion to say a word. On Prince Kung and the Ministers of the Tsungli-Yamen appealing to him regarding the action of his Government, he replied that he was, with regard to this question, without any instructions whatever. The Japanese Government, in answer to the Chinese Ambassador's appeal at Yeddo, replied that they were ready to prove at any time their right to the Loo-Choo Islands, and that a giving up of them could never be thought of. Japan, who only would yield what she had taken by force of arms, to do which China has not the means, having neither money, an army, and, least of all, a fleet.

"From authentic quarters it is affirmed that Prince Kung conferred with ex-President Grant, who visited

Pekin lately, on this question. Prince Kung begged his intervention. General Grant may have given his word to introduce this subject in a private conversation, but not officially, as the General in his retired position would undoubtedly avoid even exercising a seeming influence on the politics of the present Government of the United States.

"In Pekin,<sup>1</sup> according to the latest news, the excitement seems to be on the increase; the Ministers of the Tsungli-Yamên speak of war between China and Japan, but they at the same time make it known that they will first call in the intervention of the Foreign Powers, hoping thus to attain restitution of their original position. But whether such an intervention, in case of hostilities really breaking

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<sup>1</sup> I have extracted this from the *Standard*, which, at the time, published the following remarks upon the situation of affairs:—"The cloud which arose six months ago between China and Japan, in consequence of the seizure by the latter of the Loo-choo Islands, has not yet cleared off. In fact, it may be said that, despite the hope prevailing among the European communities in the far East, it has grown thicker in the months that have elapsed since the Loo-Choo question first attracted attention. Nor does this afford any just ground for surprise. For centuries the Chinese have exercised rights over the Prince of those Islands; neither Japan nor any other Power has ever challenged them; but suddenly they discovered that the Mikado of Japan had taken possession of the islands, deposed the Ruler, and nominated a Governor of his own. He has since justified the seizure by asserting that the Loo-Choo Islands have always been tributary to the Prince of Satsuma, the great feudatory of Kinshin, who was finally overthrown in 1877. The Manchu dynasty has never been remarkable for its indifference, nor, indeed, has any of its predecessors upon the Throne of Pekin, to the rights which it has acquired; and the Japanese Government took this step at a moment when the Chinese had given signal proof not only of their determination not to abate one jot of their pretensions, but also of their ability to enforce them. It is true that months have passed since the tidings reached China that a Japanese garrison held Loo-Choo, and that a Japanese fleet was riding in the roadstead of Napa-

out, would be granted is difficult to predict. Anyhow, the attitude of China to England in the serious difficulties between China and Japan some years ago regarding Formosa is too fresh in people's memory not to be profitably used at the present time.

"The inhabitants of the Loo-Choo Islands are said to have sent a deputation to Peking to beg her direct help in their favour. The Japanese consuls in the Chinese ports have received orders by telegraph to seize the members of the deputations on their appearing and send them back to Japan. A Japanese corvette is now at Shanghai, and two other Japanese men-of-war are cruising about in Chinese waters. In case of this news being true, the deputation

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kiang without beholding a Chinese fleet and army being despatched to reassert the Imperial authority. But it is not in accordance with Chinese habits to be precipitate, even if the supposed efficiency of the Japanese fleet were not an additional incentive to caution. The latest official announcement is one fully in consonance with the train of thought of the official Chinese mind. A despatch has been sent to the Mikado informing him that, unless the Japanese forces are withdrawn, and Loo-Choo restored to its old state of semi-independence and double vassalage to China and Japan, within the space of three months, he must take the consequences. The Japanese are anxious to have the matter submitted to either a mixed Commission or to an arbitrator, knowing well that Europeans, and Englishmen in particular, have little sympathy with the claims China possesses, and periodically advances, over most of the States of Eastern Asia. The Tokio authorities perceive that, in the eyes of most foreigners, China's grievance with regard to Loo-Choo is sentimental, for the Peking Government does not demand the surrender of the islands. Far from that, it wishes to ensure their autonomy, only demanding the perpetuation of the nominal tie and of the fluctuating tribute which have constituted Loo-Choo in its eyes a portion of the Celestial Empire. There are deeper motives behind, and underneath all this talk about the past there is a very clear perception of the fact that the Loo-Choo question is one of practical importance."



may have succeeded in landing on some place on the coast, and making their way to Peking,<sup>1</sup> where, however, they have not yet arrived. Leaving aside the question of the right of possession, it is not to be denied that the Japanese have shown great skill and energy in carrying out their purpose, and an exact knowledge of Chinese affairs. China will be

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<sup>1</sup> "At Peking it is evident that the Japanese occupation of the Islands constitutes a grave danger to China. An insult of such a venial character to the Imperial dignity might be tolerated; but a menace to the nation must be grappled with, so that it shall not develope into an actual peril. It is on this point that something may, with advantage, be said at the present time, when various circumstances are calculated to put the Japanese view so prominently forward that the Chinese claims may be lost sight of. The gist of the difference lies in the question, why is the Japanese occupation of Loo-Choo dangerous to the peace of China. Between China and Japan there has been for centuries a rivalry, not very dissimilar to that which existed for a long time between France and England. The introduction of Western ideas, arts, and manufactures into the two countries, far from allaying the keenness of the rivalry, had rather the effect of embittering it. The very eagerness shown by the Japanese to acquire gun-boats and improved weapons was a grievance in the eyes of the conservative Chinese, for they felt that their neighbours would test their naval and military efficiency either upon them or against some of their outlying possessions. The example set by the Japanese proved contagious, however, and there is good reason for believing that the Celestials have now, mainly through the energy of the Viceroy Li-Hung-Chang, caught up with their progressive neighbour, so far as the purchase of men of war, rifles, and improved artillery can be said to constitute progress. For military purposes the two States may be admitted to be much on an equality, provided the numerous responsibilities of the Peking Government do not detract from its vigour at the critical moment. At the same time, the advantage of position undoubtedly lies with Japan, and this would enable her fleet to prosecute an offensive war on the exposed seaboard of China with very considerable effect. The occupation of Loo-Choo further improves that posi-

quite as incapable of taking the islands from Japan as she was in preventing her from seizing them. Even Japan may, after these first successful efforts, at no very distant time take steps to occupy Formosa, where new sources of wealth, exhausted in her own country, are to be found in rich abundance."

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tion, for the excellent harbour of Napakiang in its sheltered bay provides the Mikado's fleet with a station on the flank of the Eastern and Yellow Seas, within two days' steaming of the coasts of Fuhkien and Chekiang. But it has further advantages which have not been mentioned, and prominent among them must be held to be that the possession of the Loo-Choo Islands carries with it that of the little-known Madjicosemah group. This latter lies off the east coast of Formosa, and has enjoyed in the eyes of the neighbouring countries a semi-sacred reputation, not widely different to that held by the Hesperides in the mythology of ancient Greece. The two largest of the group are Pachuran and Typinsan; and the coast of Formosa is less than one hundred and fifty miles distant from the former. It thus appears that the apparently harmless act of the Japanese in deposing the king of Loo-Choo has resulted in their acquisition of two groups of islands, representing a tract of territory as large as England and Wales, and having a commanding position in waters which have always been considered to be Chinese. A glance at the map will suffice to show that the Mikado has now obtained possession of two admirable halting-places on the road to Formosa and the China coast. By the acquisition of Napakiang he has supplemented the value of his own western harbours, and there is no reason for supposing that Pachusan does not contain convenient bays and safe roadsteads. These facts should show that the Loo-Choo question is one not of sentiment alone to the Chinese, but of serious practical import. Unfamiliar as the names of these places may be to us they are well known in the history of China, and the Pekin rulers are aware that as they have in past times exercised considerable influence on the result of wars between China and Japan, it is quite probable that they would do so again in any future struggle.

"The hostile policy which Japan has always pursued towards

Negotiations with the King of Malaca having failed, Afonso Dalboquerque made extensive preparations for resorting to force, and, as a preliminary step, attracted to his side a merchant fleet of five Chinese junks, having a force on board which the King of Malaca was about

China, her intrigues in Corea, and expeditions to Formosa, have kept the vigilance of the Celestials constantly on the alert. Li-Hung-Chang now beholds the Mikado, strong in his new freedom and liberated from the dread of his arrogant Daimios, stretching out his hand to the north and to the south for the purpose of extending his influence and curtailing that of China. Within the last few months Japan has committed two acts which will further incense her rival. The one is the occupation of the Loo-Choo and Madjicosemah Islands, which brings her close to Formosa, the Chinese Ireland, and the other is the signature of a Treaty with the King of Corea, which gives Japanese subjects special privileges in that country. The Mikado has thus not restricted his aggressive policy to the sea. His alliance with the ruler of the peninsula of Corea gives him a foothold on the mainland, which acquires special significance from the remembrance of the siege of Nankin and triumphs on the Yangtse by the Japanese in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These considerations, and others of a similar kind, make it very improbable that the Chinese will acquiesce in the most recent achievement brought about by the aggressive policy of Japan. To them it will appear to be a bad policy to show weakness with regard to Loo-Choo. The Japanese are the aggressors. They have no sufficient excuse for their seizure of this group, and they have for years followed a systematic policy which would, if China continued as indifferent as she is now counselled by some of her friends to remain, lead to the loss of every island she possesses beyond the immediate vicinity of her shores. If Sir Thomas Wade, or some other leading authority on the spot, cannot induce the Japanese to withdraw, the Chinese will, beyond all question, take the matter into their own hands, and at the fitting moment endeavour to expel the Japanese from the islands which they have seized."



to employ in military operations against the King of Daru or Aru,<sup>1</sup> a state on the coast of Sumatra, nearly opposite the port of Malaca, with which he was at war.

On the feast day of St. James the Greater the storming of the bridge or pier was made, under circumstances narrated in the text, and a great part of the city fired. These operations, although they did not result immediately in the fall of the city, severely harrassed the enemy, and crippled his resources. The author of *Malaca Conquistada* records the subsequent attack upon and destruction of the city by fire in these stanzas.

“Em tanto das janellas, e terrados,  
Que para aquella parte respondião,  
Mil frechas, mil pelouros desmandados  
Sobre a gente Christã mortes chovião :  
Mas, chamando Albuquerque aos esforçados  
Lima e Caldeira, áquelles que região,  
Lhes mandou que de fogo as mãos armassem,  
E que as vizinhas casas abrasassem.

“Manda tambem o Malavar valente  
Que com os seus adustos tiradores  
Impida o assomarse a imiga gente  
Ás partes, que lhe ficão superiores.  
Da empreza o forte barbaro contente  
Os seus incita a bellicos furores :  
Mil, e mil frechas logo os ares calão,  
Troços de breados cabos fogo exhalão.

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<sup>1</sup> The initial “D” here, as in *Dupe* lower down, is plainly only the Portuguese preposition *de* in combination. The place appears as *Daru* in the Portolano of Fernão Vaz Dourado, and as *Aru* in the map given by the Dutch translator of João de Barros.

“Dão ao mandato effeito : pega o fogo  
Na disposta materia : com tremenda  
Furia vibrantes pontas sobem logo  
Aos ares, e de fumo nuvem horrenda :  
Grita a misera gente ; porém rogo  
Não admitte a voraz chamma, contenda  
Com as nuvens horrisona travando,  
As esféras mais altas ameaçando.

“Eolo neste ponto desatava  
Da formosa Orithia o bravo amante,  
Com que o incendio cruel mais se esforçava,  
Com horrivel estrondo crepitante.  
Contra o fogo remedios mil buscava  
A Pagã gente, mas nenhum bastante,  
Que c'o vento de casa em casa prende,  
E, consumindo aqui, já lá se accende.

“Edificio, em grandeza, e valor raro,  
Sobre secretas rodas se movia,  
Finge a materia o marmore de Paro  
Illustre c'o metal, que Arabia cria.  
Nelle, se lhe não fora o fado avaro,  
Da Infante as bodas celebrar queria  
O Rei, e com alegre variedade  
Carro triunfante dar vista á cidade.

“Á nupcial casa, de delicias chêa,  
Tambem se atreve o vingativo lume,  
E na materia rica assi se atêa,  
Que em leve fumo, e cinza em fim a resume :  
Della a mesquita, onde com torpe e fêa  
Adoração, e barbaro costume,  
Ao vil Mafoma hourava a gente cega,  
A flamma ardente em consumir se emprega.

“Á mesquita esquadrão confuso acode,  
E procura atalhar o fogo. Em tanto  
Vendo o prudente Affonso que não pode  
Cansada a gente com trabalho tanto ;

Porque o intento ao possível se accomode;  
 Em quanto o incendio dura, e crece o pranto,  
 A artilharia embarcar manda ganhada,  
 E a que em terra ficou deixa encravada.

“O esquadrão militar logo começa  
 A ir, e vir, despojos embarcando,  
 Como no estio com fervente pressa  
 Multidão de formigas, saqueando  
 De trigo as eiras, montes atravessa  
 Por entre ervas, e espiuhos, sustentando  
 Na boca o grão pezado, até encerrallo,  
 E na estreita caveira enthesourallo.

“As barbaras catervas offendidas,  
 Quando tanto despojo embarcar virão ;  
 A dar e receber novas feridas  
 Bramando vingativos acodirão.  
 Torna de novo a morte a troncar vidas :  
 Aqui appellidão Marte, alli suspirão ;  
 Em fim effeitos crus de dura guerra  
 No mar ostentão, porém mais na terra.

“Rios correm do sangue derramado ;  
 Que, nas ondas entrando, em sanguinosa  
 Mudão a cor cerúlea : de ira armado  
 Se vê o mesmo furor, vista espantosa !  
 Mas já fina dava ao dia o Sol dourado  
 Do grande Oceano visitando a esposa :  
 Torna-se ás naus a baptizada gente ;  
 A Agarena o elemento apaga ardente.”

Liv. ix, st. 134-143.

The Javanese headman, Utemutaraja, who administered the suburban district of Upe or Dupe,<sup>1</sup> made overtures of service, and for the time, but not without showing suspicions, which were afterwards verified,

<sup>1</sup> See p. xxii.

Afonso Dalboquerque accepted his services. In the end, probably out of political necessity quite as much as proved guilt, this prince was convicted of treachery, and executed with his son and son-in-law, as an effectual means of restoring quiet in, and manifesting the Portuguese power over, the city. The Chinese, who had come for trading purposes in their junks, seized this opportunity of renewing their request for permission to depart on the prosecution of their voyage to Siam, and the Portuguese commander gladly availed himself of the occasion to send Duarte Fernandez as ambassador to Siam in their company.

After a characteristic speech, setting forth the Imperial policy of the Portuguese king, Afonso Dalboquerque again pushed forward in full strength, assaulted the bridge, and made good his position upon it. From that hour the fate of Malaca was sealed, and soon fell an easy prey into the hands of the commander, who thus captured in a city extending three miles along the shore, and of great depth inland, an incredible amount of plunder and three thousand pieces of artillery, and added to Portugal a territory considerably larger than the mother kingdom. But the King of Malaca, although in full flight, was yet in hopes of rescuing his patrimony from the foreign invader, and dispatched his own uncle, Tuão Nacem Mudaliar, to the King of China, an empire at that period in close alliance with the Malay king, to beg for assistance. Tuão Nacem made his way to Canton, and from that port was conveyed, according to custom, to Pekin; but the King of China, who had heard

of the friendly treatment accorded by Afonso Dalboquerque (for this very political object) to the Chinese merchants at Malaca, was unwilling to act, and Tuão Nacem Mudaliar, partly out of chagrin for the failure of his mission, and partly dispirited at the untimely death of his wife, did not live to convey the news of his repulse by the Chinese court to his royal nephew, but died on the return journey at Yang-chow-fu or Yang-cheu-fu, near Nanking.<sup>1</sup>

A manuscript Report, in which is embodied a succinct historical relation of the principal European embassies to China, now preserved among the Wellesley papers in the MS. department of the British Museum, very justly attributes to Afonso Dalboquerque the design of establishing friendly relations with the Chinese empire. This design was probably suggested to him in the first place by the intercourse he had with the Chinese merchant junks in the port of Malaca at the time of the siege. The following passage describes briefly the first dealings of Portugal and China :—

“Alphonso Albuquerque (from whose wise administration, while Viceroy in the East Indies, Portugal derived such advantages) formed the design of opening a communication with China, though he did not live to see it attempted. In consequence of intelligence sent by him to the Court of Portugal, a squadron sailed from Lisbon, in 1518, to convoy an Ambassador to China. The Abbé Raynal's account of this Embassy is as follows :—

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<sup>1</sup> Yang-cheu-fu, in Kiang-su, 32 deg. 26.32 min. N., 117 deg. 4.13 min. E., was, in 1277, under the Mongols, a *lu*, or chief town of a district. Marco Polo is said to have been governor of this town for three years. He cites it under the name of Yanju. But see Col. Yule's *Marco Polo*, ii, 138, etc.

“As soon as the squadron arrived at the islands in the neighbourhood of Canton, it was surrounded by Chinese vessels, who came to reconnoitre it. Ferdinand Andrada, who commanded it, did not put himself in any posture of defence, he suffered the Chinese to come on board, communicated the object of his voyage to the Mandarins that presided at Canton, and sent his ambassador on shore, who was conducted to Pekin.

“Whatever may have been the state of China when the Portuguese landed there, as they had no other object in view than to draw riches from thence and to propagate their religion, had they found the best kind of government established in this country, they would not have profited by it. Thomas Perez, their Ambassador, found the Court of Pekin disposed to favour his nation, the fame of which had spread itself throughout Asia. It had already attracted the esteem of the Chinese, which the conduct of Ferdinand Andrada, who commanded the Portuguese squadron, tended still further to increase. He visited all the coasts of China, and traded with the natives. When he was on the point of departure, he issued a proclamation in the ports he had put into, that if any one had been injured by a Portuguese, and would make it known, he should recover satisfaction. The ports of China were now upon the point of being opened to them. Thomas Perez was just about concluding a Treaty, when Simon Andrada, brother to Ferdinand, appeared on the coast with a fresh squadron. This commander treated the Chinese in the same manner as the Portuguese had for some time treated all the people of Asia. He built a fort, without permission, on the island of Taman, from whence he took opportunities of pillaging and extorting money from all the ships bound from or to the ports of China. He carried off young girls from the coast, he seized upon the Chinese, and made slaves of them; he gave himself up to the most licentious acts of piracy, and the most shameful dissoluteness. The sailors and soldiers under his command followed his example. The Chinese, enraged



at these outrages, fitted out a large fleet; the Portuguese defended themselves courageously, and escaped by making their way through the enemy's fleet. The Emperor imprisoned Thomas Perez, who died in confinement, and the Portuguese nation was banished from China for some years. After this the Chinese relaxed, and gave permission to the Portuguese to trade at the port of Sancian, to which place they brought gold from Africa, spices from the Molucca Islands, and from Ceylon elephants' teeth, and some precious stones. In return they took silks of every kind, china, gums, medicinal herbs, and tea, which has since become so necessary a commodity to the northern nations of Europe.

"The Portuguese contented themselves with the huts and factories they had at Sancian, and the liberty granted to their trade by the Chinese Government, till an opportunity offered of establishing themselves upon a footing more solid and less dependant upon the Mandarins, who had the command of the coast.

"A pirate named Tchang-si-lao, whose successes had made him powerful, had seized upon the Island of Macao, from whence he blocked up the ports of China, and even proceeded so far as to lay siege to Canton. The neighbouring Mandarins had recourse to the Portuguese, who had ships in the harbour of Sancian; they hastened to the relief of Canton, raised the siege, and obtained a complete victory over the pirate, whom they pursued as far as Macao, where he slew himself.

"The Emperor of China, informed of the service the Portuguese had rendered him on this occasion, bestowed Macao upon them, as a mark of his gratitude. They received this grant with joy, and built a town which became very flourishing, and was advantageously situated for the trade they soon after entered into with Japan.

"The author of *L'Idée Générale de la Chine*, published at Paris in 1780, adds to his account of this transaction (which agrees with the above) that the behaviour of the



Portuguese ambassador confirmed the Chinese in their aversion to foreigners,<sup>1</sup> against whom they had always shut their empire. And speaking of the Emperor's edict permitting the Portuguese to settle at Macao, he says, 'but the restrictions with which the Chinese accompanied this favour, and the manner of forming the settlement, as well as the shackles imposed on the liberty of the Portuguese, give to Macao rather the appearance of a place besieged than of a free commercial city'.<sup>2</sup>

The Viceroy of Canton has just lately expressed himself in cordial terms towards the Portuguese nation, and expressed the necessity of drawing still closer the relations between China and Portugal, which was the first of the European nations to possess commercial establishments in China.

The construction of a powerful, in fact to the Malays an impregnable fortress in the heart of their capital was a natural consequence of the Portuguese victory. The bird's-eye view of this fortress, which has been reproduced for this volume from Corréa's invaluable *Lendas da India*, and the plan of the same, also reproduced for this volume from the equally precious manuscript of Pedro Barretto de Resende's *Livro do Estado da India Oriental* (by kind permission of the trustees of the British Museum), show sufficiently the imposing nature of this stronghold. Next in importance to the

<sup>1</sup> This author adds in a note—"Ammian Marcellin qui écrivait dans le quatrième siècle de notre ère, parle de cet éloignement des Chinois pour les étrangers."

<sup>2</sup> Add. MS., 13,875, fo. 24: "Report of Embassies to China, presented to the British Museum by the Representatives of the Marquess Wellesley."

fortress were reconstructive measures of the victors, as for example the rearrangement of the currency upon a more scientific basis, and the repression of sedition with that iron hand, for which some historians and biographers have been so unnecessarily severe upon Afonso Dalboquerque. Before we condemn this prominent trait in the character of the Portuguese commander we must take into consideration the somewhat ungentle spirit of the age in which he lived, the brutalities practised by Asiatics upon such unfortunate Europeans as fell into their hands, and the absolute necessity that a comparatively small band of men were under to repress unsparingly any and every measure likely to injure their tenure of a territory so far from the natural basis of their operations. Viewed in this light, the execution of Utemutaraja, and the carrying out of the sentence passed upon Ruy Diaz, were measures calculated to procure the security of the whole body, rather than instances of supreme gratification of personal antipathy towards the sufferers.

The incidents of the dispatch of Duarte Fernandez to the court of Siam with specific instructions—an event which helped greatly to elevate the position of Portuguese politics in the east of Asia—the subsequent mission of Antonio de Miranda de Azevedo to the same country, the interchange of presents and friendly compliments, similar courtesies exchanged with the kings of Campar and Java, and the sending forth of a party to explore the Moluccas, then known as the Clove Islands or Mace-apple (*i.e.*, nutmeg) Islands, combine to elevate in a considerable degree the career

of Afonso Dalboquerque from that of a vulgar free-booter or licensed adventurer (as some will have him to be) to that of an earnest and scientific pioneer, anxious that his nation, his own followers, and himself also should—

“αἰέν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ἔξοχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων.”

After detailing the arrangement made by Afonso Dalboquerque for the government of the newly-conquered territory, the author of the *Commentaries* introduces an interesting ORATION, delivered by the illustrious Roman orator, Camillo Portio, before Pope Leo X. This oration, although it introduces notices of some events beyond the scope of the *Commentaries*, is of value, as showing the way in which the Papal court, and probably all Christendom, viewed with admiration and emulation the marvellously rapid successes which had fallen to the arms of Portugal in her dealing with the infidel nations of the East.

The remaining portion of the present volume reverts to India and Goa, and the events which had transpired during the absence of Afonso Dalboquerque in the Malay expedition. Milrrhau or Merlao, the duly appointed Governor of Goa, was conducting the affairs of the city peaceably, when Pulatecão, in command of a force mustered by the Hidalcão, came down from the inland territory of that prince, and took up a strong position in Benastarim, or Benestarij,<sup>1</sup> a fortress on

<sup>1</sup> The variation in the orthography of this fortress is interesting, and shows the peculiar proclivity of the Portuguese language for a nasal sound at the termination of words. Many of the names of persons and places which occur in the text of the *Commentaries*,

the mainland due west of the Island of Goa ; but in so disposing his forces he appears to have exceeded the instructions which he had received from the Hidalcão. This prince therefore appointed Roçalcão, called by some historians Rasul Khan, to supersede Pulatecão (or Fulad Khan), and by means of the Portuguese under Diogo Mendez de Vasconcelos (who had been liberated by the people to succeed Rodrigo Rabelo as Captain of Goa, when that officer fell in a skirmish with the Turks, in preference to Francisco Pantoja, to whom the succession rightly belonged), Roçalcão got possession of the fortress of Benestarim, and immediately disconcerted the little garrison of Goa, by making a formal demand for the surrender of the city.

While these events were transpiring, Afonso Dalboquerque had set sail from Malaca in the *Flor de la Mar*, but suffered shipwreck off the dangerous coast of Sumatra, and only reached Cochim with great difficulty some time in the month of January 1512. This disaster was felt all the more keenly by the Viceroy because he afterwards learned that had he visited the Maldivé Islands,<sup>1</sup> according to his original intentions during this voyage, he would have fallen in with Mafamede Maçari, the merchant of Cairo—an enemy with whom he was particularly anxious to measure

terminate in -ij, and it is probable that they were all pronounced with a nasal sound at the end of the word. Hence we find Pangim or Pangij, and Augim or Augij ; just as in the ordinary language, *assi*, *perú*, *mui*, and other words have a nasal, not written, but always pronounced at the end.

<sup>1</sup> Pedro Barretto de Resende gives a plan of the Portuguese fortress on one of these islands.

his strength. This man was the chief upholder of the policy of bringing over the Rumes to assist the Çamorim in driving the Portuguese out of Malabar. He however feared that Afonso Dalboquerque would get him into his power, so he fled from Calicut (when the break in the blockade happened by the recall of Manuel de Lacerda to the assistance of Goa against Pulatecão) towards the Straits, but was caught in a storm and wrecked at the Cape of Guardafum, and thence made his way, carrying with him Simão Rangel (who had been captured on his voyage from Cochim to Goa) into slavery to Candaluz, in the Maldives, where he imagined himself safe, and out of the possibility of capture by the Portuguese cruisers, who had hitherto kept to more northerly latitudes.

The welcome arrival of the fleet with the great commander on board gave the signal for heartfelt rejoicing throughout the Portuguese settlements of India, and from January to August 1512, Afonso Dalboquerque busied himself with the expedition of necessary business which had no doubt accumulated in his absence during the past year. But fate had not ceased to "weave the crimson web of war" for Afonso Dalboquerque; the relief of Goa was the uppermost feeling in his heart, and he hailed with the greatest satisfaction and delight the arrival of two annual fleets sent out from the mother kingdom in 1511 and 1512 respectively, for the reinforcement of the Indian colonies. These fleets, the one commanded by Dom Garcia, or Gracia, de Noronha, his nephew; the other by Jorge de Mello Pereira and Gracia de Sousa, added no less

than seventeen ships of war, with their men and stores, to the sadly diminished number of serviceable vessels and fighting men at the disposal of the Viceroy. But the joy he experienced at receiving these welcome reinforcements was quickly dispelled by the orders sent out to him from the king of Portugal for discussing the question of retaining or abandoning the possession of Goa.

Afonso Dalboquerque very prudently abstained from mentioning this matter until he had re-established the liberty of the city by the operations which led to the recovery of the dominating fortress of Benastarim, for he doubtless felt that had he divulged the king's orders to his captains and officers before they had driven the Turks into the interior, the movements in aid of the besieged city and island would have been carried out without heartiness and spirit, or perhaps even neglected and refused. But when the fortress had yielded to the Portuguese, the spirits of the populace raised by the dispersion of the enemy, and the martial feelings of the army elated by the easy victory, then it was that the commander felt that a fitting opportunity at length had arrived when, although he could no longer with propriety withhold the contents of the Royal dispatch, the general consensus of opinion would lean towards that course which he so ardently desired to carry out.

The surrender of Benastarim was accomplished with practically little trouble, for Roçalcão seems to have been, after all, but half-hearted in the task of its defence. He appears, however, to have tried as far as



he could to shield the Portuguese renegade deserters from a fate which he probably knew only too well would overtake them if they fell into the power of their irate master; but the excuse which he made, that it was contrary to the law of his country and the principles of his religion<sup>1</sup> to give them up, availed nothing with Afonso Dalboquerque, whose ferocity (particularly if all that Castanheda and Correa state be true) towards the ill-fated wretches can hardly be paralleled with any other relation out of the whole range of history.

The settlement of Fernão Lopez, the ringleader of these renegades, upon the uninhabited Island of Saint Helena, is of great interest to the political geographer. Correa, whose phrases seem to indicate that he commiserated the unfortunate man, says of him: "Fernão Lopez<sup>2</sup> managed to get on board a Portuguese vessel homeward bound, for he had left his wife and children in Lisbon, but the ship stopped at the Island of St. Helena to take in water, and there this Fernão Lopez remained in hiding, and when he was found missing out of the ship the crew set out and searched for him, but they could not find him, so they left him a barrel of biscuit and some pieces of hung beef, and dried fish, and salt, and a fire and some old clothes, which

<sup>1</sup> See MS., Sloan. 1820, a closely written folio work, seventeenth or eighteenth century, in Portuguese, apparently unpublished, entitled "A Seita dos Indios Orientais, e principalmente dos Malavares", in eight books, treating of the history and mythology of the religious sects, manners, and customs, of the people inhabiting Malabar.

<sup>2</sup> See the extract on pp. 240-242 for the Portuguese text.



each one contributed; and when the vessel set sail, they left a letter for him, that in case of any ship putting in there he was to make signs to show whether he were alive or dead, and shew himself in order that they might supply him with whatever he required. Then the vessel set sail, and Fernão Lopez, seeing the ship had left, went out of the wood and took possession of the things which he found left for him, and kept up the fire so that it should not go out, and set to work to find stones which he beat one against another, and he saw that they struck fire and he kept them. Thus, with the four fingers of his left hand, and with the stump of his right hand which had been cut off, as God helped him in his great mercy, he dug a hollow in a bank wherein he made a small grotto, and enlarged it within, where he lived in retreat and used to sleep, and he filled up the mouth of the grotto with prickly bushes. He found tender herbs which were savoury to eat, and he boiled them with salt in two saucepans which they had left for him. And while he was living in this way during the next year a ship touched at the island, and when he saw the ship he hid himself.

“The crew of the ship, going on shore, when they saw the grotto and a straw bed whereon he slept, and the bags, and the staves of the barrel which had been left with biscuit for him, and the saucepans, and coals for the fire, were amazed, for they thought that some negroes were living there in hiding from another ship, but when they beheld the clothing they agreed that it was a Portuguese man. So they took in their water,

and did not meddle with anything, but, on the contrary, left him biscuits, and cheeses, and things to eat, and a letter bidding him not to hide himself, but when any ship should touch there he should speak with it, for no one would harm him. And the ship set sail, and, in spreading her sails, there fell overboard a cock, which the waves carried to the shore, and Fernão Lopez caught it and fed it upon some rice which they had left behind for him, so that the cock became on such loving terms with him that it followed him wherever he went, and at night it roosted with him in the hole. This cock remained with this man for many years, it would come at his call, for, as time went on, this man used to show himself and converse with the people of the ships which passed by, and all gave him things to plant and to sow, so that he cultivated a great many gourds, pomegranates, and palm trees, and kept ducks, hens, sows, and she-goats with young, all of which increased largely, and all became wild in the wood.

“This man lived for many years alone in this island, leading this remarkable life, and when it was related to the king he was very desirous of seeing him, for they said that he was like a wild man; therefore, the king sent word to beg him of his own accord to come to Portugal. This he did, and he went and secretly disembarked in the house of the captain of the ship, and thence went by night to converse with the king and the queen, who gave him a hermitage and houses of friars wherein he might remain; but he would accept nought of this, but obtained permission of the

king and went to Rome, and confessed himself to the Pope, who was pleased to see him, and gave him letters to the king that he would send him back again to the island. This likewise the king performed. This man stayed on this island for upwards of ten years without any one ever seeing him, for he used to hide himself.

“In this island there lived a fugitive Javanese youth, who also stayed with him many years. This youth was the one who revealed him to a ship which touched there. For the captain, Pero Gomez Teixeira, who had been Auditor-General in India, threatened the black man so much that he went and pointed out the place where Fernão Lopez was hidden. And when he found that he was taken he made loud outcries, thinking that they were going to take him on board. But Pero Gomez consoled him, and talked for a long time with him, and assured him that he would not carry him away, and gave him many things, although he did not care for them, but very earnestly besought him to take the youth with him in the ship. Pero Gomez, therefore, took him on receiving a promise from Fernão Lopez that he would not hide himself from the crews. And when this had been agreed to, Pero Gomez left with him a paper, signed and sealed, wherein he desired all captains who might touch there of their kindness not to use any force in desiring to carry him to Portugal against his will, for it was from fear of this that Fernão Lopez used in by-gone times to hide himself. Therefore, he gave him a safeguard in the king's name, and swore to it, that no one

should carry him away from the island against his will. And then Fernão Lopez felt assured, so that he used no longer to hide himself, and spoke with all comers, and gave them of the produce of the island, which yielded in great abundance. And in the island he died, after living there for a long time, which was in the year 1546."

The blockade of Calicut, which was commenced anew by D. Garcia de Noronha; the mission of Diogo Fernandez, Adail of Goa, with the returning ambassador of the Hidalcão, to arrange the terms of peace; the dispatch of the Cambayan ambassador, in whose company Tristão Déga went to demand leave to erect a fortress in Diu; the dispatch of a messenger from Miliquiaz of Diú; the mission of Gaspar Chanoca to Narsinga; the reception of an ambassador with presents from the king of Vengapor, an inland territory bordering on the kingdom of the Zabaim; an interview of a fruitless nature with Roçalcão; and other similar business, naturally occupied Afonso Dalboquerque for some time after his return to Goa. But an event occurred about this period to which he devoted considerable interest, and attached great importance. This was the arrival of an envoy, named Mateus or Matthew, the brother of the Patriarch of Abyssinia, from the little known and mysterious kingdom of Prester John, with a present of a piece of the Wood of the True Cross from the Warden of the Franciscan Friars of Mount Sion, Jerusalem, to the king of Portugal, and an offer of alliance by marriage of the children

of the Prester John with the Royal Princes of the kingdom.

Afonso Dalboquerque forwarded this ambassador and his sacred present with great *éclat* to the king of Portugal, but in the eyes of many of the Portuguese Mateus was looked upon as an impostor whom the Viceroy favoured for his own glorification. The king treated him with honour, and sent him back in 1520 with D. Rodrigo de Lima, a Portuguese ambassador, but Mateus died on the way at Bisam,<sup>1</sup> on the 23rd of May, 1520, and D. Rodrigo prosecuted his journey, a relation of which,<sup>2</sup> by Father Francisco Alvarez, translated from the Portuguese and edited by the accomplished Portuguese scholar Lord Stanley of Alderley, is now being published by the Hakluyt Society. Students of Portuguese history, who are already under a debt of gratitude to the noble translator of Vasco da

<sup>1</sup> According to the work mentioned in the next note ; but from the *Commentaries*, p. 254, he appears to have died at Maçua, or Massowah, an important city on the African side of the Red Sea ; cf.

“ . . . . . e as melhores  
Povoações que a parte Africa tem,  
Maçua são, Arquico, e Suanquem.”—*Cam. Lus.*, x, 97.

Mateus, the ambassador, appears to have been of an irritable disposition, and this was perhaps the cause of the dislike shewn to him by the Portuguese with whom he came into contact.

<sup>2</sup> The title of this rare book, a fine specimen of early Portuguese typography, is : “Ho Preste Joam das Indias. Verdadera informaçam das terras do Preste Joam, segundo vio e escreveo ho padre Francisco Alvarez Capellã del Rey nosso senhor. Agora nouamête impresso por mandado do dito senhor em casa de Luis Rodriguez liureiro de sua alteza.” The colophon states that the book was printed in 1540.

Gama from Correa's *Lendas da India*, will look forward to the appearance of this narrative of the Portuguese embassy to Abyssinia in 1520 with the greatest interest.

After making disposition for the projected fortress in Calicut, if the Çamorim should really grant the site—a fact which Afonso Dalboquerque seems to have despaired of at last—an assembly of the principal Portuguese personages was held, and the King's articles read. The debate which ensued resulted in the determination to hold Goa at all hazard; and the letter which Afonso Dalboquerque addressed to the King, a characteristic specimen of the fearlessness of the great commander,<sup>1</sup> concludes this volume.

The portrait of Dom Vasco da Gama, which is placed as a frontispiece to this volume, and that of Diogo Lopez de Sequeira, which is set to face page 254, are derived from the MS. of Pedro Barretto de Resende, in the Sloane Library of MSS. at the British Museum. They have been reproduced by the autotype process, with permission of the Trustees of the British Museum, to whom the thanks of the Hakluyt Society are due for this favour.

The interesting plan of Malaca fortress and settlement comes from the same MS. The map of the

<sup>1</sup> The phrase, "*e não me tome cada anno conta do que faço como a Almozarife*", in Afonso Dalboquerque's letter, seems clearly to point to a certain necessity on the part of those who have had to govern India for occasional use of large sums of money for secret political objects. The history of Warren Hastings and Lord Clive in later centuries afford examples of the disasters attendant upon this necessity.



Malay peninsula has been reproduced in a reduced form with great care from a chart contained in a most valuable Portolano executed by the Portuguese hydrographer, Diego Homem, in 1558. This MS. is preserved among the additional MSS. in the British Museum. (*Add. MSS.*, 5415 A.) For the permission to trace these, I desire to record my thanks to Mr. E. M. Thompson, F.S.A., keeper of the manuscripts in the British Museum. The bird's-eye view of Malaca has been reduced by photo-lithography from the frequently cited *Lendas da India*, a work of very great value for collation with other historical narratives of the Early History of Portuguese India.

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
## CHRONOLOGY OF PART III.

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PAGE	A.D.
1. Afonso Dalboquerque assaults Goa . . .	25 Nov. 1510
1. [Sails for the Straits . . . . .]	Feb. 1511]
207. [Dom Garcia de Noronha sails with six ships from Portugal . . . . .]	25 March and 8 April 1511]
101. Afonso Dalboquerque assaults Malaca on St. James's Day . . . . .]	[25 July 1511]
207. [Builds the fortress of Malaca . . . . .]	August 1511]
164. Antonio Dabreu sails to explore the Moluccas During November [1511]	
195. [Afonso Dalboquerque, shipwrecked on the voy- age from Malaca to India, reaches Cochim During January 1512]	
195. [Dom Garcia de Noronha reaches Moçambique Beginning of February 1512]	
208. [Jorge de Mello Pereira sails with twelve ships from Portugal . . . . .]	25 March 1512]
208. [João Chanoca sails for Portugal . . . . .]	13 July 1512]
207. Arrival of the Fleets of D. Garcia D. Noronha, and Jorge de Mello at Cochim . . . . .]	20 Aug. 1512]
210. Afonso Dalboquerque sails from Cochim for Goa 10 Sept. 1512	

208. [The Fortress of Calicut built by the Portuguese  
During the Year 1512]
255. Dom Garcia de Noronha blockades Calicut  
During Jan. [1513]
256. But rejoins Afonso Dalboquerque at Goa 10 Feb. [1513]
172. Oration of Camillo Portio before Leo X During Oct. 1513
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COMMENTARIES  
OF THE  
GREAT AFONSO DALBOQUERQUE.




COMMENTARIES  
OF THE GREAT  
AFONSO  
DALBOQUERQUE,  
WHO WAS  
CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE EAST INDIES  
IN THE TIME OF THE VERY POWERFUL  
KING D. MANUEL,  
THE FIRST OF THIS NAME.

*PART III.*

LISBON:  
IN THE ROYAL PRINTING OFFICE,  
ANNO MDCCLXXIV;

*With Licence of the Royal Board of Censors, and Royal Privilege.*





# TITLES

OF THE

## CHAPTERS CONTAINED IN THIS THIRD PART.

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WHEREIN IS CONTAINED AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT THE GREAT AFONSO  
DALBOQUERQUE PERFORMED IN THE CONQUEST OF THE KING-  
DOM OF GOA FOR THE SECOND TIME, AND OF THE KING-  
DOM OF MALACA: AND ALL THE REST THAT HE DID  
UNTIL HIS DEPARTURE TO THE STRAITS.

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### CHAPTER I.

How, after his fleet was ready, he set out for the harbour of  
Cananor: and what passed with the King of Garçopa and  
Timoja concerning the entry of the river of Goa . . . 1

### CHAPTER II.

Of the council which the great Afonso Dalboquerque held with  
the captains concerning the attacking of the city, and the  
remainder of the events connected therewith . . . 6

### CHAPTER III.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque attacked the city of Goa, and  
took it by force of arms, when some of our side were killed ;  
and of the great havoc that was made of the Moors . . . 9

### CHAPTER IV.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque gave the soldiers permission  
to sack the city: and, of the crucifix which was found in  
some old walls from which stone was taken for the fortress:  
and of the miracle which Our Lord performed for our side  
on the day of the battle . . . 15

## CHAPTER V.

How the Nequibares sent to request a safe conduct from Afonso Dalboquerque, in order that they might come and live at Goa; and how our forces put to rout Meliqueaye, the captain of the Hidalcão . . . . . 21

## CHAPTER VI.

How Merlao came to Goa, and the Nequibares desired Afonso Dalboquerque to give him to them for their governor, and what took place thereupon; and how he ordered Diogo Fernandez de Béja to destroy the fortress of Çacotorá . . . . . 25

## CHAPTER VII.

Of the ambassadors whom the Çamorim, after the fall of Goa, sent to the great Afonso Dalboquerque, desiring peace with him; and how Simão Rangel was sent upon this business, and what passed concerning it . . . . . 30

## CHAPTER VIII.

How the King of Narsinga sent his ambassadors to visit Afonso Dalboquerque concerning the capture of Goa; and of the news which Fr. Luiz communicated to him, and what passed thereafter . . . . . 35

## CHAPTER IX.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque set in order certain matters in the city, and established a Mint there, and of what followed . . . . . 39

## CHAPTER X.

Of the proceedings of the Bendará, Governor of Malaca, when he heard that Goa had been taken, and of the news which Ruy de Araujo, who was in captivity there, wrote to the great Afonso Dalboquerque . . . . . 44

## CHAPTER XI.

How the Captains of the Fleet of Diogo Mendez requested him to set out for Malaca; and of what passed with them, and how he begged Afonso Dalboquerque to grant him permission to go; and of the reasons wherefore it was not granted . . . . . 48

## CHAPTER XII.

How Diogo Mendez, by the advice of his captains, hoisted sail to pass over the bar, and the great Afonso Dalboquerque sent after him, and they made him turn back, and the rest which took place . . . . . 51

## CHAPTER XIII.

- How the great Afonso Dalboquerque set sail for the Straits of Méca with his fleet, and finding he could not cross the shoals of Padua, stood off Goa and made his way direct to Malaca . 55

## CHAPTER XIV.

- How the great Afonso Dalboquerque set sail from Cochim, and made his way direct to Malaca, and of what passed thereupon 57

## CHAPTER XV.

- How the great Afonso Dalboquerque set sail from the port of Pacé, and at sea he sighted a sailing vessel which was carrying the Moor who was flying from him, and how he sent after the vessel, and what further took place . . . 60

## CHAPTER XVI.

- How the great Afonso Dalboquerque reached the port of Malaca, and the king sent immediately to visit him, and the rest that took place . . . 66

## CHAPTER XVII.

- Of the site and foundation of the kingdom and city of Malaca . 71

## CHAPTER XVIII.

- Of the customs and government of the city of Malaca . . 84

## CHAPTER XIX.

- Of the message which the great Afonso Dalboquerque sent to the king of Malaca, and of the council which he held with his captains concerning the letter which Ruy de Araujo sent him 90

## CHAPTER XX.

- Of the requisition which the great Afonso Dalboquerque ordered to be made to the king, signed by himself and all the captains; and how the king sent him Ruy de Araujo and his companions whom he had there . . . 93

## CHAPTER XXI.

- How the Chinese merchants, who were at Malaca, made their way to the great Afonso Dalboquerque; and of what passed with him; and of the council which he held with the Captains, Fidalgos, and Cavaliers of the Fleet to attack the city . 97

## CHAPTER XXII.

- How the great Afonso Dalboquerque, on the morning of St. James's day, attacked the city of Malaca, and what passed thereupon . . . 101

CHAPTER XXIII.

How Tuão Bandão, captain of the king of Malaca, perceiving the dispersion of the Moors, went to their assistance with a body of soldiers, and what passed thereupon; and how the king took to flight, and our men pursued him . . . 105

CHAPTER XXIV.

How the king of Malaca, after the Portuguese had withdrawn to their ships, began to reconstruct the stockades and fortified his position on the bridge; and of the message which Utemutara-ja sent to the great Afonso Dalboquerque . . . 108

CHAPTER XXV.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque prepared himself for renewing the attack upon the stockades which the king had set upon the bridge: and how the Chinese desired of him permission to return to their land: and of the ambassador whom he sent with them to the king of Siao . . . 111

CHAPTER XXVI.

The speech which the great Afonso Dalboquerque made to the Captains and men of the Fleet for the second attack upon the city, and what passed thereupon . . . 114

CHAPTER XXVII.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque again attacked the city according to the resolution which had been arrived at, and how he entered the bridge by force of arms and fortified himself on it . . . 120

CHAPTER XXVIII.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque ordered relief to be given to our men who were stationed at the mouth of the street which led to the bridge: and how Utemutara-ja and Nina-chatu, and other merchants, seeing the overthrow of the city, came and placed themselves in his hands . . . 124

CHAPTER XXIX.

Of how, after the Prince of Malaca had withdrawn from his father, he came to the river of Muar and fortified himself therein with a number of stockades, and the great Afonso Dalboquerque sent a force against him, and put him to flight 128

CHAPTER XXX.

How the King of Malaca, after the Portuguese had gained the city from him, withdrew to the kingdom of Pão, and dispatched an Ambassador to the King of China, begging for succour . . . 131

## CHAPTER XXXI.

How the King of Malaca, having arrived at the kingdom of Pão, died; and how the great Afonso Dalboquerque began to build the fortress; and the inscription which he placed over the gate after it was finished, and what passed hereupon . . . 134

## CHAPTER XXXII.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque, at the request of the Governors and people of the city, ordered money to be coined; and of the value thereof, and of the rest that was done thereupon . . . 137

## CHAPTER XXXIII.

How the merchants and all the noble Moors of the city complained to the great Afonso Dalboquerque of the tyrannies which Utemutaraja exercised in the land, and how he had in his power all the supplies, and of many other things which he did . . . 143

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque, on account of the corroboration which he received concerning the treason which Utemutaraja was planning against him, determined to seize him, and his son, and his son-in-law; and the rest that took place, and what passed with the wife of Utemutaraja . . . 147

## CHAPTER XXXV.

How Duarte Fernandez, and the Chinese, whom he carried in his company, reached the city of Udiá, where the King of Sião lived, and gave him the message which he carried from the great Afonso Dalboquerque; and of the ambassador whom the King of Sião sent to him . . . 152

## CHAPTER XXXVI.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque dispatched the ambassador of the King of Sião, and in company with him sent Antonio de Miranda de Azevedo with instructions how to act, and of the present which was sent through him . . . 156

## CHAPTER XXXVII.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque dispatched the ambassadors of the Kings of Campar and Java, and ordered the exploration of the Island of Maluco . . . 159

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

- Of the Council which the great Afonso Dalboquerque held with the Captains respecting the order in which he should leave the management of affairs at Malaca, and some ordinances which he made for the government of the country before his departure for India . . . . . 165

## CHAPTER XXXIX.

- Oration which Camillo Portio made to the Pope Leo the Tenth in praise of the capture of Malaca, and of the victories gained by the Portuguese in their conquest of India . . . . . 169

## CHAPTER XL.

- The proceedings of the Portuguese in Goa with the Captains of the Hidalcão, who came and besieged the city after the departure of the great Afonso Dalboquerque for Malaca . . . . . 187

## CHAPTER XLI.

- How the Hidalcão, on learning that his Captain had made an entry into the Island of Goa and taken Benastarim without permission, ordered Roçalcão to take it from him, and what passed thereupon . . . . . 190

## CHAPTER XLII.

- How the great Afonso Dalboquerque, having set sail from Malaca, steered for the channel by which he had entered when he came from India: and how he was wrecked on some shallows off the Coast of Çamatra, and miraculously saved, and the rest that took place . . . . . 193

## CHAPTER XLIII.

- Of what was lost in the ship *Flor de la Mar*: and how the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, after having collected his people together on the ship *Trindade*, proceeded on his route to Ceilão: and of what took place on the voyage until they arrived at Cochim . . . . . 198

## CHAPTER XLIV.

- How the great Afonso Dalboquerque reached Cochim; and of the news which they gave him concerning Goa, and of the coming of the Rumes, and of the fleet which arrived from Portugal . . . . . 204

## CHAPTER XLV.

- How the great Afonso Dalboquerque set out from Cochim with the intention of going in search of the Rumes; and how he proceeded to besiege the fortress of Benastarim . . . . . 210



## CHAPTER XLVI.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque ordered the stockade, where-  
with the Turks had surrounded the fortress in order that our  
ships should not go inside, to be pulled up; and how he went  
to the city after having put them inside, and what further  
took place . . . . . 214

## CHAPTER XLVII.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque arrived at the city [of Goa],  
and of the great reception with which the inhabitants met  
him, and of the rest which passed with the Turks . . . . . 220

## CHAPTER XLVIII.

How Roçalcão was put to flight, and the great Afonso Dalbo-  
querque followed in pursuit after him up to the very walls of  
the fortress of Benesterij, and of what further took place . . . . . 225

## CHAPTER XLIX.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque rallied his people, and went  
back to the city; and how he returned again with all his  
battle array to besiege the fortress, and of what passed with  
Roçalcão . . . . . 229

## CHAPTER L.

Of how the great Afonso Dalboquerque debated with the Cap-  
tains and Fidalgoes who were there the terms offered by  
Roçalcão; and of the agreement which was made; and how  
he set out for Goa . . . . . 234

## CHAPTER LI.

How our men entered the fortress, and wanted to pillage the  
Turks, if the great Afonso Dalboquerque had not prevented  
them; and what passed with the renegades, and how he set  
forth towards Goa . . . . . 236

## CHAPTER LII.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque sent D. Garcia de Noronha,  
his nephew, with a fleet against Calicut; and how he dis-  
patched the ambassadors who were waiting for him at Goa,  
and the rest which took place . . . . . 243

## CHAPTER LIII.

How an ambassador from King Vengapor arrived at Goa, and how  
the great Dalboquerque bore himself with Roçalcão, and what  
passed with them . . . . . 246

## CHAPTER LIV.

Of the arrival of the embassy of the Prestes João at Goa, and of the manner in which he was received; and how the great Afonso Dalboquerque sent him to Portugal, and the rest which took place . . . . . 250


## CHAPTER LV.


Of the arrival of D. Garcia de Noronha at Cochim; and how, after settling the order in which the vessels were to be arranged, and dispatching the ships which were to sail to Portugal during that year with their ladings, he set sail for Calicut with all his fleet, and what took place there . . . . . 255

## CHAPTER LVI.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque gave an account to the captains and officers of the king concerning the letter which the King had written to him respecting the surrender of Goa to the Hídalcão, and what was agreed to in this behalf . . . . . 257

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## PART III.

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WHEREIN IS CONTAINED AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT THE GREAT AFONSO DALBOQUERQUE PERFORMED IN THE CONQUEST OF THE KINGDOM OF GOA FOR THE SECOND TIME, AND OF THE KINGDOM OF MALACA : AND ALL THE REST THAT HE DID UNTIL HIS DEPARTURE TO THE STRAITS.

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### CHAPTER I.

How, after his fleet was ready, he set out for the harbour of Cananor : and what passed with the King of Garçopa and Timoja concerning the entry of the river of Goa.

WHEN the interviews were concluded, which the great Afonso Dalboquerque held in Cochim with Gonçalo de Sequeira and the other captains, he set out towards Cananor, where he found ready the fleet and all the things which he required for his voyage. And without making any delay, he set sail with a fleet of twenty-three vessels, containing about two thousand Portuguese : and of them there were the Captains Manuel de Lacerda; Fernão Perez Dandrade; Simão Dandrade, his brother; Bastião de Miranda; Afonso Pessoa; Ruy de Brito Patalim; Diogo Fernandez de Béja; Jorge Nunez de Lião; Francisco Pereira Pestana; D. João de Lima; D. Jeronymo de Lima, his brother; Manuel da Cunha; Duarte de Melo; Pero Dafonseca; Gaspar de Paiva; Simão Martinez; Francisco Pantoja; Antonio de Matos; and Diogo Mendez de Vasconcelos, who was going to Malaca; Dinis Cerniche, Balthezar da Silva, and

Pero Coresma, who were to accompany [Diogo Mendez de Vasconcelos]. And so the whole fleet went along the coast and stood over against Onor to take in fresh supplies and water.<sup>1</sup>

As soon as the King of Garçopa and Timoja were informed of the arrival of Afonso Dalboquerque at the port, they went to talk with him, and after the customary greetings were over, he asked them what news they had of Goa

<sup>1</sup> It is useful to compare with this list that of Gaspar Correa, who gives the following names of captains accompanying Afonso Dalboquerque against Goa :—

\*Joam de Lima.

Jeronymo de Lima, his brother.

Manuel de Lacerda.

Fernam Peres d'Andrade.

Simão d'Andrade, his brother.

Diogo Fernandes de Béja.

\*Manuel da Cunha.

Duarte de Mello.

Francisco de Tavora.

Vasco Fernandes Coutinho.

\*Garcia de Sousa.

Gaspar Cão.

Lopo Vaz de Sampayo.

Ayres da Silva.

Dinis Fernandes de Mello.

Joam Serrano.

Diogo Mendes de Vasconcelos.

Pero Coresma.

Baltasar da Silva.

Micer Vinete Cerniche [called Dinis Cerniche in the *Commentaries*].

Antonio Raposo.

\*Simão Martins.

Gaspar de Paiva.

Francisco Pantoja.

\*Bastiam de Miranda d'Azevedo.

Afonso Pessoa.

Jorge Martins de Lião [called Jorge Nunez de Lião in the *Commentaries*].

in twenty-eight ships, and 1,700 Portuguese. The names marked with asterisks are among those who gave an opinion at the council of war just before. Correa also mentions the following as being with Afonso Dalboquerque in the attack on Goa :—

Fernam Gomes de Lemos.

Nuno Vaz de Castello Branco.

\*Jorge da Silveira.

Ruy de Brito.

Luis Coutinho, brother of Vasco Fernandez.

Simão d'Andrade, brother of Fernam Perez.

Gonzalo d'Almeida.

Simão Martins Henriquez.

Payo Rodriguez de Sousa.

Diogo Pirez de Miranda.

Duarte de Mello.

Alvaro Peçanha.

Luis Preto.

Pero Dafonsequa.

Antonio de Matos.

Antonio Diniz, and others.

Lord Stanley's *First Voyage of Magellan*, pp. xxiii, xxiv.



and of the *Hidalcão*? They told him that there were in Goa three captains, who had about four thousand men in the garrison, all Turks, Rumes, and *Coraçones*,<sup>1</sup> with certain peons of Balagate, who were archers; and there were about an equal number of native Moors. And they declared that, if he had come with the intention of attacking the city, it was just at the very nick of time, for the *Hidalcão* was prosecuting a war with the Guazils of the Kingdom of Decan, who had wrested from him a great part of his lands, and he was now so far advanced into the interior of the country, that it was impossible for him to return and relieve Goa. They said, too, that they were ready with all their people, as they had already notified to him, to serve him by land in that expedition.

Afonso Dalboquerque received the promises they made, and thanked them heartily for them. But, although it seemed to him to be a doubtful thing to attack Goa, held as it was by so many forces and now become so much on the alert, as these persons had declared to him, nevertheless he made up his mind to blockade it with all his forces, and to attack the enemy; and with this determination he set sail with the whole of his fleet, and bore up for Anjadiva, where he remained for eleven days without forming any resolutions of future proceedings. For when he arrived there, he was advised not to place any reliance upon the promised offers of the King of Garçopa and of Timoja, because they were in fear lest things should not turn out well for them, and they did not wish to be in worse relations to the *Hidalcão* than they were already. And thus the great Afonso Dalboquerque, perplexed by all these doubts which were conveyed to him, set out from Anjadiva, and proceeded to cast anchor over against the bar of Goa, and ordered Manuel da Cunha, with six ships, to enter through Old Goa, and make his way to Agacij, and to the land of Saste, to co-operate with the army

<sup>1</sup> Inhabitants of the Khorassan.

of Timoja, who would have to approach by that direction. And Manuel da Cunha, as soon as he reached the pass of Benastarim and of Agacij, fired a gun and remained quietly in the river waiting for the army to arrive.

No sooner had Manuel da Cunha set forth, than Afonso Dalboquerque summoned the captains to his ship, and told them they were well aware of the promises made to them by the King of Garçopa and Timoja, but that he himself, from what he had heard in Anjadiva, and also because they had delayed in their journey, very much doubted if these people meant to keep their word. He therefore begged them to decide whether he should undertake this matter without counting very much on the support of the native army which had been offered, or whether they should first go to Cambaya and there settle the terms of peace. The captains listened to the arguments of Afonso Dalboquerque, and were all unanimously of opinion that he ought to attack Goa; for if that city were once taken, the King of Cambaya would consent, they said, to carry out all the conditions they might require of him; and what was more, he would not delay releasing the captives whom he had in his power. This advice appeared good to Afonso Dalboquerque, who sent immediately a message to Manuel da Cunha to return and rejoin the fleet. And, as soon as he arrived, all weighed anchor, and stood in up the river and reached a pass about as far from the city as a falconet would carry a shot, where the Turks had sunk three Malabar ships laden with stones, in order to impede any further passage of our vessels up the river. But this artifice, which the Turks thought to avail themselves of, turned out exactly the opposite of what they intended; for, instead of blocking the river, the force of the water that ran down was so great, that it opened two channels much deeper than the one which they had blocked up.

When Afonso Dalboquerque arrived at this spot, he

ordered the small vessels to go up through these new channels which the river had made, and told the captains to strain every nerve to reach the fortress as quickly as they could ; and, as it was now late, there was not time for great vessels to make the passage. But, as soon as morning broke, Afonso Dalboquerque got into a boat, and proceeded to the station where the small vessels were at anchor, with all the rest of the fleet which followed him, and there he settled himself, and sent Duarte de Lemos, Gaspar de Paiva, and Diogo Fernandez de Béja, to man their skiffs and reconnoitre the condition of the fortress. These three got up in front of it, and examined it very closely, and reported to Afonso Dalboquerque that it was very strong, fortified with many trenches and bulwarks, and embrasures flush with the water,<sup>1</sup> with much artillery therein, and a very large ditch. So Afonso Dalboquerque, on receipt of this intelligence which the captains reported, and on consideration of the number of the forces within the city, came to the conclusion that it was a very perilous undertaking to attack it ; yet, nevertheless, confiding in God to help him, he sent on in advance Bastião de Miranda, Afonso Pessoa, and Ruy de Brito Patalim, to make their way with their galleys to the other side of the fortress ; and as they were perceived they were plied with the artillery contained in it, but our Lord protected them, so that they sustained no injury. And, although all these things rendered the business of attacking the city more hazardous, yet, in order to be more completely informed on all points, he ordered Diogo Fernandez de Béja to seize by night upon some native interpreter ; and by means of a Moor who was thus taken, he learned that the Turks had a great quantity of artillery both large and small, and many foot soldiers and cavalry, and many stores ; and that Moors, the natives of the land, had promised the Hidalcão that they would all die in defending the city from the

<sup>1</sup> *Ao lume da agua*, "between wind and water".

entry of the Portuguese; and that the Turks, in addition to this promise which they had made, out of fear that if any troubles came upon them the Moors would rise up against them, had given orders that all the women and children of the principal persons of the land should be placed in the fortress.

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## CHAPTER II.

Of the council which the great Afonso Dalboquerque held with the captains concerning the attacking of the city, and the remainder of the events connected therewith.

For three days after the great Afonso Dalboquerque had acquired this information concerning the ready state of the city he remained without coming to any determination whether he should wait or not for the King of Garcopa and Timoja, from whom the only help he expected was that they would come and stir up the Hindoos against the Moors, and prevent their furnishing the latter with supplies or paying the duties for the land which they were bound to pay. And at this juncture, while he was thus delaying himself, without making up his mind what to do, the Turks made some very strong stockades of timber, filled in with earth, with their ditches full of water, along the banks, and in these they stationed many pieces of large artillery, and appointed a captain with his men to defend them.

But when Afonso Dalboquerque perceived that the Turks, out of the excessive confidence they had in their fortress, were constructing stockades outside to ward off the attack upon their ships, and prevent their being burned, and were quite certain of the safety of everything else, he summoned the captains and all the *Fidalgos* and cavaliers of the fleet, and laid before them the opinion he had of these doings of

the Turks, and desired it to be debated whether they should first of all attack the stockades, or set themselves forthwith in battle array and storm the fortress. And when this had been discussed, at length every one agreed that the fortress should be attacked before the stockades; because, although it might be the stronger, it was there that they all desired to accomplish the wishes they had of taking vengeance of what had already befallen them. For after they had once taken the fortress, there was nothing more for them to do.

But Afonso Dalboquerque and Diogo Mendez de Vasconcelos were not with them in this way of thinking, but rather considered that they should first destroy the stockades, and when these were overcome, they would get in [to the fortress] with the enemy pell-mell; and that this ought to be put into practice immediately, because all the rest of the time they spent there without doing anything was but weakening more and more their chances of succeeding in this matter; and in this opinion of Afonso Dalboquerque everyone concurred, but they agreed to wait three days longer for the King of Garçopa. For Afonso Dalboquerque told them that as they were clearly minded to attack the city, they had no time now to look for any other help beyond that of our Lord Jesus Christ, which would not fail them, seeing that they fought for his Holy Faith, which he for his part truly believed in; and that the detention of the King of Garçopa and Timoja had all been brought about by the Turks by the great force of bribes which they had given them not to come; and that Timoja was so artful that he was sure to keep up his dissembling and not arrive until after the fall of the city, for he saw very well that it was like to cost much blood in the taking; and therefore they ought not to lose time in waiting for his support.

And with this settlement of the matter he dismissed the captains to their ships to make ready for the next day, in the morning, when all were to proceed to attack the stock-

ades, and when they were once captured, the circumstances of the victory would point out how they should proceed. So he divided all his forces into three companies in order of battle; that is to say, Manuel da Cunha, Manuel de Lacerda, D. João de Lima, D. Jeronymo de Lima, his brother, Gaspar Paiva, Gaspar Cão, Fernão Feyo, Pero Dafonseca, and many others, into one company, which was to go and attack the stockades near the fortress. And in the second company he set Diogo Mendez de Vasconcelos, Baltezar da Silva, Dinis Cerniche, Pero Coresma, who carried with him his son Jorge Coresma (who is now superintendent of the royal ovens), who, though he was but a child, gave a very good account of himself that day; and Ruy de Brito Patalim, and Jorge Nunez de Lião, with many other soldiers, to attack the stockades on the sides near the ships; while he himself, with the remainder of the forces and captains, would go and take the stockades in flank by a road which led from Mandovij by a branch upwards which he knew of, for if he went there he would be placed between the Moors and the city, and if he took their stockades in flank they could not fail to make great havoc among them.

And because there were in that road, which Afonso Dalboquerque determined to explore, certain palisadings of very strong timber, in order not to be delayed by anything when he should get there, he ordered Dinis Fernandez, the master of his ship, to go in advance in charge of thirty mariners to cut them down, and he was not to allow anyone to set fire to the ships which were on the beach, unless they were entirely discomfited in the endeavour to take the city. But, whereas the captains still adhered to their opinion, they returned again forthwith by night to talk with Afonso Dalboquerque, and laid before him many reasons why he should attack the fortress before the stockades; and he on his part unfolded to them many others, to



show where he disagreed from their conclusions. And there arose so many discussions on one side and the other about this, that Afonso Dalboquerque, in spite of his own opinion, and in order to content them, desisted from what he had arranged to do, and allowed himself to be convinced by their arguments. And when the Turks perceived this delay, for it was now seven days that our men had been there without doing anything, they began to grow audacious, and built some stockades still closer to our fleet, wherein they placed six large bombards, and began to fire them against us.

Afonso Dalboquerque was annoyed at the little account the Turks made of him, and with grave and opportune consideration, he sent word to the captains to make themselves ready, and on the following day, in the morning, to come on board his ship, for his intention was, in spite of all the discussions that had been held, to attack the stockades and fight the Turks, for he could not brook their vain-glorying; and each one was to fight in the place which had been marked out for him.

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### CHAPTER III.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque attacked the city of Goa, and took it by force of arms, when some of our side were killed; and of the great havoc that was made of the Moors.

And now that the great Afonso Dalboquerque had made all arrangements to attack the city, as I have said, on the following day, before morning broke, which was the day of St. Catharine,<sup>1</sup> the 25th day of the month of November,

<sup>1</sup> "Na luz, que sempre celebrada, e dina  
Será de Egyptia Sancta Catharina."

CAM., *Lus.*, x, 43.

See Vol. I, *Introduct.*, p. i, for the context and Fanshaw's quaint translation.

of one thousand five hundred and ten, the captains, who were already prepared, arrived with all their men, and boarded the flag-ship; and they found Afonso Dalboquerque already gone on board his skiff, and a *paráo* with a hundred and fifty soldiers waiting for them. And after a general confession had been made by all of them, they arranged themselves in three companies of attack, according to the instructions already promulgated, and proceeded against the city, for the day had now fully dawned; and, on their arrival, without any further consultation, they went on to attack the stockades, each company taking up the position that had been marked out for it.

The Turks, who were stationed therein, defended themselves for a long time, and prevented any entry of the enemy, and Afonso Dalboquerque, with the men he had in his company, on arriving at the palisades which Dinis Fernandez had already cut down, went up along the edge of the ridge at the double. The Turks, because they did not fear any attack from that side, as soon as they felt themselves harassed by people at their back, after making a long resistance, began to retire from the stockades. The captains, when they perceived that the enemy were beginning to become embarrassed with the arrival of Afonso Dalboquerque, fell upon them so valiantly, carrying in their van the Apostle Santiago [Saint James the greater], who was going with them as their guide, that in a short space of time they got into the stockades, and with the enemy in flight made their way pell-mell as far as the gates of the city, without looking behind them, killing and maiming many Turks and Rumes, all of them of superior class, and many well attired in silken habits and brocades.

Manuel da Cunha, Manuel de Lacerda, Dom João de Lima, D. Jeronymo de Lima, his brother, and others in their company, which were in advance, on arriving at the gate, experienced great resistance from the Turks; but,

nevertheless, animated by the victory which our Lord pointed out to them, they entered into the city by force of arms, and behind them entered Dinis Fernandez, who had come up by this time with the men whom he had taken to cut down the palisades. And so all these being united together kept on pursuing the Moors as far as the gate of the fortress, and then they fought a great battle with them; so well fought indeed was it on one side and the other, that for a long space of time each side thought that it had gained the victory. The Turks, however, who were stationed within the fortress, came up at once on horse to succour their men, and so put our men to rout. But just at this moment there arrived Diogo Mendez and Jorge Nunes de Lião, with all the *Fidalgos* and men they had in their company, and found a great number of our men already wounded and put to great straits; but on their arrival, the new comers shouted out to them to fall again upon the Turks, and they would follow them up.

With this fresh relief our men fell upon the Moors on foot and on horseback, and one and all closed so desperately with them, that they routed them, and all together entered pell-mell through the gates of the fortress; some of our party being left behind already dead or wounded. Manuel de Lacerda, who was marching along wounded in his face by an arrow, just as he entered by the gate encountered a Turk upon a horse, and killed him, and mounted the horse, and performed a great feat in continuing to go on, for he had a piece of broken arrow fixed in his face, and all his armour was smirched in the blood which ran down from it. At this time Afonso Dalboquerque was making his way with his company at the back of our men, going at a quick march, in order to give succour whenever he should perceive they had need of it. But the Turks, when they became aware that they had been invaded by our men, who were following them up, collected together to the number of five

hundred, including a hundred mounted men with their own captain, and rallied and turned back, and fought with such vigour, that our soldiers tried hard for a long time without being able to make them yield.

When Afonso Dalboquerque was informed of the peril our men were in, he bore down to this spot at full speed, with all the soldiers in his company, to reinforce them, and on coming up to them, some among their company made such fierce havoc among the Turks with their lances, that they routed them, and killed many ; among them being two chief captains out of three whom the Hidalcão had there. As soon as Manuel de Lacerda beheld Afonso Dalboquerque, he dismounted his charger and presented it to him. And when Afonso Dalboquerque saw him with his armour all smirched with blood, he embraced him, and said:—"Sir Manuel de Lacerda, I declare to you that I am greatly envious of you, and so would Alexander the Great have been, had he been here, for you look more gallant for an evening's rendezvous than Arelhano".<sup>1</sup> And when Afonso Dalboquerque mounted on the horse, all the captains took horses which the Turks had abandoned, and followed up after the enemy, and these, without making any further resistance, turned their backs and fled out of the gate of the fortress. And many others there, just wherever they chanced to be, threw themselves down from the walls, in order to shorten their journey.

As soon as the fortress had been abandoned, Afonso Dalboquerque gave orders that the gates should be shut that led to the city, and a good watch kept over them, in order that our men should not follow the Moors, nor disband themselves to plunder. For he feared that as the enemy were very numerous, they would unite together, and bring

<sup>1</sup> The Emperor Aurelian, whose reign presents a succession of brilliant exploits which restored for a time their ancient lustre to the arms of Rome. In a war against the Sarmatians he was believed to have slain forty-eight of the enemy in one day.

about another catastrophe like that which befel the Portuguese at Calicut.<sup>1</sup> So he gave orders to all the captains to take up positions in the walls of the fortress ; for he had made up his mind to fortify himself in it. The Turks indeed were so dismayed, that those who managed to escape from the fury of our soldiers made their way in flight over towards Benastarim, with the object of passing over from that place to the opposite side of the mainland. And they went on so excited by fear, that without waiting for any vessel of transport they swam across the river, and thereby many of them were drowned and many horses were lost.

The city had now been entered, and when Afonso Dalboquerque perceived that the fortress was strongly fortified with artillery, and the embrasures covered with clay outside, in order to deceive our people if they attacked them, he offered up many thanks to our Lord for thus delivering them from the dangers which had been prepared against them, had they operated against the fortress, as the captains had thought they ought to have done. Out of our party, one hundred and fifty soldiers were wounded ; and of the *Fidalgos* and captains, Manuel de Lacerda, who was the first who went in at the gate and the first who received any wounds (for thus I found it written), and Gaspar de Paiva, Manuel da Cunha, D. João de Lima, Gaspar Cão, Simão Dandrade, Dinis Fernandez, and all the rest who were in the advance guard. And seven were killed, of whom one was D. Jeronymo de Lima, who was mortally wounded at the entry of the gate of the fortress. And while he lay on the ground so severely struck that he could not survive, his brother, D. João de Lima, who was wheeling round with others, came upon him ; and when he beheld him in such a condition, with his head leaning against the wall, he exclaimed, with many tears :—" What is this, brother ? how art thou ?" D. Jeronymo replied :—" I am on the point of

<sup>1</sup> See vol. II, p. xix.

finishing this journey; and I am glad, as it has pleased our Lord to require this service of me, that it has been completed here in his service and in that of the King of Portugal."

D. João de Lima desired to remain in company with him; but he said:—"Brother, there is no time for you to remain with me; go and perform what is required of you, I will remain here and finish my days, for I have no longer any strength left." So D. João de Lima left him, and went on, following after the Moors; and when the fortress had been captured and the Moors driven out, he returned to seek after his brother, and found him already dead. I should be very glad to have been either one of these two brothers; but I know not how to decide which one of the two I most envy,—whether D. João de Lima, because he went to fight where such another one as himself could be met with, or D. Jeronymo de Lima, who did not desire to remedy his wounds, although they were mortal (it being a very natural thing for men to desire to live), but rather sought to advance his brother's honour, and would not consent to his remaining behind with him at a time when the other *Fidalgos* and cavaliers were carrying on the fight with the Turks within the fortress. The decision of this I leave to those who read the lessons of this history; let them judge whether of these two brothers best performed his obligations.

They killed also André de Afonseca, Antonio Graces, and Alvaro Gomes, son of the *almoxarife*<sup>1</sup> of Alenquer, and others, whose names are not known. But they who died and they who remained alive so performed their task, not only in the attack on the city, but in all the other conflicts in which they found themselves this day engaged with the enemy, that it is worthy that they should be held in great remembrance; for, in thus gaining Goa, the possession of India became secured [to Portugal].

<sup>1</sup> *Almoxarife*, a receiver of customs or dues for commodities imported or exported. Arabic, *Al mochrif*, an inspector.—Engelmann.



Nor should anyone forget Diogo Mendez de Vasconcelos and those of his company, for the alacrity and powerful efforts with which he relieved our soldiers, when a great number of them had already been wounded, contributed in a great measure towards the capture of the fortress. And, indeed, Afonso Dalboquerque was so very well aware of the powerful efforts and discretion of Diogo Mendez, that he often declared to him, when they were at variance respecting his voyage to Malaca:—"I abhor the life that I lead, Sir Diogo Mendez, for my tenure of the supreme office here has done you harm." Thus it was that if our soldiers, after the first capture of this city, were considered to have been ill-advised to evacuate it, in this second capture they recovered their *prestige* in returning to take it by force of arms, putting to death, besides many other natives of the city, two thousand men, whites, Turks, Rumes, and Cora-gones, which produced, indeed, a terrible dread throughout all the land, on account of the great confidence that had hitherto been reposed in their invincibility.

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#### CHAPTER IV.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque gave the soldiers permission to sack the city: and, of the crucifix which was found in some old walls from which stone was taken for the fortress: and of the miracle which Our Lord performed for our side on the day of the battle.

Directly it was reported in Cochim that the great Afonso Dalboquerque had taken Goa, the captains who were there loading their ships to set out for Portugal, calling to mind how he had told them that before their departure they should have news of the taking of Goa, became very sad and full of shame, when they knew of it, because they had not seen with him in that enterprise.

After having commanded the captains to take up their

positions and guard the fortress, Afonso Dalboquerque gave permission to the soldiers to sack the city, and free right to keep everything they took; but as for his own share, he cared for nothing more than the contentment derived for having been enabled to keep his word, which he had given to the Hídalcão when he was in Goa, as has already been related.

In the city were captured a hundred large guns (*bombardas*) and a large quantity of smaller artillery, and two hundred horses, and many supplies and munitions of war. All these were ordered to be delivered to the factor for the king. And after the city had been pillaged, Afonso Dalboquerque told the captains to reconnoitre the whole of the island and to put to the sword all the Moors, men, women, and children, that should be found, and to give no quarter to any one of them; for his determination was to leave no seed of this race throughout the whole of the island. And he did this, not only because it was necessary for the security of the land that there should be none but Hindoos within it, but also as a punishment for the treachery of which the Moors had been guilty when he took the city for the first time. And for four days continuously they poured out the blood of the Moors who were found therein; and it was ascertained that of men, women, and children, the number exceeded six thousand.

The Hindoos, also, for their part, by reason of the hatred in which they held the Turks, because they had been deprived there of the lands whereon they lived, as soon as they heard the news of the fall of Goa (the principal men, with their dependents, having fled up into the mountain country), descended, and cut off the Moors' retreat through the passes, as they were flying from the fury of the Portuguese. And when they had taken from them all they carried, they put them all to the sword, without saving any lives. Now, in the company of these Turks they killed one who was the

treasurer and paymaster of the *Hidalcão's* forces; and from him they took all the money he had. And Afonso Dalboquerque ordered that a certain mosque should be filled with some Moors whom the Hindoos had taken prisoners, and then set on fire, and in this body of people was a renegade Christian who deserted to the *Hidalcão* when Goa was taken for the first time.

As soon as the despoiling of the land had been accomplished, Afonso Dalboquerque turned his attention without delay to the fortifications of the city, and ordered that a great quantity of cement should be prepared, and all the sepulchres of the Moors thrown down, in order to obtain plenty of stone for the works, and to all the captains and *fidalgos* he appointed a regular turn of duty, and so made great haste to complete the work; for he was fearful of the arrival of the *Hidalcão*, and would not that he should find him in an unprepared state. And, as he hoped to establish in Goa the principal seat of the Governors of India, he so arranged the plan, that the palace of the *Çabaio* remained within the boundary, because the edifices of it were very nobly designed, a work of great beauty and finely built. And by reason of this great diligence, in a very short time he completed the fortress where it now stands, with its towers and ditches, with their breastworks, for the defence of the harbour and anchorage of the ships.

At this time some men were progressing with the destruction of some old walls, in order to get stones for the works of defence, when they discovered in the foundations<sup>1</sup> an image of the crucifix in copper. When the news of this ran through the city, Afonso Dalboquerque came down at once with all the people and clergy who were with him, and they carried the crucifix, with great devotion and many tears, to the church. Great wonder was there that then

<sup>1</sup> *Alicerces*; also found as *alicesse* and *alicece*, from the Arabic *al-apas*, the cement of a building.

seized upon all beholders; for within the memory of man there was no record of any Christians ever having been at that place, and they believed that our Lord had sent down that sign from Heaven, in order to shew that it was his will that the kingdom should belong to the King of Portugal and not to the *Hidalcão*, and that their mosques should become houses of prayer,<sup>1</sup> wherein his name should be worshipped. For whereas the city was very strongly garrisoned and provided with artillery and arms, and all other things necessary for its defence, our people had not been sufficient—being so few in number—to take it, had there not been within it this signal of the Cross whereon our Lord suffered, which called upon them as it were, and gave them the power to attack the city; had it not been also for the Apostle *Sanctiago*, who helped them, whereof the very Moors bore good testimony, to the effect that after the fall of the city they inquired of our men what manner of man was that captain with shining armour and a red cross, who marched with the Christians, striking and killing the Moors, for it was he alone that had taken their city from them.

And *Afonso Dalboquerque*, not only from the great devotion which he had for this saint, but because he was a knight of the order of the saint, did not forget this favour which he had received from him; and he sent to the convent of *Palmela*<sup>2</sup> a staff of the length of six palms and of the thickness of a lance,<sup>3</sup> all overlaid with gold, with inlaid work,<sup>4</sup> and the hand of the staff covered with pearls and

<sup>1</sup> *Isaiah* lvi, 7; *Math.* xxi, 13; *Mark* xi, 17; *Luke* xix, 46.

<sup>2</sup> *Palmela*, a town in Portugal, south of Lisbon, 38 deg. 34 min. N.; 8 deg. 57 min. W. *Bluteau* gives an interesting account of its history. The convent is the head of the Military Order of *Santiago*, and is kept by Brethren of the Rule of St. *Augustine*.

<sup>3</sup> *Arremeção*.

<sup>4</sup> *Lavrado de Tauxia*; *Tauxia* or *atuxia*, damaskeening or inlaying of one metal upon another; from the Arabic *at-tauchiya*, to colour, to render

rubies, and a penitential scourge of very large beads of gold, and a shell<sup>1</sup> of gold of good size, with many precious stones in it, placed upon a hat of crimson satin; and at his death he bequeathed to the Apostle Sanctiago of Galiza<sup>2</sup> a very large lampstand of silver, and a hundred thousand *reis*<sup>3</sup> in cash for oil.

When this news of the taking of Goa reached Cambaya, and it became known that Afonso Dalboquerque was fortifying himself therein, with intent to maintain his position, the king perceived that his own league was destroyed, and therefore ordered the liberation of the prisoners whom he had captured when D. Afonso Noronha, the nephew of Afonso Dalboquerque, had been taken prisoner, and also offered to give up Diu for the site of a Portuguese fortress; and from that time forward the king continually sent ambassadors to treat for peace. And Mirocem,<sup>4</sup> captain of the fleet of the Grand Sultan, who was in Cambaya (with some of the forces that had escaped from the rout inflicted upon them by the Viceroy<sup>5</sup>), where he was awaiting the relief for which he had sent to Cairo, in order to refit his forces at Goa, no sooner learned that Goa was taken (and that, too, with great havoc among the Turks), than he gave up all hopes of bringing his mission to a fortunate termination, and obtained permission from the King of Cambaya to go to Judá,<sup>6</sup> where he remained for some days, and from that port set out for Suez by sea in a shallop,<sup>7</sup> where he found beautiful; in Portuguese the word has the more limited meaning given above.

<sup>1</sup> *Vieira*. This word gives the name to a large number of Portuguese families. Among others who have borne it, is the author of the well-known Portuguese Grammar and Portuguese-English Dictionaries.

<sup>2</sup> Galicia.

<sup>3</sup> About £20 16s. 8d. of English money,—a large sum in those days.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. i, p. 222; vol. ii, p. 112.

<sup>5</sup> At Diu. See vol. ii, pp. 112, 113, note.—*Lusiada*, x, 34-36.

<sup>6</sup> Djeddah. See vol. i, p. 234.

<sup>7</sup> *Gelua*. See *jelua*, vol. i, p. 226, note.

the fleet in progress of preparation. And when Mirocem thus arrived at Cairo to impart this news of the taking of Goa to the Sultan, orders were given to stop the building of the fleet, and no more trouble was taken about it. The ambassador of the King of Cambaya was thereupon despatched with orders to report that on the completion of the fortress, Afonso Dalboquerque would come and visit the king and arrange the terms of peace. And because Afonso Dalboquerque was desirous of sounding the wishes of the Hidalcão relative to an alliance, he wrote the following letter to him, with certain grandiloquent ideas<sup>1</sup> involved in it; for, as long as he governed India, he always availed himself, first of one thing, then of another, in his intercourse with the kings.

LETTER WHICH THE GREAT AFONSO DALBOQUERQUE WROTE TO  
THE HIDALCAO AS SOON AS GOA HAD BEEN TAKEN.

“Very honourable and good Cavalier Milohau! the great Afonso Dalboquerque, Captain-General of India and of the Kingdom and Lordship of Ormuz and of the Kingdom and Lordship of Goa, for the very high and very powerful D. Manuel, King of Portugal and of the Algarves, on this side and on that of the sea, in Africa Lord of Guiné, and of the Conquest, Navigation, and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, and of India, I send you my greeting. You must well know how the Çabayo, your father, used to take the ships of Malabar out of the ports and harbours of the King my Lord; wherefore it was that I was constrained to go against Goa, and take the city, and there it is that I am occupied in building a very strong fortress. I wish most sincerely that your father had been living, that he might know me to be a man of my word: out of regard for him, I shall be ever your friend, and I will assist you

<sup>1</sup> *Rebolarias*, an uncommon word, probably derived from *rebolar*, to roll about.



against the King of Decan, and against your enemies ; and I will cause all the horses<sup>1</sup> that arrive here to be carried to your stations and your marts, in order that you may have possession of them. Fain would I that the Merchants of your land would come with white stuffs and all manner of merchandize to this port, and take to yours in exchange merchandize of the sea and of the land, and horses, and I will give them a safe conduct. If you wish for my friendship, let your messengers come to me with your communications, and I will send you others on my part, who shall convey to you my communications: if you will perform this which I write unto you, by my aid shall you be able to gain possession of much land, and become a great Lord among the Moors. Be desirous of performing this, for thus it shall be well with you, and you shall have great power ; and for all that the Çabayo, your father, be dead, I will be your father, and bring you up like a son. Let your messenger bring back immediately to me a reply, and let the merchants of the land come under safe-conduct to Goa; and as for the Merchants who bring merchandize and come under your letters of safe conduct, signed by your hand, I will be responsible for their safety."

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## CHAPTER V.

How the Nequibares sent to request a safe conduct from Afonso Dalboquerque, in order that they might come and live at Goa ; and how our forces put to rout Meliqueaye, the captain of the Hidalcão.

When the Nequibares, who were stationed on the mainland, perceived that the great Afonso Dalboquerque was establishing himself firmly in Goa, they sent to desire a safe

<sup>1</sup> The horse trade was a great source of employment and revenue on the Indian coast.—See vol. ii, pp. 76, 77, 107, 111 ; see also Col. Yule, *Marco Polo*, vol. i, pp. 84, 88, 324, 333, etc., and Index ; 2nd edition.

conduct from him in order that they might come over with all their people and live in the city. These Nequibares were the principal men and captains of the people. Now, whereas Afonso Dalboquerque was anxious of gathering together into the city all the native Hindoos of the land, he was very glad of the offers of these Nequibares, for he was in hopes that they would help him in the construction of the fortress, so he sent them the safe conduct which they had desired him to give; and when they arrived in Goa he gave them houses and possessions according to each one's station of life on the mainland. And after he had sent messengers to this effect to the Nequibares, news reached him that Meliqueaye,<sup>1</sup> captain of the *Hidalcão*, had arrived with a large body of men at Condal, and at Bandá, with the intention of forcing an entrance into the island of Goa. And although Afonso Dalboquerque was fully occupied in the work upon the fortress, because he felt so strongly the necessity of finishing it as quickly as he could, nevertheless he could not endure that a captain of the *Hidalcão* should come and besiege the lands of Goa while he was in the island; he therefore lost no time in despatching Diogo Fernandez de Béja to sail into the River of Bandá, and dispute the passage with Meliqueaye in the lands of Antuge and Saste. And with him he sent also, as captains of the vessels, Aires Pereira, Antonio Dabrea, Gaspar Cão, and Antonio de Matos, with two hundred men.

Diogo Fernandez, as soon as he was ready, set out with his people, and reached Bandá, and went up the river, and without any further consideration disembarked immediately. When Meliqueaye perceived that our men had disembarked, he proceeded to attack them, relying upon the numerous bodies of Turks who were under his command, and Diogo Fernandez waited for them with great bravery, and plied

<sup>1</sup> The first part of this name is *Melek*, Lord. See vol. ii, pp. 85, 86, for names similarly formed.

the enemy so fiercely with lances, that the Turks, disconcerted by the determined resistance with which our people awaited them on foot, took to their horses and retreated in so disorderly a manner, that many threw themselves down over the ravines and there ended their days.

With this victory, Diogo Fernandez returned to Goa, and related to Afonso Dalboquerque all that had taken place, and declared how Meliqueaye was making his way in the direction of Divarij, in order to cross over into the island [of Goa] in that direction. With this news of the intentions of Meliqueaye, which Diogo Fernandez brought him, Afonso Dalboquerque forthwith dispatched Gaspar de Pavia to proceed to guard that pass, and in company with him there went Afonso Pessoa, Martim Guedez, Vasco Fernandez Coutinho, and many others. Meliqueaye, finding himself discomfited by the inability of his people, withdrew with the shattered remains of his forces, and made his way to essay the entrance to the island by the pass of Divarij. But, on arriving there, although he went carelessly, with the idea that he would not find anyone there to resist him, inasmuch as he was by nature very proud, nevertheless he made up his mind to lay siege to the stockades which Gaspar de Paiva had by that time constructed, and drew up his forces, both infantry and cavalry, in battle array, with himself in the front rank, and made his way to attack them.

But Gaspar de Paiva, who had already received notice of the approach of Meliqueaye, awaited the attack with great readiness, and at the first encounter his matchlockmen slew some of the mounted Turks; and these, according to their custom, used to ride fastened into their saddles with straps, so that the horses, having no longer any riders to govern them, ran among their own people and threw them into disorder. As soon as Gaspar de Paiva observed that the Turks were thrown into confusion, he sallied out of his trenches and lost no time in falling upon the enemy, and routed

them, and followed up after them for a good space. Vasco Fernandez Coutinho, although at that time he was but a lad of eighteen years of age, encountered a Turk on a horse, and taking him by the reins, raised up his caparison and stabbed him with a sword ; and when the horse fell down dead, he fell upon the Turk, and cut off his head, and thus at that day of the fight shewed himself to be a son worthy of his sire, a descendant worthy of his ancestors.

When the affair was thus terminated, Gaspar de Paiva withdrew to his stockade, and Meliqueaye, finding himself sorely pressed by our men on both sides, no longer ventured to attack them, but withdrew with his men two leagues away into the interior country, to a place which is called Diocalij, and there he pitched his camp, making some very strong stockades of wood for its defence, in case he should be attacked there. As soon as Afonso Dalboquerque perceived that Meliqueaye was thus put to rout and it was probable, in case of his being attacked at once, that this chief might easily fall into his hands, he proceeded himself to seek for him, in the place where the camp was pitched, with one thousand Portuguese, and two thousand natives commanded by their own captains, and passed over to the mainland in the galleys and boats. And as soon as the force had disembarked, Afonso Dalboquerque divided it into four battalions, and stationed them in certain passes, about the distance from the edge of the sea of a shot from a matchlock, and there he arranged an ambush, and ordered the captains of the Hindoos to take their soldiers and run to the enemy's camp, and in case any Turks should issue out after them, they were to retreat in the direction of the place where he had placed the ambush.

The captains of the Hindoos, as soon as they came in sight of the camp, found Meliqueaye outside the stockades, drawn up on a lofty hill with his army, like a man who was well aware of the trap laid for him by Afonso Dalboquerque.

But as he was a good captain, and well versed in the art of war, he remained perfectly quiet, and would not attack the Hindoos. So when the captains observed that Meliqueaye did not care to meddle with them, they withdrew to the place where Afonso Dalboquerque was waiting (for he had given them the order to do so in this case), and related to him the position of the affair as they had found it. And Afonso Dalboquerque, perceiving thus that Meliqueaye had become aware of his plan, proceeded to the Island of Divarij, and therein he left Rodrigo Rabelo and Manuel de Lacerda, with soldiers, and then he went on to the city.

After the lapse of a few days, Meliqueaye, who found himself not sufficiently strong to be able to resist our people if they were to desire to invade him, sent a messenger to Afonso Dalboquerque desiring peace with him. But Afonso Dalboquerque demanded of the messenger whether Meliqueaye held a permission from the *Hidalcão* to enter into negotiations for peace or not. The messenger replied that the only message he carried was from Meliqueaye, who was a captain of the *Hidalcão*, and could not enter into peace without the permission of the *Hidalcão*. Afonso Dalboquerque therefore dispatched the messenger back without any reply, for it appeared to him when he reflected upon the disorganised proceedings of Meliqueaye, that his stay there could not be in accordance with the wishes of the *Hidalcão*.

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## CHAPTER VI.

How Merlao came to Goa, and the Nequibares desired Afonso Dalboquerque to give him to them for their governor, and what took place thereupon; and how he ordered Diogo Fernandez de Béja to destroy the fortress of Çacotorá.

For some days past, a messenger from the King of Onor had been staying in Goa, seeking to conclude an alliance

with the great Afonso Dalboquerque ; for this king had usurped the kingdom and ejected from it Merlao, to whom it belonged by right of being the elder brother ; and therefore the king was very much in fear that Afonso Dalboquerque would favour Merlao in opposition to him, in consequence of the undertaking which he had given to the Portuguese to help them in their first enterprise against Goa. As soon as Merlao (who at this period was in Baticalá with the king, his uncle, in possession of soldiers on foot and horse, with the intention of setting out to recover his kingdom if he could) became aware that his brother was negotiating with Afonso Dalboquerque, in order to benefit himself by such an alliance, he sent a messenger with letters informing Afonso Dalboquerque of the position in which the matter stood, and telling him how his brother had risen up against him, and deprived him of the kingdom by force, begging Afonso Dalboquerque to help him with his alliance, and stipulating that he would serve the King of Portugal in all that might be commanded of him. And Afonso Dalboquerque accepted his offers, not only because his fame was great as a brave cavalier, but also because he was a captain whom the Hindoos held in great esteem. And this he did with the intention of conferring upon him the government of the lands of Goa ; for he had been brought up there, and had always made war upon the Turks, and on two occasions, when he had been besieged by them, with his Hindoos alone he had defended the city like a very valiant cavalier ; and with this determination, because it seemed to him to be very conducive to the service of the King Dom Manuel to re-establish Merlao and shew him favours, Afonso Dalboquerque sent to Baticalá the galleys for him, with some vessels for the transport of his men and horses. And he also sent two Portuguese captains, with two thousand Hindoo soldiers, to go by land and receive him at Cintácora, carrying letters to the Tana-



dares<sup>1</sup> and people of the lands of Goa, ordering them to receive him and obey him as they would Afonso Dalboquerque himself. And all these people did so with great delight, by reason of the estimation in which they held him, for they were desirous of being governed by him.

The brother, who was in Onor, being informed that Merlao had come to Cintácora to embark, immediately sent some of his people to Caribal and Ancola (two places which lie in front of Cintácora, on the opposite side of the river, where the Kingdom of Goa is divided from that of Onor), to labour to prevent his passage, promising them great rewards if they captured him; for he was alarmed lest Afonso Dalboquerque should assist him in his attempt to cast him out of the kingdom. But, notwithstanding all these endeavours which his brother made, Merlao conducted himself with such skill, that he passed over without any conflict with the soldiers of his brother, and reached Goa (taking with him a captain of the King of Narsinga, who was called Icarao, who for days past had been in his company, in discord with the king), where he was received with great pleasure by Afonso Dalboquerque, who ordered that he should be lodged in the principal houses of the city, and instructed the factor to supply him with everything he or his people should require.

The Nequibares were so delighted at the arrival of Merlao, that it was not many days before they went to Afonso Dalboquerque [and begged him] to give him to them as their governor, for all the people desired him. And Afonso Dalboquerque was very glad at this proceeding on their part, because this was the principal reason why he had extended his assistance to him; so he told the Nequibares that for his own part he was glad of it, and he would talk with Merlao and then give them a reply. And, on the following day, in the morning, Afonso Dalboquerque caused

<sup>1</sup> See vol. ii, p. 125, note.

Merlao to be summoned before him, and told him that he was desirous of letting him hold the lands of Goa at a yearly rental, and of giving him the government of them, provided that he would pay every year to the King Dom Manuel, his Lord, or to his governors of India, forty thousand *pardaos*,<sup>1</sup> in four payments, just as the people had to pay, in addition to a payment for three months, which the land still owed to the *Hidalcão*; for they had to be demanded on the part of the King, his Lord. Merlao was very well pleased.

And when the agreements which were made about this matter had been drawn and signed, Afonso Dalboquerque summoned before him the Nequibares and all the principal men of the Hindoos, and took Merlao by the hand before them, and told them that he gave him to them to be their governor, for he knew how much they desired to have him, and how well they would be treated by him; and they received Merlao with great pleasure and much festivity and blowing of horns, in accordance with their customs. And, in two or three days' time, Merlao set out, and crossed over to the mainland, taking with him five thousand peons and fifty horsemen, and commenced at once to farm his *Tanadarias*.<sup>2</sup>

Now, seeing that the fortress of Goa was already in so advanced a state that it would withstand all the power of the *Hidalcão*, Afonso Dalboquerque sent Diogo Fernandez de Béja, as chief captain of three ships, to dismantle the fortress of Çacotorá (as the King D. Manuel so often had ordered to be done), and he gave him a set of instructions how he was to act in this business, and there he was to remain until the fifteenth day of the month of May, for he

<sup>1</sup> For the value of the *pardao*, see vol. ii, p. 95. Forty thousand *pardaos* is somewhat more than £3000.

<sup>2</sup> *Tanadaria* is rendered by *Vieyra Cabeça de Comarca*, the principal city or town of a *Comarca* or district; in this passage the word appears to apply to the office or appointment of a *Tanadar*.

might be enabled to come to him, if the affairs of India permitted it, as late as this; but if it were to fall out that Afonso Dalboquerque could not be with him by that time, then Diogo Fernandez de Béja was to proceed to Ormuz, with his letters and powers which he carried, in order to receive the tribute, for Cogeatat had sent word to say that he was willing to pay it; and when this had been done, he was to make his way in the month of August by the route to India, and unite with the fleet of Manuel de Lacerda, who was to remain as chief captain of the sea while he himself (Afonso Dalboquerque) sailed away from India, and the two united were to cruise off that coast, for so, if Goa fell into any trouble, they could succour the city; and in order that Diogo Fernandez might be the better entertained by Cogeatat, Afonso Dalboquerque gave permission to all the ships of Ormuz that were in Goa to carry spices, and gave them a safe conduct to be enabled to pass, giving them to understand that they were to come back direct to Goa with the horses they were to bring with them.

And because Afonso Dalboquerque was in certain respects impeded and prevented from carrying out his intended expedition in this direction, Diogo Fernandez de Béja, after he had destroyed the fortress of Çacotorá, and the appointed period of time had elapsed, made his way to Ormuz, and received the tribute, and from that port set sail for India, and found Goa besieged by the forces of the Hidalcão, as will be related hereafter.

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## CHAPTER VII.

Of the ambassadors whom the Çamorim, after the fall of Goa, sent to the great Afonso Dalboquerque, desiring peace with him; and how Simão Rangel was sent upon this business, and what passed concerning it.

Whereas the Çamorim had been informed that the great Afonso Dalboquerque had captured Goa, and was fortifying himself in the city with the intention of retaining possession of it,—no longer relying upon the league which had been made between himself and the Hidalcão with the object of ejecting the Portuguese from India; and whereas, too, he was aware that the King of Cambaya, another member of the league, had sent back to Afonso Dalboquerque the Portuguese who had been prisoners in his territory; he ordered his ambassadors to repair to Afonso Dalboquerque, and they set out from Calicut in a *parádo*, and in a few days reached Goa. And when they had arrived they sent word to Afonso Dalboquerque that they had come to his Lordship with an embassy from the Çamorim, and begged him of his kindness that he would grant them a hearing.

So in order to give a greater air of importance to this business, Afonso Dalboquerque ordered Francisco Pantoja, chief alcaide of the fortress, to proceed to the ambassadors and bring them; while he himself waited in the hall of reception with all the captains and *Fidalgos*, and received them with great expressions of delight and demonstrations of being well pleased with their friendship.

The ambassadors, after shewing him the accustomed courtesy according to their manner, told him that the Çamorim, their Lord, had sent word by them to inform him how happy he would be if he could have been able to converse with him, so that he could shew him the pleasure he felt in the capture of Goa by the Portuguese; and that in conse-

quence of his desire of friendship with the King of Portugal he had sent to make him an offer of all his estate, if it would please him, and a site in the kingdom for the construction of a fortress, for thus would his friendship be more truly manifested ; and begged that a person of great confidence might be sent to him to arrange this matter on a proper footing.

Afonso Dalboquerque replied to them that he accepted those offers of alliance made by the Çamorim in the name of the King of Portugal, his Lord, and on these conditions he himself would serve the Çamorim with all his fleets and soldiers that were stationed in India, whenever it were required, and that he would send without delay, in their company, a servant of the King, his Lord, to treat of that matter of theirs that had been proposed. And whereas for some time Afonso Dalboquerque had been desirous of setting foot in Calicut and constructing there a fortress with peace and friendship (seeing that he never could get the better of the Çamorim in the war which he had carried on against him), when three or four days had passed after Afonso Dalboquerque had related to the captains all this business, and all of them had arrived at the conclusion that it would be very conducive to the service of the King of Portugal that a fortress should be constructed in Calicut, he dispatched the ambassadors and shewed them every attention in the name of the King ; and in company with them he sent Simão Rangel, servant of the King, in a *fusta*, with written instructions concerning the way he was to proceed.

As soon as Simão Rangel arrived at Calicut, he went on board the *caravela* of Simão Afonso which was riding at anchor in the harbour, and there he awaited the answer of the King, for Afonso Dalboquerque had so commanded him to act. When the ambassadors had come before their king, they related to him how Afonso Dalboquerque was in Goa with great strength of soldiery, and how he was fortifying him-

self in that city, and how the Portuguese had discomfited a captain of the *Hidalcão*, who had come down upon the lands of Goa; and that Afonso Dalboquerque had sent in their company a servant of the King of Portugal to ratify the terms of peace.

The Çamorim, knowing that Simão Rangel was on board the *caravela*, and was not likely to come on shore, commanded the governors of the city to commune with him, and they had many conversations relative to the terms of the peace, without being able to arrive at any definite conclusion; for the king was willing only to grant a fortress in Chale, whereas Afonso Dalboquerque ordered in his written instructions that he was not to accept any site unless it were in the harbour of Calicut in front of the king's own landing-stage.<sup>1</sup> And it turned out that, after all, they came to no agreement, for the king would not grant any site for a fortress in his own land; but only wanted to keep the matter open with dissimulations, to the end that, at this same season, the Moorish merchants might dispatch their ships, which they had laden, for the Straits; but this they could not do as long as the *caravelas* of the Portuguese fleet were lying there at anchor in the harbour.

When Simão Rangel perceived the object of these delays, and that it was all owing to the bad temper and dissimulation of the king, he ceased to communicate with the governors, and went on board the *fusta*, and shaped his course for Goa, where he arrived and gave an account to Afonso Dalboquerque of what had taken place, and related the dilatory way in which the Çamorim had carried on the negotiations with him. And he declared, too, that in his own opinion the king would never, of his own will, grant permission to erect a fortress in any site in his land, for all that he might offer them a site in Chale.

But, inasmuch as Afonso Dalboquerque was by this time

<sup>1</sup> Or jetty, *Cerame*; see vol. i, p. 115.



ready with his fleet to sail away and cruise off the straits [of the Red Sea]—which projected expedition he afterwards abandoned for the voyage to Malaca, as will be related further on—he left this matter open and in the position it now stood, until his return from Malaca, and desired Manuel de Lacerda, who was under orders, to remain as Chief Captain of the Fleet on that coast [of India] to continue ever cruising off the harbour of Calicut, and to harass it in every possible way, and prevent any ships from getting out.

But while Afonso Dalboquerque was away at Malaca, the Turks came down to besiege Goa, and thereby Manuel de Lacerda was compelled to quit the coast of Calicut and proceed to the assistance of Goa. And at this very time the Moors had an opportunity of dispatching their ships, laden with spiceries, to the Straits: and these, when they were so far advanced as the Island of Çacotorá, between the Cape of Guardafum and Magadoxo,<sup>1</sup> encountered a storm so fierce that it wrecked two of them, and the others were wrecked in that gulf; and Mafamede Maçari,<sup>2</sup> who was sailing in that company reached the Maldivé Islands.<sup>3</sup>

When the Moorish merchants, who lived in Calicut, perceived that their trade navigation was thus cut off, they departed with their wares, some to Cairo, others to Cambaya, others to Ormuz and to other parts, in such wise that very few who were not natives of that place were left remaining in Calicut, and these used to come from Çufim,<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On the coast of Somali, in Africa.

<sup>2</sup> Mafamede Maçari, evidently a corrupted form of the name Muhammed.....

<sup>3</sup> In the Indian Ocean, 5 deg. N. lat., 73 deg. 30 min. E. long.

<sup>4</sup> Çufim, also called by the Portuguese Azafie, and by the natives Asfi, is evidently Safie, on the coast of Barbary, 32 deg. 17 min. N., 9 deg. 8 min. W. There is a valuable account of this great city in *Le Grand Dictionnaire Géographique* of M. Bruzen de la Martiniere. Paris, folio, 1768.

from Ourão<sup>1</sup> from Tremecim,<sup>2</sup> and from Tripoli,<sup>3</sup> with their wares, to Cairo, and from Cairo they used to make their way to Judá, and from Judá to Calicut, with ready money, and there they used to build new ships, and load them with spices, and so returned to their own lands.

On one occasion, Afonso Dalboquerque enquired of a Moor of these people who had been taken in one of their ships which had come from the Straits, how it was that they ventured to come from so far off to trade in Calicut, seeing that it stood between two of our fortresses, and that they were obliged to pass over the very place where our fleets were stationed. The Moor replied that the profits were so great that they would run all risks to get there; for, for every *cruzado* laid out in Calicut, they used to make twelve or thirteen in Judá and in all the places that stood within the mouth of the Straits; and he stated it was in consequence of this profit being so great, and the trade in pepper being so extensive, that the Moors who were established in Calicut laboured to prevent the Çamorim from granting permission to the Portuguese to erect a fortress in his territory, for if this were granted to them the merchants would be left without any trade navigation to the Straits.

<sup>1</sup> Ourão, now Oran, on the north coast of Africa. See vol. i, p. 120.

<sup>2</sup> Tremecim, also called Tremecem, Telemicen, Telmsen, Tlemecen, or Tlemcen, and anciently Timisi, a town fifty miles S. W. of Oran, 34 deg. 52 min. N., 1 deg. 18 min. W. See K. Johnston's *Dictionary of Geography*; Ritter's *Geographisch-Statistisch Lexicon*, by A. Stark, Leipzig, 1865; and M. Bruzen de la Martiniere's work quoted above, where there is an interesting notice of the site.

<sup>3</sup> Tripoli, on the north coast of Africa.

<sup>4</sup> Jidda. See vol. i, p. 234.

## CHAPTER VIII.

How the King of Narsinga sent his ambassadors to visit Afonso Dalboquerque concerning the capture of Goa; and of the news which Fr. Luiz communicated to him, and what passed thereafter.

After that the great Afonso Dalboquerque sent Fr. Luiz to Narsinga,—following the disaster of Calicut (as I have already related),—he never received any news of how things had fared with him in respect to the instructions which he carried with him; but when Goa had been taken for the second time, as soon as the news reached Narsinga the king immediately ordered his ambassadors to pay a visit to Afonso Dalboquerque, and by means of them Fr. Luiz wrote to him, relating the manner of his arrival at Narsinga, and stating that, in other letters which he had written he had described how he had been well received by all except the king; and, on this occasion, he desired to inform Afonso Dalboquerque that the King of Narsinga was getting himself ready with five thousand men on foot and two thousand on horse, for an expedition against one of his vassals who had risen up in rebellion and seized the city of Pergundá,<sup>1</sup> (the rebel) declaring that to himself belonged the kingdom itself by right; and that directly he had taken the rebel the king would proceed with all this force of men to his places situated on the edge of the sea, and he (Fr. Luiz), for his part, could not understand the drift of this, but as Goa was so close by he would advise Afonso Dalboquerque to keep up friendly communications with the king, and by no means to place any reliance upon the King of Garçopa, nor upon Timoja, for they were men of such bad dispositions that they had even written to the King of Narsinga that, if he wished to regain possession of Goa,—for it had

<sup>1</sup> Pergundá, perhaps Purkundi, in the Bengal Presidency, 30 deg. 28 min. N., 79 deg. 4 min. E. 247

anciently belonged to the ancestors of the king—he must send them both infantry, and cavalry, and elephants, and then they would deliver the city over to him before the Portuguese could fortify their position therein. And, he went on to say, that he had received trustworthy news that the *Hidalcão* had set forth with a large force to attack the city of Calbergate,<sup>1</sup> the Guazil of which was an Abyssinian eunuch, a servant of the King of Decam,<sup>2</sup> by name Melique Distur,<sup>3</sup> and, as it could not withstand the siege, after two months it had surrendered upon certain conditions; and there had risen up against the *Hidalcão* four of the principal Guazils of the kingdom (for the *Hidalcão* carried back with him the King of Decam a prisoner, deprived of all his command), who had gone up against him with a numerous force in hopes of destroying him; and when these Guazils arrived at a certain watercourse which they could not pass they let themselves rest and there remained; but the *Hidalcão*, out of fear of them, had sent for the soldiers who were on duty in guarding the lands of Goa.

And Fr. Luiz went on to declare that there had also arrived news to the King of Narsinga that the principal Hindoos of the city of Bilgão<sup>4</sup> (as soon as they had heard of the capture of Goa and fortification of it by the Portuguese) had broken out into rebellion against the *Hidalcão*, and had cast the Moors out of the city, and put themselves under the command of the king [of Narsinga], for this city had

<sup>1</sup> *Kulbarga*, *Golbarga*, or *Calberga*, in the Nizam's dominions, Bengal Presidency, 17 deg. 20 min. N., 76 deg. 52 min. E. The latter part of the name, according to the Portuguese rendering, may be intended to signify *Ghaut*.

<sup>2</sup> The Deccan.

<sup>3</sup> This is manifestly the Portuguese rendering of *Melek Distur*. The first word has been frequently explained before. The word *distur* is of Persian origin, and is used both in the Persian and Arabic languages to signify a *minister*; here, however, it appears rather as a proper name than as a title.

<sup>4</sup> *Belgão*, *Belgaum*, or *Belganw*, in the Bombay Presidency, 15 deg. 50 min. N., 74 deg. 31 min. E.

formerly belonged to him, but the *Hidalcão* had taken it from him.

Bilgão is a very large city, and there is in it a very large fort, and it is a pass and principal port from the kingdom of Decam to Goa. There is a very extensive mountain range which overlooks the lands of Goa, just as the range of Algarve [in Portugal] looks over the plain of Ourique, and when this range has been crossed the kingdom of Decam lies all along flat table-land, like the same plain. And because the principal reason why the old Çabayo had obtained possession of Goa was that he had captured this fortress by treachery of the Hindoos who used to hold it, Afonso Dalboquerque used to say very often, when he found himself annoyed by the recalcitration of the *Hidalcão*, that if the king D. Manuel desired to keep the kingdom of Goa safe, he ought by all means to try all in his power to take this fortress, for by holding it he would secure all the estate he had there. And as for the negotiations which his instructions ordered him to carry out, he had presented them many times without getting any answer to the purpose, but always had been put off; but at last he had told him, that he was very much disconcerted at the orders for attacking him, and he might build a fortress in Batacalá, for he said that he was very desirous of his friendship at the very time that he knew that it had been entered into with the *Hidalcão*, but that did not agree with the offers that he had made to help him in taking the kingdom of Decam, which had been his of old. And when these interviews with the king were over, the king sent for the governor of the city, and blamed him very much for desiring this alliance with the *Hidalcão*. And that King of Garçopa had written him a letter by virtue of which he could take him and destroy him if he liked, but as they were now very friendly, he had not done so; but that if this were done for money, which he had promised to give him every year, the *Hidalcão* would show

towards them that true faith which his father had shown towards the King of Narsinga when he took him in battle, but released him on his promise to serve him for ever.

At the receipt of this intelligence, which Fray Luiz wrote of matters which had passed with the King of Narsinga, and with his governor, Afonso Dalboquerque became somewhat in suspense when he saw that he was withdrawing from that which he had so often declared, namely, to help him against the *Hidalcão*. But as he knew how this came about, he dissembled with him, and wrote to Fray Luiz by the same ambassador who had brought him the letter, to take his leave of the king with as much dissimulation as he could, and return immediately; and he put himself in communication with the *Hidalcão*, declaring that he desired friendship with him. For, in order that the affairs of India should progress satisfactorily, as was convenient to the King of Portugal, Afonso Dalboquerque always laboured to make each one of these lords understand that he desired to have peace and friendship and the trade in horses with him, which was what they claimed; for, whereas he held the key of their position at Goa, he desired by means of this artifice to sow dissensions among them.

After he had written to the *Hidalcão*, he sent off to the ambassadors of the King of Narsinga, sending word by them that a year ago he had sent certain conditions to him through Fray Luiz, but as he had not yet received any reply to them, he could not come to any conclusion with regard to the messages that had been sent. The ambassadors set out, and when they arrived at Bisnaga, they found Fray Luiz was dead, for a Turk had killed him, and it was reported that the *Hidalcão* had ordered his murder; and they delivered the message which they brought from Afonso Dalboquerque to the king, and told him that while at Goa they had discovered that he was communicating with the *Hidalcão*. So alarmed was the King of Narsinga at hearing of this alliance, for he

knew that the *Hidalcão* had the horses which was the principal strength of his army, that he immediately sent back the two ambassadors to the great Afonso Dalboquerque with very full powers to conclude a treaty of friendship, and to arrange the terms of the trade in horses.

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## CHAPTER IX.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque set in order certain matters in the city, and established a Mint there, and of what followed.

The great Afonso Dalboquerque was so desirous that Goa should return to the state of trade which it had always enjoyed when under the rule of the *Çabayo*, that so soon as the fortress was on the point of completion he dispatched several captains along the coast with orders to compel all the ships they met with to go into port at Goa, and this he did for two reasons. The first was, that he might benefit the harbour and re-people the city to its former number of population; and that the caravans of *Narsinga* and of the kingdom of the *Decam*, with their merchandise, might come to Goa in search of horses as they used of old to come (for the horses of this region are much esteemed and fetch a great price, because, apart from the need of them for military purposes, the captains and principal lords are in the habit of carrying their wives about on horses). The other reason was, that he might ruin the harbour of *Batalá*, which had become very noble through the horse-trade and the quantity of merchandise which flowed into it from *Ormuz*. For he considered that if the horse-trade were established in Goa, there would always be in the city from four to five hundred horses belonging to the merchants which he could make use of in case of urgency. And in consequence of the diligence which Afonso Dalboquerque set about this matter, and because he had ordered that houses in the city



should be given to the principal merchants for the better arrangement of their merchandise, merchant ships began immediately to flock from many quarters to the harbour of Goa, some coming from Ormuz with horses. And with a view to improving this state of business, he gave orders for the construction of some great stables, and organised a service of three hundred peons of the district, whose duty it was to transport grass, hay, and supplies for horses. And with the object of providing return cargoes for the merchants, so that they should not be compelled to seek a cargo in any other port, he commanded the Factor and officials to take care always to have in the Factory pepper, cloves, and ginger, and all the other kinds of merchandise which the merchants were likely to require, and in the clearing papers which they delivered with the cargoes whenever the merchants desired to set sail, it was to be set forth that the ships were to be bound for Ormuz and to no other port, for it was Afonso Dalboquerque's desire to destroy the commerce of the Straits.

In consequence of the liberty which the Moors had of loading their ships with spices at Goa, all the merchants came there to settle their trade. And in one of these ships which brought horses Cogeamir<sup>1</sup> was found, to whom Afonso Dalboquerque, on the occasion of his taking Goa for the first time, had given two ships laden with merchandise to make the voyage to Ormuz. This man was now bringing back horses in exchange for his merchandise, and when he arrived at India and learned that the Moors of Goa had risen up against Afonso Dalboquerque, and had driven him out of the city, he had made his way to Dabul and gone to make a present of the horses to the Hidalcão. But when Afonso Dalboquerque was informed that this man was arrived, he ordered his people to arrest him because of the treachery he had been guilty of, and with him

<sup>1</sup> See vol. ii, p. 110.

was taken also one of his sons, and they were put in chains, and all their goods seized, among them being twenty-five horses, which were forthwith put into the Factory.

After having arranged all these matters, Afonso Dalboquerque established a chief office wherein could be coined money of silver, gold, and copper, of the same standard which had been settled with the people and the merchants of the city when Goa was captured for the first time.<sup>1</sup> And with this end in view, he commanded that all the Moorish money should be brought to the Mint and be stamped with the dies of the King of Portugal, and he gave to these coins the same names that they had, as has been declared already.<sup>2</sup> This Mint was farmed out to a Chetim<sup>3</sup> from Batalá, at the rent of six hundred thousand *reis*;<sup>4</sup> and Alvaro Godinho, a married householder of Goa, was appointed Treasurer of the Mint, and all the other offices were filled up with chief men who were married, with a view to encouraging the people to marry and people the land.<sup>5</sup> For, already at this time there were in Goa about four hundred and fifty married men, all servants of the King, and of the Queen, and of the Lords of Portugal: and those who desired to marry were so numerous, that Afonso Dalboquerque could hardly grant their requests, for he did not give permission except for the men of proved character to marry. But in order to favour this work, as it was entirely of his own idea, and also because they were men of good character, and had deserved by their good services that this privilege should be granted to them, he extended the permission to marry far beyond the powers which had been assigned by the king D. Manuel, for the women with whom they married were the daughters of the principal men of the land.

And he granted this favour, among other reasons, in

<sup>1</sup> See vol. ii, p. 128.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. ii, pp. 129, 130.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. ii, p. 130, note 2.

<sup>4</sup> About £125.

<sup>5</sup> See vol. ii, p. 99.

order that when the Hindoos observed what he did for their daughters, and nieces, and sisters, they might with better willingness turn Christians; and for this reason he would not suffer any of the women to be enslaved, but ordered that they should all be taken away from the masters who had possession of them; and he divided among all the married ones, the lands, houses, and cattle, and everything else that there was, to give them a start in life; and if the women whom he thus gave in marriage asked for the houses which had been in possession of their fathers or their husbands, he ordered that these should be so given, and therein they found many jewels and gold-pieces which had been hidden underground and abandoned when the city was captured. And as for the landed property which, according to information he obtained, had been in possession of the Moorish mosques and the Hindoo pagodas, he gave them all to the principal church of the city, which he dedicated to the protection of *Sancta Catherina*, on whose feast-day Our Lord had given him the victory over that city.<sup>1</sup> But in this matter of giving permission for marriages, Afonso Dalboquerque experienced much opposition, for there were many who disapproved of his thus maintaining Goa. The chief opponents in this were Lourenço Moreno, the Factor of Cochim, and Antonio Real, Chief *Alcaide*, and Gaspar Pereira, and Diogo Pereira, who, not content with meeting together and taking counsel upon this business, even went so far as to write to the king D. Manuel, setting forth their arguments how that the king ought to give orders for its prevention. And the principal reason they gave, was that it created many expenses, for they thought that if it were shown to entail loss of state property the king would be stirred to more rapid action in this matter.

And Afonso Dalboquerque appointed as captain of the fortress Rodrigo Rabelo, who was a very brave cavalier;

<sup>1</sup> See vol. i, Introduction, p. i.

and Francisco Pantoja, chief *Alcaide*; and Francisco Corvinel, a Florentine by birth, factor. The scribes of the Factory were João Teixeira, son of João Paçanha of Alenquer (who accompanied Afonso Dalboquerque in the first capture of Goa), and Vicente da Costa (son of Master Afonso who had been chief physician to king D. Manuel), married in Goa. And he laid down rules for the inhabitants of the city, with regard to the appointment of judges, municipal officers,<sup>1</sup> and superintendent of weights and measures,<sup>2</sup> every year.

And when all these things have been thus ordained (as well as others which I omit, to avoid seeming unnecessarily long), the great Afonso Dalboquerque began to make his fleet ready, with the intention of not passing the winter in Goa, because of the dearth of supplies therein, and because there was not enough money to pay his men. And he determined to set forth in that direction where he could be of most service to the king. And he left four hundred soldiers to guard the fortress of Goa, and a great quantity of artillery, both large and small, gunpowder, saltpetre, and sulphur, and a machine in working-order for making as much as might be required, and eighty mounted men, married and settled in Goa. Duarte de Mello was appointed chief captain of the sea, with four ships and three galleys, under orders to cruise along the coast and provide the city with whatever was required; and when Manuel de Lacerda should arrive, whom Afonso Dalboquerque would leave to be chief captain of a fleet in Cochim, with all his powers, then Duarte de Mello was to obey him as if he were Dalboquerque himself. And for payment of all these people and fleets, he assigned the twelve thousand *cruzados* which Merlao had undertaken to pay for the rent of the island.

<sup>1</sup> *Vereadores*.

<sup>2</sup> *Almotaceis*: there is an older form, *almocabel*; *al-mohtasib*, Arab.

## CHAPTER X.

Of the proceedings of the Bendará, Governor of Malaca, when he heard that Goa had been taken, and of the news which Ruy de Araujo, who was in captivity there, wrote to the great Afonso Dalboquerque.

Inasmuch as Goa was very much renowned in all the parts and kingdoms of India, the news soon spread through the merchants of Calicut, informing all the kings how the great Afonso Dalboquerque had taken the city and driven the Turks out of it. When this news reached Malaca, the Bendará who governed the kingdom for the king his nephew, fearing lest Afonso Dalboquerque should determine to come to Malaca and exact vengeance for the treason and spoliation which had been practised upon the Portuguese,<sup>1</sup>—with his accustomed dissimulation and subtlety,—lost no time in providing his city with quantities of supplies, and went to Ruy de Araujo and the other captives who had been put into a house and very badly treated, and told them, without saying anything about the current state of affairs in India, that the tumult which had arisen against the Portuguese had not been brought about by his design nor by his orders, but that the Guzerates and Jaos had planned it without his knowledge, because they were afraid that the Portuguese would treat them badly whenever they went out of their port, and he further declared that it was his intention to punish these people severely, because he desired very much to be on friendly terms with the Portuguese, and to see them carrying on a trade with Malaca.

When this interview was at an end, the Bendará gave orders to take the prisoners into a house outside the city, which was not so dismal as the one they had occupied. When Ninachatu, a Hindoo resident of Malaca, who had

<sup>1</sup> See vol. ii, pp. 73, 74.

frequently performed many good services to our people during their captivity, heard this news of the taking of Goa, he made his way to the Bendará, and told him that if Goa had been taken by the Portuguese—as the report went—he was afraid that the Governor of India would desire to come to the land [of Malaca] to take vengeance for what had been done therein to the Captain of the King of Portugal; and therefore it was his opinion that it would be advisable to order the liberation of Ruy de Araujo and his companions, and to treat them very kindly, for it might even be that a time might come when they would be glad to use these men for mediation. This advice, which Ninachatu gave, pleased the Bendará, and he gave orders for the release of the Portuguese, and gave them a house wherein they might live, and ten thousand *calains*<sup>1</sup> worth of Cambayan stuffs, of that which had been taken from the fleet of Diogo Lopez de Sequeira,<sup>2</sup> to trade with, and support themselves from their profits, for this was the custom of the king with his slaves; and it was signified to them that this property was assigned to them for their support, but when the Portuguese ships should arrive, then their accounts should be settled, and all the loss that they had sustained there should be made good. This time-serving<sup>3</sup> policy, which the Bendará used in his dealings with Ruy de Araujo and his companions, was not only the result of the entreaties of Ninachatu, but also because there was a junk ready to set sail for India, and he wanted the news to be taken there by it how well he was treating the Portuguese whom he had captured; and so said some Moors, who were his friends, to Ruy de Araujo. But they said also that as soon as the junk had set sail, all that the Bendará had granted to them would be taken away again, and they would be again cast into prison, and even if the Bendará did not do so it would be solely out of fear

<sup>1</sup> *Calains*. The word *Calaim* signifies a very fine kind of Indian copper.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. ii, page 74.

<sup>3</sup> *Viztude*.



of what he had heard of the progress of Afonso Dalboquerque.

When Ruy de Araujo came to know this, he determined to send word to Afonso Dalboquerque of all that had taken place in Malaca, and arranged his plans with a Moor who was named Abedalla,<sup>1</sup> and through him he wrote that he would have Afonso Dalboquerque to know there were nineteen Portuguese alive, and the Bendará had tried many times to force them to turn Moors, and did many cruel things to them on this account, and behaved very cruelly to them on this account. But the Bendará was in a great dread, lest he (Afonso Dalboquerque) should make his way to Malaca, for he was not liked by any of the kings whose territory was contiguous to his own, and all were obliged to oppose him because he was a great tyrant and practised constant robberies upon the merchants who had any intercourse with that port. And if he (Afonso Dalboquerque) should make up his mind to go to Malaca, then it ought only to be with the greatest fleet possible, to the end that the sea and land both should obey him when they beheld the great power of the King of Portugal in those regions; and if any junk should be captured in their passage for Malaca, no cruelty ought to be done to the people taken in them, only they should be kept captive, and on arriving at the port he ought to send some of them on land with orders to convey to the Bendará the message that he (Afonso Dalboquerque) was not minded to make war upon Malaca nor to take any of her possessions, provided that the king would make a treaty of peace and friendship with him, and deliver up the Christians, and put himself under the orders of the King of Portugal; for the Bendará had determined, directly he should be informed of the arrival of our fleet on the coast, to send all the captains off immediately four leagues' distance up into the interior country, until terms

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Abedalá, vol. i, p. 121.



could be arranged, for he was afraid that if they remained on the spot they would give Afonso Dalboquerque intelligence of many events. But as for past events, after that day of his misfortunes, and of the departure of Diogo Lopez de Sequeira from that port, he would not write too minutely, for all was overwhelmed by the bad treatment they had received from the Bendará in their captivity up to the present day. It was true, indeed, that the Bendará had thought good to give them a home in which they were all living, and ten thousand *calains*<sup>1</sup> worth of merchandise, whereof they were to support themselves by the profits, declaring that he was ready, on his part, to make good to them all the loss they had received when Afonso Dalboquerque, on his part, should reimburse him for the loss, on the other hand, which he had experienced from the attacks made by Portuguese ships on his junks; and declaring, too, that he had punished the Guzerates and Jaos who had been guilty of treason, in such a manner that henceforth they would never again dare to do so, for (said the Bendará), he was very desirous of the friendship of the King of Portugal, and wished to become his vassal. And (Ruy de Araujo continued) as for these things and many more of which he did not write, as he did not take any notice of them, the Bendará every day made a thousand excuses; but he himself, and all his fellow captains with him, begged him (Afonso Dalboquerque), for the love of God, to keep them in remembrance, and rescue them out of this captivity, and to cause to be given to the Moor, the bearer of the letter, twenty *cruzados* out of his effects, for he had lent it to the captives to buy food, and to show him kindness; for, besides his always helping them and accompanying them, he had consented, with very little persuasion, to undertake the journey, seeing that he ran a very great risk of his life if he had been discovered, but he trusted in the kindness

<sup>1</sup> See p. 45.

which Afonso Dalboquerque would shew him for it; and that Ninachatu took the opportunity to beg him, of his great kindness, that he would not let the Moors of Cochim know what he had done for the captives in Malaca, for he feared lest they should write to the Bendará and do him an injury for it; for it was Ninachatu who had given the captives an opportunity of writing, and of despatching the Moor with the letter; but if it were so disposed that his Lordship, Afonso Dalboquerque, could not possibly get to Malaca by any reasonable manner, then that he would send them word of it as secretly as he could, before the Moors could get intelligence of the impossibility of his going, for he trusted that Our Lord would grant them a means of going from that to some other place safe and free to make their way back again to India.

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## CHAPTER XI.

How the Captains of the Fleet of Diogo Mendez requested him to set out for Malaca; and of what passed with them, and how he begged Afonso Dalboquerque to grant him permission to go; and of the reasons wherefore it was not granted.

The captains of the fleet of Diogo Mendes, seeing that the fortress of Goa was quite finished, and the affairs of the city continuing to become more and more in order, and being desirous of performing their voyage, went to him and declared to him that their ships were those of merchants who had struck a contract with the king D. Manuel, to go to Malaca, and take in a cargo, and that up to that present time there had always been some excuse for the delay of their setting sail because the monsoon had not yet come; but now that they were having this wind, and the business of Goa was finished, in which, indeed, all had served the king very well, they ought to proceed.

Diogo Mendes replied to them that he liked their advice very much, but it was necessary to give an account of the proposed starting to Afonso Dalboquerque, not only as a compliment, but in order that the opportunity might be taken to get him to supply the ships with some things which were necessary for that voyage, and they had given their fealty to him, and could not sail out of that port with his licence.<sup>1</sup> Dinis Cerniche, like a foreigner, and one who had more regard for his profit than for his honour, replied that those compliments might be dispensed with, for in the contract which the merchants made with the king he had therein given them exemption from the jurisdiction of Afonso Dalboquerque and all other governors of India. But inasmuch as Diogo Mendez was an experienced man, although in this matter he erred in what he did by advice of the captains, masters, and pilots of his fleet, dismissing from his mind the arguments advanced by Dinis Cerniche, he went to Afonso Dalboquerque and told him that while they were in Cananor he, Afonso Dalboquerque, had said that on the completion of the Goa undertaking, and on arrival of the time of the monsoon, permission should be accorded for his departure to Malaca, and he would give him everything that he required for his voyage; and that as Our Lord had given him the city thus gained with so much honours for himself, and he, Diogo Mendez, was no longer required there, therefore he begged him very much of his kindness to dispatch him, and give him licence to set forth, for when he looked into the conditions whereby the merchants had contracted with the king, he found he could not put any hindrance in the way of their performing their voyage, but on the other hand his captains would murder him if he did not go; and they made every day formal requisitions to him that they might set out, but he did not wish to do so without Afonso Dalboquerque's consent.

<sup>1</sup> See vol. ii, pp. 232, 233.

Afonso Dalboquerque replied that it was true he had promised at Cananor to dispatch him directly the business of Goa was completed ; but when he had made that promise he was not aware of the condition in which the affairs of Malaca were, and that it was but a few days since he had received a letter from Ruy de Araujo, giving him an account of the state of that country, and declaring that in case he had to navigate to those parts it must be with so powerful a fleet that everything should yield to it ; and when he considered this, and saw in how difficult a position the affairs of Malaca were placed,<sup>1</sup> he must beg him of his kindness not to be desirous of risking his vessels and the people he had brought with him, for should any disaster happen to them both would have to bear the blame, since it was plain, from what had happened to Diogo Lopez de Sequeira,<sup>2</sup> that they could not open up any commerce with Malaca except by exchange of lance-thrusts,<sup>3</sup> and this could not be effected by four rotten ships and two rusty swords. And there were two reasons why he could not help him with his soldiers and his fleet :—the first, because affairs at Goa were, as he could see for himself, in so delicate a condition ; the second, that there was news of the coming of the Rumes, which had set the whole of India in an uproar ; but when these disturbances were over he promised he would help him, as he had already promised. After many conversations with Afonso Dalboquerque, who was determined not to grant him permission to go, Diogo Mendez took leave of him discontented, and when he arrived at his ship the captains came on board to hear what had taken place, except Baltezar da Silva, who remained behind ill at Cananor. Diogo Mendez gave them an account of what had been said by Afonso

<sup>1</sup> *Os negocios de Malaca estarem de mã desistão.* The latter word is equivalent to *digestão*, and the phrase signifies “ of a hard, indigestible, untractable character ”.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. ii, pp. 31, 73, 74.

<sup>3</sup> *A troca de lançadas.* There is here a play on the word *troco*, which also signifies “ exchange ” in a commercial sense.

Dalboquerque, and with this reply all came to the determination of setting out without making any further demand for permission to do so.

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## CHAPTER XII.

How Diogo Mendez, by the advice of his captains, hoisted sail to pass over the bar, and the great Afonso Dalboquerque sent after him, and they made him turn back, and the rest which took place.

Now inasmuch as the captains were ill pleased because the great Afonso Dalboquerque had denied them the permission to depart which Diogo Mendez had begged of him, and as they held firm to their opinion that he could neither demand their submission to his orders nor could they profess it to him, because they had come out under exemption from the orders of the Governor of India, they therefore determined to set their sails and shape their course in a straight line for Malaca. And because they had some misgiving about sailing out over the bar at night, Manuel Pirez, who held the office of pilot and captain of Baltezar da Silva's ship, declared that he could lead all the vessels out over the bar, even if it were at midnight, and could take them to Malacca, and return to Portugal without touching at India at all on the return journey.

At this declaration made by Manuel Pirez, immediately on the fall of night all set their sails except Pero Coresma, who was not in this plot and kept quietly aloof. Now Manuel Pirez, whose vessel could sail very well on a bow-line, found no difficulty in sailing at once right over the bar, but the others kept on tacking until the morning broke. As soon as Afonso Dalboquerque was informed that Diogo Mendez had gone off, he immediately sent after him Duarte da Silva and James Teixeira in two galleys, and Manuel de Lacerda along the shore with a party of mounted men, to

make their way to the bar and take up and get into any boats that might be there, and force him to stop ; and he gave instructions both to one party and the other, that in case the fugitives would not give heed to this, their command, then they were to sink them all.

On coming up with Diogo Mendez, James Teixeira required him, on behalf of Afonso Dalboquerque, to return, but the former, who was still fully resolved to go, would not yield when called upon to do so. So when James Teixeira perceived that he would not pay any attention to the commands of Afonso Dalboquerque, he called out to Martim Afonso, who was the pilot of the fugitive vessel, to give orders for taking in their sails, but he replied that only if Diogo Mendez, who was properly his chief captain, should order him to do so would he do it. So perceiving that neither by fair nor by foul means could he prevail upon Diogo Mendez to return, he aimed a shot at him, high up over the rigging, and then ordered another shot to be fired ; but at this juncture there arrived Duarte da Silva in the other galley, and fired a shot at the fugitive ship and struck her on the halliards, and down fell the main yard all at once.

When Diogo Mendez perceived that his mainsail was disabled, he signalled to the others to take in their sails, and he let go his anchor. As soon as Manuel Pirez saw that the flagship of this fleet had struck her sails, he came up alongside of her and asked Diogo Mendez for further instructions ; and he replied that all he could do was to shorten sail, and then they must all go back and pay the penalty for what they had done, in accordance with the advice given by him and the other captains. And while the matter was in this state Pero Dalpoem, Auditor of India, came up in a *paráo*, and when Manuel de Lacerda saw him he proceeded to unite with him, and they took Diogo Mendez and all the other captains, pilots, and masters, and carried them back as prisoners to the city.



Afonso Dalboquerque, who had already received intelligence of the progress of the affair by a messenger, whom Manuel de Lacerda had despatched by land, caused Diogo Mendez to be brought into his presence, and told him that he was exceedingly astonished to think that he should thus break the word of honour which he had given, and disobey his captain-general before all the ambassadors of the kings and lords of India, who were in that place, by the advice of four lunatics<sup>1</sup> in his fleet, when it had been already decided that it was not advantageous to the service of the king that he should be permitted to go to Malaca. And Diogo Mendez replied that he had done this, not with the intention of acting disobediently towards him, but because his honour had compelled him to do as he had done, for he, being a man accustomed to very great deeds, had been sent out, like an ordinary esquire, with two boats to reinforce the Island of Chorão,<sup>2</sup> upon which the Turks had made a descent.

Afonso Dalboquerque told him that that was not a valid excuse, for no honourable man who was a cavalier like himself would think of feeling dishonoured at being ordered to fight for the service of his king, and he reminded him that he had despatched on that same expedition to Chorão Manuel de Lacerda, the chief captain of the king's fleet, with other boats, and he had not thought it any affront to be engaged in it. And, he continued, this affair was very serious, and of such a character that he should not be performing his duty if he failed to visit it with its just punishment, which he for his part intended to carry out to the full; and there and then he sent him under arrest to the keep of the castle.<sup>3</sup> And as for the other captains, pilots, and masters, he

<sup>1</sup> *Sandeos*.

<sup>2</sup> One of the many islands that lie near that of Goa, and make up the Goa territory.

<sup>3</sup> *A torre de menagem*. See vol. i, p. 45.



ordered them to be put into chains, and in solitary confinement, and gave orders to Pero Dalpoem to draw up, as briefly and quickly as he might, a formal account of this affair, for there were in Goa at that time ambassadors of the king of Narsinga and of other kings of India, who had witnessed the disobedience which had been shown to Afonso Dalboquerque ; and he did not wish that they should depart without first of all observing the punishment which he should visit upon them in consequence.

And when the final inquiry had been made, and all was drawn up, Afonso Dalboquerque commanded that all the captains should be summoned ; and, having taken notice of the charges brought against them by the Auditor, it was adjudged that Diogo Mendez be sent back in disgrace to Portugal, to appear and answer to the acts of accusation for his misdeeds in person before the king D. Manuel, and Pero Coresma was also to be sent back in disgrace to Portugal, although he was not in the plot, because he did not divulge the intended flight of Diogo Mendez ; and Dinis Cerniche was condemned to be put to death by decapitation, and Martim Afonso, chief pilot, and Manuel Pirez, pilot and captain of the ship of Baltezar da Silva, and Diogo Fernandez, master of Dinis Cerniche's ship, all three to be imprisoned in their ships, of which they were but lately masters and pilots ; and these sentences upon them were carried out forthwith that very day ; and when Afonso Dalboquerque ordered the execution of Dinis Cerniche to be carried out, the ambassadors of the King of Narsinga came and begged him to forgive him, which he did, commuting this punishment into transportation to Portugal in disgrace, there to answer in person the formal charges of misdeeds brought against him.

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## CHAPTER XIII.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque set sail for the Straits of Méca with his fleet, and finding he could not cross the shoals of Padua, stood off Goa and made his way direct to Malaca.

Although the king D. Manuel had very often written to the great Afonso Dalboquerque to go up the Straits of the Red Sea and erect a fortress in Adem, the affairs of Goa occupied so much of his time and thoughts that he never yet had any opportunity before now of taking this enterprise in hand. And although the letter which Ruy de Araujo wrote concerning the state of affairs at Malaca had greatly embarrassed him in his proceedings (as has already been related), nevertheless, trusting to the mercy of God, he made up his mind to proceed to the Straits and accomplish the desires of the king D. Manuel; and having his fleet ready with men, supplies, arms, artillery, and everything else that was required for the undertaking of this enterprise (leaving Goa in good order), he set out, but when he had made his course so far forward as the shoals of Padua,<sup>1</sup> and found that he could not get beyond them because the season was now so far advanced, he put back again into harbour, and came to an anchor with all his fleet over against the bar of Goa, and after having dropped anchor, he ordered Rodrigo Rabelo, captain of the city, to be summoned, and told him that on account of the adverse state of the weather, and because the monsoon of the Straits and Ormuz was already gone by, and there was no longer any opportunity of navigating to those parts, it was his intention to go and winter at Malaca and see if he could in any way chastise the Malays for the treason which they had practised upon Diogo Lopez de Sequeira; therefore he

<sup>1</sup> See the B[aixos] de Padua, 13 deg. N. lat., on Fernão Vaz Dourado's Map of India, vol. ii, p. 1.

greatly commended to him the charge of taking care of the city, for the city was always the uppermost thought of his heart,<sup>1</sup> dreading lest the *Hidalcão* should attack it again; and from that port he went on to Cananor, and leaving the fortress provided with more men than it had, he set out again for Cochim.

As soon as the king learned that Afonso Dalboquerque was on the bar, he lost no time in visiting him on board his vessel, and gave him a long list of reasons why he ought not to go to Malaca, for, he said, the affairs of Goa were still in so critical a state, that it required him personally to control them; and in addition to this, the *Çamorim* of Calicut was in such a state of disaffection, that he for his part should not be surprised if he broke out into open treason directly he heard of his departure from India. But although this statement by the King of Cochim had a great show of reason in it, yet in it he did not express his own sentiments, but the design of causing Afonso Dalboquerque to abandon his voyage to Malaca was conceived by the advice of Chirnamercar and Mamalemercara, two Moorish merchants, men full of all kinds of evil and worthless designs.

Now the principal cause of their giving this counsel was, that they feared lest Afonso Dalboquerque should capture the ships which they had sent to Malaca; and if Malaca were taken, they would be left without any means of trading in the whole of that archipelago, from Cape Comorim eastwards, for they were the richest merchants in the whole of Malabar. And although Afonso Dalboquerque clearly perceived that those merchants had deceived the poor king in persuading him to turn aside from the course he really wished to pursue, yet because the king was friendly to us, Afonso Dalboquerque dissembled with him and pretended not to see through the plot, and told him that his mind was now quite made up to accomplish that voyage, because the

<sup>1</sup> *Porque a levava atravesada na garganta.*

season would not permit of his passing over to the Straits in accordance with the orders he had received from the king D. Manuel, his lord ; but, he said he trusted in God that the king of Cochim would very soon hear news of how thoroughly he had taken vengeance for the treason which had been practised in that city of Malaca upon the Portuguese ; and that Goa was in so strong a condition that he should not be afraid even if all the power of the Hidalcão were brought to bear against the city.

When this conversation was over which Afonso Dalboquerque held with the king, he took his leave of him, and sent for Manuel de Lacerda, whom he found there, and because his fleet was but small he reinforced him with four small ships more, and two large ships, men, and munitions of war, with instructions that in the month of August he was to proceed to unite with the other ships which he would then find cruising off the bar of Goa ; and he gave him also plenary jurisdiction over all the other captains who should come there, that they should obey him, as though he represented Afonso Dalboquerque in person ; and he was always to cruise along that coast in order to be able to render assistance if the affairs of Goa required it ; and then Afonso Dalboquerque dismissed him to get his fleet in readiness, while he himself gave orders to his captains to lift their cables and set sails.

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#### CHAPTER XIV.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque set sail from Cochim, and made his way direct to Malaca, and of what passed thereupon.

The great Afonso Dalboquerque, having thus taken his leave of the King of Cochim and dispatched Manuel de Lacerda, who was to remain behind as chief captain of that coast, set sail with all his fleet, which consisted of eighteen

sailing vessels, three of which were galleys. The captains were—D. João de Lima; Fernão Telez Dandrade; Gaspar de Paiva; James Teixeira; Bastiam de Miranda; Aires Pereira; Jorge Nunes de Lião; Dinis Fernandez de Melo, chief *Patrão*; Pero Dalpoem, Auditor of India; Antonio Dabreu; Nuno Vaz de Castelo-branco; Simão Dandrade; Duarte da Silva; Simão Martinz; Afonso Pessoa; Simão Afonso; and Jorge Botelho; and, proceeding on their way, when they had got as far forward as Ceilão (Ceylon), they caught sight of a ship.

Afonso Dalboquerque gave orders to chase her, and they took her, and he was very glad to find it belonged to the Guzerates, as he felt his voyage would now be carried out safely, for the Guzerates understand the navigation of those parts much more thoroughly than any other nations, on account of the great commerce they carry on in those places. And while the fleet was in this latitude a storm arose, during which the galley which was commanded by Captain Simão Martinz, was lost; for, without his knowledge, the ship had been loaded with copper, and she sprung a leak at the prow, and the force of the storm drove her over on her side, and she foundered, but all the people were saved, for Duarte da Silva stood by the ship in his great galley, which was all ready for the emergency. And when all the men had been brought off the wreck, Afonso Dalboquerque led the whole fleet, and brought up at anchor in the harbour of Pedir,<sup>1</sup> having in his company five Guzerate vessels which he had captured on the voyage.

And there he found João Viegas and eight Christians of the company of Ruy de Araujo, who had arrived thus far in their flight from the city of Malaca, and João Viegas recounted to him how the King of Malaca had endeavoured to force them to become Moors, and had ordered some of

<sup>1</sup> A harbour on the northern coast of the Island of Sumatra, 5 deg. 24 min. N. lat., 96 deg. 4 min. E. long., a little to the east of Acheen.

them to be tied hand and foot and circumcised; and they had suffered many torments because they would not deny the faith of Jesus Christ. And one night, when they were all ready to flee away, they were discovered, and Ruy Daraujo and those who were now with him were left behind, because that they were unable to escape. And he declared further that with the King of Pacé there was a principal Moor of Malaca whose name was Naodabegea,<sup>1</sup> who had been the chief author of the treason which had been plotted against Diogo Lopez de Sequeira; and this man had fled from Malaca because he and the Bendará, whom the king killed, had laid a plan to kill the king and take possession of the kingdom.

On hearing this news Afonso Dalboquerque immediately took his leave of the King of Pedir, and made his way to Pacé,<sup>2</sup> which is the principal port of the Island of Samatra, and as soon as he arrived there he sent João Viegas to pay him a visit, and to declare to him that it had come to the knowledge of Afonso Dalboquerque that in the city of Pacé there was a Moor who was fleeing from Malacca who was implicated in the attempt to murder certain Portuguese, who belonged to some ships which the King of Portugal, his lord, had sent to the port of the city of Malaca, and that

<sup>1</sup> The Edition of 1576 reads Naodabegea, that of 1774, Maodabegea; but from the recurrence of the name on p. 62 there can be no doubt that this latter is a typographical error. For the meaning of the first part of this word, see vol. i, p. 227.

<sup>2</sup> Pacé, a harbour a little to the east of Pedir, on the northern coast of the Island of Sumatra. Barretto de Resende gives "Passen" and "Porto de Passen" in Pedro Berthelot's map dated 1635, in the Sloan. MS. 197, fo. 390, on this site. K. Johnston, in the "Royal Atlas", spells the place "Passier" and "Pasier", and assigns the position of 5 deg. 2 min. N., 97 deg. 10 min. E. to the former; and that of 5 deg. 10 min. N., 97 deg. 22 min. E. to the latter place. There can be no doubt that this is a mistake. The spelling adopted by Berthelot is an illustration of the peculiar nasality introduced into the sound of final vowels by the Portuguese.



he begged him of his goodness to cause this Moor to be delivered over to him.

The King of Pacé replied that it was quite true that the Moor had been there, but at present he had no news of him, but he would cause very diligent search to be made after him, and when he was found he would hand him over to Afonso Dalboquerque. And when the king had sent this reply to Afonso Dalboquerque he advised the Moor to go straight at once to Malaca and give the king notice of the approach of the Portuguese, for when he heard this news he would pardon him, and reinstate him in his good favour. As soon as the king had arranged this he sent to Afonso Dalboquerque to say that he had ordered search to be made for the Moor but he could not be found, and he thought he must have fled away, for he could not learn any news of him anywhere throughout the city. But as Afonso Dalboquerque perceived that all this was deception on the part of the king he would not hold any further communications with him, but, not breaking off his friendship, he sailed away.

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## CHAPTER XV.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque set sail from the port of Pacé, and at sea he sighted a sailing vessel which was carrying the Moor who was flying from him, and how he sent after the vessel, and what further took place.

As soon as Afonso Dalboquerque had taken his departure from the King of Pacé he ordered the fleet to set sail, and in this manner so sailing along all together with a favourable wind, they caught sight of a *pangajaoa*.<sup>1</sup> This is the name

<sup>1</sup> The latter part of this word is clearly the Portuguese fem. adj. for Javanese. The *Pangajaoa* was a sort of boat impelled by oars. Bluteau calls the *Pangajoa* a kind of rowing boat, used in India. It appears to be different from the *Pangaio*, a sort of small boat composed



of a kind of long vessel, very fast sailing, used in that country; and as the wind had dropped by this time, and Aires Pereira, captain of the *Taforea*, was nearest to it, Afonso Dalboquerque signalled to him to give chase. Aires Pereira got into his boat with some soldiers and set out in pursuit. And the Moors who were on board of the vessel defended themselves with so much spirit that they wounded Aires Pereira and a considerable number of his people without their being able to get in.

Not content with thus defending his vessel the captain, although he was severely wounded, leaped down to Aires Pereira in his boat, and they fought with cuts and blows at each other, and there was at length despatched; and then our people boarded the *pangajaoa* and put to death all the Moors who sought to make any defence, and took seven or eight prisoners, and gathered themselves together again in their boat, and there they found the Moorish captain half dead, without any blood flowing from the numerous wounds he had received.

Aires Pereira commanded the mariners to throw him into the sea just as he was; but when they perceived that he was richly clothed, they sought first of all to strip him, and then they found on his left arm a bracelet of bone, set in gold, and when they took this off all his blood flowed away and he expired. Aires Pereira was so surprised at this that he took the bracelet and the captive Moors to Afonso Dalboquerque, and recounted to him all that had passed, and Afonso Dalboquerque inquired of the Moors who that Cap-

of boards tied together with cords only. "*Navigium Pangaio, e levi et raro ligno constructum, non nisi funibus colligatum est, nullo omnino clavo ferreo infixo*" (*Hist. Ind. Orient.*, p. 220). Camões calls it *sutil*, "lightly skimming", in the line—

"Os Pangayos sutis da bruta gente."—I, 92.

Although narrow and lightly built, the Pangaio is capable of carrying a considerable burden.

tain was, and what was the use of that bracelet to him which he wore; and they replied that he was a principal Moor of Malaca, whose name was Naodabeguea,<sup>1</sup> and he was on his way to warn the king of the coming of the Portuguese, and the bracelet was formed of the bones of certain animals which were called *cabals*,<sup>2</sup> that are bred in the mountain ranges of the kingdom of Siam, and the person who carries those bones so that they touch his flesh can never lose his blood, however many wounds he may receive, so long as they are kept on him. Afonso Dalboquerque was much moved at the death of the Moors from whom he had hoped to obtain information concerning the state of affairs at Malaca, and he prized the bracelet very much for its virtues, and kept it to send it to the king D. Manuel.

When Aires Pereira had returned into his own ship, the whole fleet went back along the coast in the same order as they had first come, and when they were in the latitude of the Powder Island<sup>3</sup> they sighted two very large junks, and gave chase to them. One of these, which was from Chormandel,<sup>4</sup> struck immediately; the other, from Jaoa,<sup>5</sup> would not do so; Afonso Dalboquerque therefore ordered Pero Dalpoem to go up close and call upon her to surrender, and if she would not do so, then to attack her at close quarters; and as it happened that, in the act of boarding the junk, our own men were closely pressed, the Javanese wounded

<sup>1</sup> Called Maodabegea, on p. 59, *n*.

<sup>2</sup> *Cabais*. João de Barros, in *Decad.*, ii, f. 139, col. 23, relates a similar circumstance to this here described; no description of this fabulous creature is recorded by Bluteau, who mentions the passage.

<sup>3</sup> Polvoreira, shown in Barretto de Resende's copy of Pedro Berthelot's map as Polverera, an island in the Straits of Malaca. MS. Sloan, 197, f. 390; Keith Johnston does not mention it.

<sup>4</sup> Coromandel, or Karimanal, Madras Presidency, 13 deg. 24 min. N., 80 deg. 19 min. E.

<sup>5</sup> Java.

several of the men with arrows, and hampered the gear of the mizen-sail<sup>1</sup> and the bowsprit.<sup>2</sup>

When Pero Dalpoem perceived that his rigging was thus destroyed, he disengaged his ship from the junk, and drew off from her. But Afonso Dalboquerque, who was the nearest to him, as soon as he saw Pero Dalpoem disengaging himself, drew up close and demanded the surrender of the junk, which was about six hundred tons burden, very well supplied with arms, and carrying three hundred fighting men on board; and fearing lest her men should set her on fire as soon as he had grappled her—a custom which the Javanese have when they find themselves overcome by the enemies—Afonso Dalboquerque ordered the master<sup>3</sup> of his ship to take the ship's boat, ready with a cable through the ship's hawses,<sup>4</sup> with orders to the effect that he was to arrange so as to be able to cast off the cable whenever he wished, if the Javanese should set fire to the ship.

When this had been set in order, Afonso Dalboquerque drew up close alongside the junk and began to fire into her with his bombards; and as the enemy would not even yet yield, although there were already forty of them killed and a great number of the others wounded, he got ready to board her. As soon as the Javanese perceived that they were overpowered by the ship, the *Flor de la Mar*, which was built with very lofty castles, they set fire to the junk.

<sup>1</sup> *Traquete*. Jal interprets this rightly as the *Voile de misaine*, or mizen sail; it was also called the *traquete davante*. Moraes wrongly defines it to be a *vela do mastro mais alto do navio*. It is the *trinchetto* of the Italians. Bluteau calls it the "*Vela pequena, atada à peça mais alta do mastro grande*."

<sup>2</sup> *Goroupés*; also *gouroupéz* and *gurupés*.

<sup>3</sup> *Mestre*, probably *mate*, through *Maitre*, *Fr.*

<sup>4</sup> *Escovês*, an indeclinable plural, sometimes written *escovêns* and *escouves*. Jal quotes the passage in more than one place in his *Glossaire Nautique*, as *escouves*; but the misprint of *esconves*, if it is one, is found in the early edition, as well as the later one, of the *Commentaries*. The word appears to be derived from *excebiæ*, *Lat.*; *écubier*, *Fr.*

It was not until the flames reached the ship that Afonso Dalboquerque gave orders to the mate to unhook his ship and cast off from the junk, and draw away out from between the vessels. The Javanese no sooner observed the shadow of the towering ship passing away from over them, than they set to work to extinguish the fire in their own vessel, but as it had by this time become very extensive, they could only do so, with very great difficulty, and this compelled them to surrender.

The junk having now surrendered, Afonso Dalboquerque discovered that the King of Pacé was on board, and so he sent for him, and when he saw him he begged his pardon very earnestly for this unfortunate affair which should not have happened if he had known of his Royal Highness being on board, and he showed him those ceremonies and that good treatment which is due to a personage of such dignity; and when he had entertained him and taken care for some of his servants who had got badly wounded in the fight, the king gave him an account of his misfortune, setting forth how he was on his way to the King of Java, who was his relative, to ask his assistance with soldiers and a fleet against one of his governors who had risen up in rebellion with the kingdom against him, but if he, Afonso Dalboquerque, would undertake this enterprise and reseate him in his estate again, then he would become a vassal of the King of Portugal, and pay him tribute.

Afonso Dalboquerque, considering that the trade of Pacé would be of great importance to Malaca, if he took it, on account of the great quantity of pepper that the Island contains, told him that he was now engaged on an expedition for settling accounts with the King of Malaca for an injustice which he had done to a captain of the King of Portugal his lord, who had reached that port under the royal safeguard, but when this had been completed he would promise that upon his return voyage to India he would

replace him in the possession of his kingdom. The king thanked him very much for his promises of assistance, and declared he would remain there in the ship with him, and ordered those who were in the junk to follow him. And when the fleet was now close to Malaca, Nuno Vaz de Castelo-Branco captured a very rich junk which had just sailed out of the port, bound for the kingdom of Siam, and from the Moors who were taken in her Afonso Dalboquerque learned that Ruy Daraujo and the Portuguese of his company were alive, and that the king already knew of his coming.

So numerous were the ships that they passed on that voyage, that had it not been Afonso Dalboquerque's determination to go to Malaca, they could have taken the largest prize that was ever beheld in those parts; for it was just the time of the monsoon when the Moors navigate to the kingdoms of India which lie to the east of Cape Comorim, but during the other monsoon they make their way direct to the Straits of Méca, laden with all sorts of different spices which are brought to Malaca. But inasmuch as Afonso Dalboquerque desired to have secure peace and friendship with all the kings and Hindoo lords who have their territories on the South, and to trade in their ports—as the King D. Manuel had ordered that the commerce of Malaca should not be destroyed,—he treated all the ships which he passed on the way with good will and entertainment, and to their captains he shewed every kindness in the name of the king of Portugal, and gave them safe conducts, enabling them to navigate—provided they did not go to the Straits—and at this they were very well pleased.



## CHAPTER XVI.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque reached the port of Malaca, and the king sent immediately to visit him, and the rest that took place.

When the great Afonso Dalboquerque had taken the king of Pacé into his ship, he continued his course and sailed up to the shoals of Capacia<sup>1</sup>, and entered the twelve fathom passage, and reached the harbour of Malaca one day at evening with all his fleet decked with flags, and the men sounding their trumpets, and ordered them to salute the city with all the artillery, and proceeded to cast anchor in front of the harbour. And when the fleet had thus anchored, the king immediately sent a Moor with a message to Afonso Dalboquerque, asking what was the object of so great a fleet; whether he came for war or for peace, for he did not wish for anything else than peace with the king of Portugal; and giving him to know that his Bendará had been put to death by his orders on account of his complicity in the rising which had taken place against the Portuguese captain (Diogo Lopez de Sequeira) who had come to that port, and resulted in the murder of the Christians who were in the land, but this was no fault of his.

Afonso Dalboquerque listened to this artful apology, and dissembled with him, in hopes of getting Ruy de Araujo and the other Christians who were there in his power again, so he replied that he was well aware how little the king of Malaca was to blame in the matter of the treachery shown to the captain of the king his lord, and now that the king had at length avenged the death of the Christians whom the Bendará had put to death, by cutting off his head, he begged he would of his favour cause those who were left alive to be

<sup>1</sup> In the Straits of Malaca, to the north of the city.

delivered up, and pay, out of the property of the Bendará, for all the goods which had been seized.

The king lost no time in sending the Moor back to declare to Afonso Dalboquerque that they should make peace first, and then he would send back the Christians and make satisfaction for all that had been taken. Afonso Dalboquerque replied that he would not make peace until the Christians had been sent back and all the king's property restored, according to the terms of his first answer sent through the same Moor, and when he had received everything, there would be time to talk of peace, for this was what the king his lord desired, and it was for this object that the King of Portugal had sent him thither, for this fleet had not come in search of a cargo, but to make war upon the king of Malaca, if he would not come to terms of peace with the king his lord.

Notwithstanding all this, the king still refused to deliver up Ruy de Araujo and the Christians without first making peace, for he thought by this means to curb the spirit of Afonso Dalboquerque; but he, on his part, determined not to come to any terms until the Christians were first of all restored to him, as well as all the property which had been detained, and so these negotiations went on from one side to the other until the king of Malaca began to put into practice some of his artifices, and ordered a fleet of launches<sup>1</sup> to issue out of the river, and when they had made a good muster with men and artillery they withdrew again; with these trickeries<sup>2</sup> and follies they thought to get the advantage of Afonso Dalboquerque, but he put up with everything in hopes of getting Ruy de Araujo into his

<sup>1</sup> *Lancharas.*

<sup>2</sup> *Biocos*, a word employed chiefly in the phrase *andar a biocos*, said of women that walk about with a cloak that covers the greater part of their faces and one eye, so that they can see other people without being known.



hands again, for he remembered how the Viceroy had sent him in company with Diogo Lopez de Sequeira in disgrace to Malaca, on his account.<sup>1</sup> And being informed by Ruy de Araujo that the king was causing certain stockades of very great strength to be erected along the seaboard, Afonso Dalboquerque sent word to the King of Malaca to say, that it did not look like a sign of good friendship when he would not send back his Portuguese but ordered the erection of stockades, like one who rather desired war than peace; and how differently, he said, had the king of Pacé behaved to him, for as soon as his port was reached he immediately sent back nine Portuguese who had got away so far in their flight from the bondage in which he, the king of Malaca, had held them; but it seemed, indeed, as if there was no arriving at any settlement with him. The king, in spite of all these arguments, still determined not to surrender the Christians without first of all making a treaty of peace.

Afonso Dalboquerque saw through this design of the king; and in order that he should not think that he had produced any effect by this display of launches in the river which were making a great show there every day according to the king's orders, he decided to undeceive him, and so he gave orders that an expedition of four boats well armed with fighting men and artillery should be got ready, and make their way along the bank and throw some shots from their bombards into the city. When the Moors perceived the boats setting out from the ships, they came out to wait for them, beyond the river's mouth, in a fleet of twenty *pangajaoas*, armed with many men. No sooner had Afonso Dalboquerque perceived them than he ordered a number of boats to be sent to reinforce the four first sent. This disconcerted the Moors, who observed the movement, and

<sup>1</sup> For the circumstances concerning the carrying of Ruy de Araujo to Malaca, see vol. ii, p. 45.

withdrew themselves back again into the river with their fleet. And when they had retired the king again sent the accustomed messages, full of deceit and specious words and falsehoods, to Afonso Dalboquerque.

And Afonso Dalboquerque again listened to them with great patience, always hoping to avoid having recourse to war, and explaining to the king how his coming to Malaca was for the preservation of the port, and for the making of a treaty and ratiying friendship with him, and by no means for the purpose of destroying him. But as there were Moors of many races in the city, all of whom were anxious to prevent a peaceable solution of this matter—to the end that our people should not get a footing in the land—they led the king to believe that Afonso Dalboquerque would never dare to attack the city, but as soon as the monsoon should spring up he would have to be gone without waiting any longer. And a similar thought was in the minds of his own captains. Those who most laboured to prevent peace being made were the Guzarates, for all the trade of Cambaya lies at Malaca, and they offered to help the king with six hundred whites, all well armed, and forty bombardars.

And besides all these designs which the king entered into, with the aid of the Moors both native and foreign, Ruy de Aranjo sent word to Afonso Dalboquerque that the stockades were fast approaching completion, and the king was making ready for his defence; and the Turks, Guzarates, Rumes, and Coraçoones were the principal ones who were advising him to make no agreement, but to forbid our people to make any settlement in the land; and in order to carry out their designs they were giving large bribes to the king and his governors; and they had also on their side the Cacizes,<sup>1</sup> who made long harangues to him,

<sup>1</sup> Cacizes, priests whose duty was to recount with dramatic vehemence in high places, and public concourses, the circumstances of the death of the Prophet.

declaring that the Portuguese were renegades and thieves, desirous of lording over the whole world, and that he would be sorry for it if he allowed them to come into the city. And Ruy de Araujo went on to say that the Xabandar<sup>1</sup> of the Guzarates, who was the mainstay of all the merchants of Cambaya—a man of great credit with the king—had gone to the king and begged him very earnestly not to make friendship with the Portuguese nor come to any terms of peace with them, for their ships and those of the Moors could not navigate in one and the same course in one and the same monsoon, neither could they take in their cargoes all together in the same port, for, if this was a matter of keen competition, even when all engaged were of one nation, how much more difficult would those things be, seeing that these on the one hands were Moors, and the Portuguese, on the other hand, Christians, desirous to destroy them and procuring the destruction of them all; and the Xabandar declared that he gave him this advice because he was very desirous of doing him a service, and preserving the kingdom; and he ought to temporize with the chief captain of that (Portuguese) fleet, and keep up negotiations with him, for when the monsoon should come, he could not remain there any longer.

The king was well pleased with the advice given by the Xabandar, and discussed it all with his governors, and they all were of opinion that such a policy should be carried out; therefore he ordered that his fleet should be repaired immediately, to the end that it might be prepared for anything that might happen, and that the work of the stockades should be pressed on more quickly.

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<sup>1</sup> See vol. ii, p. 132. The meaning of the term is "Lord of the Shore".

## CHAPTER XVII.

Of the site and foundation of the kingdom and city of Malaca.

The kingdom of Malaca<sup>1</sup> on the one side is co-terminous

<sup>1</sup> Camões makes the prophetic Siren sing :—

“ Mais avante fareis, que se conheça  
Malaca por emporio ennobrecido,  
Onde toda a provincia do mar grande  
Suas mercadorias ricas mande.

“ Dizem que desta terra, co'as possantes  
Ondas o mar entrando, dividio  
A nobre ilha Samatra, que já d'antes  
Juntas ambas a gente antiga vio :  
Chersoneso foi dita, e das prestantes  
Veas d'ouro, que a terra produzio,  
Aurea por epitheto lhe-ajuntaram,  
Alguns que fosse Ophir imaginaram.

“ Mas na ponta da terra Cingapura  
Verás, onde o caminho ás náos se estreita  
Daqui, tornando a costa á Cynosura,  
Se encurva, e para a Aurora se endireita :  
Vês Pam, Patâne, reinos, e a longura  
De Sião, que estes e outros mais sujeita ;  
Olha o rio Menão, que se derrama  
Do grande lago, que Chiamai se chama.”

x, 123-125.

“ MALACCA, see before where ye shall pitch  
Your great Emporium, and your Magazines :  
The Rendezvouz of all that Ocean round  
For Merchandizes rich that there abound.

“ From this ('tis said) the Waves' impetuous course,  
Breaking a passage through, from Main to Main,  
SAMATRA's noble Isle of old did force,  
Which then a Neck of Land therewith did chain :  
That this was CHERSONESE till that divorce,  
And from the wealthy mines, that there remain,

with the kingdom of Queda,<sup>1</sup> and on the other with the kingdom of Pam,<sup>2</sup> and would have about a hundred leagues of coast, and in breadth, across the land up to a chain of mountains where the kingdom of Sião<sup>3</sup> stops, it would be about ten leagues. All this land of old was subject to the kingdom of Sião, and it would be about ninety years,<sup>4</sup> a little more or less—when Afonso Dalboquerque arrived there—since it became a kingdom of itself. And the kings of this kingdom became in time so powerful, that they were called *Coltois*, a word used among them for “Emperor.” Now, because it is necessary, for well understanding these commentaries, to look a little further into the foundation of Malaca, I will relate here whence this kingdom derived its first beginning.

At the time when Malaca was founded, there reigned in the Island of Jaoa a king who was called Bataratamurel,

The Epithite of GOLDEN had annex:  
Some think it was the OPHYR in the Text.

“But at that Point doth CINGAPUR appear:  
Where the pinchd Streight leaves Ships no room to play.  
Heer the Coast, winding to the Northerne Beare,  
Faces the fair Aurora all the way.  
See PAN, PATANE (ancient Realms that were),  
And long SYAN, which These, and more, obey!  
The copious River of MEXAM behold,  
And the great Lake Chiamay from whence 'tis roll'd!”

*Fanshaw.*

<sup>1</sup> Queda, or Kidah, 7 deg. 6 min. N., 100 deg. 33 min. E.; on the western side of the Malay Peninsula.

“Queda, que he só cabeça  
Das que pimenta alli tem produzido.”

*Lus.*, x, 123.

<sup>2</sup> Pahang, 3 deg. 35 min. N., 103 deg. 17 min. E., on the eastern side of the Peninsula.

<sup>3</sup> Siam.

<sup>4</sup> See notes derived from Col. Yule's *Marco Polo*, at end of this chapter.

and in the kingdom of Palimbão<sup>1</sup> which lies within the Island of Jaoa, there reigned a Hindoo king whose name was Parimiçura, and as there were many dissensions between them they at length came to an understanding that Parimiçura should marry one of the daughters of Bataratamurel, who was called Parimiçuri, and continue paying a certain tribute to the king of Jaoa his father-in-law. This king Parimiçura, when a few days had elapsed after he had made this agreement, repented of it, and rose up and threw off his promise of obedience, and would not pay the tribute to his father-in-law, and in order to do this he conferred with some of his relatives, and put his intentions into practice.

When Bataratamurel perceived that his son-in-law had risen up in rebellion against him, and was unwilling to pay the tribute, he came against him with a large force and overcame him, and took away his kingdom from him; and Parimiçura, seeing that he was worsted and fearing lest he should fall into the hands of his father-in-law, fled away with his wife, his children and his slaves, and some few remnants of his forces, in a junk, and reached Singapura,<sup>2</sup> which was a very large and very populous city—as is witnessed by its great ruins which still appear to this very day—before the foundation of Malaca, and put himself under obedience to the king of Sião.

Singapura, whence this city takes its name, is a channel through which all the shipping for those parts passes, and signifies in the Malay language, "*treacherous delay*"; and this designation suits the place very well, for sometimes it happens that when ships are there waiting for a monsoon there comes so fierce a storm that they are lost.

When the king Parimiçura had arrived at this port, the captain of the city, whose name was Tamagi, seeing him coming in this plight, entertained him in his house, and

<sup>1</sup> ? Palembang, in Sumatra island, 2 deg. 46 min. S., 104 deg. 50 min. E. See note at end of chapter.

<sup>2</sup> Singapore.



showed him many honours. But Parimiçura, as a payment for the good treatment he had received, out of covetousness for the richness of the land, murdered him with a creese a week after his arrival, and became Lord of the Channel and population that there were in it.

As soon as it was known in the kingdom of Palimbão how prosperous Parimiçura had become, three thousand natives of this kingdom made their way to the king, and these he kept with him, and he lived in the city of Singapura for five years, robbing every one who passed through, for he had a numerous fleet of launches on the sea. The Lord of Patané,<sup>1</sup> who was Tamugi's brother,<sup>2</sup> when he learned that Parimiçura had murdered his brother, and had made himself lord of the channel, made ready and fell upon him with a large force, and being assisted by those of the country who owed him a grudge on account of his rapacity, overcame him.

Parimiçura being now overcome fled away and went up into the river of Muar, where he found some fishermen who lived in poverty, and commenced again to get land into cultivation to produce bread<sup>3</sup> for his subsistence, and with a little fish which the fisherman used to give him he lived there for some time; and some people whom he carried with him led no other life than roving as robbers over the sea in launches which they found.

At this time there lived also in the port, where now the population of Malaca is located, twenty or thirty fishermen, who supported themselves sometimes by fishing, and at other times by robbing; and they hearing that king Pari-

<sup>1</sup> Patani, in the Malay Peninsula, 6 deg. 56 min. N., 101 deg. 2 min. E.

<sup>2</sup> Note the altered form of this name.

<sup>3</sup> *E começou a fazer terras de pão pera se manter*; it may be that there is here a play on the word *terra* in the phrase *terras de pão*, lumps of bread, as it were, instead of the expanse of territory he had formerly held sway over.

miçura was settled at Muar, with the reputation of being a cavalier and man of spirit, made their way to him and told him that in the country where they were, three leagues' distance along a river, there was a plain which was called Bintão,<sup>1</sup> very fertile, wherein large crops of rice could be grown, as well as all other things required, and well supplied with water for drinking; that he ought to remove

<sup>1</sup> Bintang. "An Island called *Pentam*, a very wild place. All the wood that grows thereon consists of odoriferous trees."—*Marco Polo*, Ed. Yule, ii, 261.

Of this island, situated in 1 deg. 10 min. N. lat., 104 deg. 30 min. E. long., Col. Yule writes as follows:—"Pentam is no doubt the Bintang of our maps, more properly Bentan, a considerable Island at the Eastern extremity of the Straits of Malacca. It appears in the list published by Dulaurier from a Javanese inscription, of the kingdoms conquered in the fifteenth century by the sovereigns reigning at Majapahit in Java. Bintang was for a long time after the Portuguese conquest of Malacca the chief residence of the Malay Sultans who had been expelled by that conquest, and it still nominally belongs to the Sultan of Johore the descendant of those princes, though, in fact, ruled by the Dutch, whose port of Rhio stands on a small island close to its western shore. It is the Bintão of the Portuguese, whereof Camoens speaks as the persistent enemy of Malacca." The passage is as follows:—

"Mas depois que as estrelas o chamarem,  
Succederás, ó forte Mascarenhas,  
E, se injustos o mando te tomarem,  
Prometto-te que fama eterna tenhas!  
Para teus inimigos confessarem  
Teu valor alto, o fado quer que venhas  
A mandar mais de palmas coroadas,  
Que de fortuna justa acompanhado :

"No reino de Bintão, que tantos danos  
Terá a Malaca muito tempo feitos,  
N' hum só dia as injurias de mil annos  
Vingarás co' o valor de illustres peitos :  
Trabalhos e perigos inhumanos,  
Abrolhos ferreos mil, passos estreitos,  
Tranqueiras, baluartes, lanças, settas,  
Tudo fico, que rompas e sobmettas."

thither, and if he would make his settlement there, they would serve him and become his tributaries.

Parimiçura, having received this information which the fishermen had given to him, went and viewed the site, and was very much pleased with it and with all that territory; and returning to Muar embarked with all his household and followers, and went to live at Bintão, and began to make extensive sowings of grain, and orchards of fruit, and made some very large palaces for his occupation, and became so well pleased with this land that he created the fishermen to be Nobles and Mandarins of his household out of recompense for their services in having shown him the situation; and because the harbour was commodious and very deep with good water, in the space of four months after Parimiçura had first gone thither, there was a population of a hundred inhabitants where the city of Malaca now stands.<sup>1</sup>

The robbers who used to go about pirating over the sea in launches that made a practice of putting into the port of Malaca for water, appreciating the favours and good entertainment that they received from the king Parimiçura, began to take up their abode there, and carry thither the goods they had stolen, and a great development began to take place, so that within two years there was a population of two thousand inhabitants, and they began to acquire a steady trade. This Parimiçura gave the name of *Malaca* to the new colony, because, in the language of Jaoa, when a man of Palimbão flees away they call him *Malayo*; and since he had come to that place fleeing from the kingdom of Palimbão, of which indeed he once was king, he gave the place the name of *Malaca*. Others say that it was

<sup>1</sup> From this text it would appear that the city of Malaca was built on the plain of Bintão. If the statement of the *Commentaries* is correct, Bintão can hardly be identified with the Island of Bintang, as above. Very possibly there were several sites thus named. Bantam, on the West Coast of Java, is another example of the name.

called Malaca because of the numbers of people who came there from one part and the other in so short a space of time, for the word *Malaca* also signifies to *meet*, and therefore they gave it the name of city in contradiction. Of these two opinions let each one accept that which he thinks to be the best, for this is the truth of the matter.

Batara Tamurel, having perceived the rapid growth of affairs at Malaca, and the prosperity which attended his son-in-law, reconciled himself with him again and sent him a great many supplies at his expense; and because the king Parimiçura was a man of good nature and treated with kindness those who visited that port, the inhabitants of Pacé and of Bengala<sup>1</sup> began to trade with those of Malaca, and seven years after Parimiçura had begun this population of Malaca, he died, and left behind him a son whose name was Xaquendarxa, who, though he was a Hindoo, married a daughter of the king of Pacé, but it would not have been very difficult to make him turn Moor, for when they were married, either by reason of the entreaties of his wife, or from the admonitions of his father-in-law, very few days elapsed before he became a Moor. And this king Xaquendarxa, after having several sons, desired to go and see the king of China, saying he wished to go and see a king who had for his vassals the Javanese, and the Siamese, and people of all other known lands; so he set out from Malaca, taking with him a present for the king of China, and occupied three years in the journey, and became his vassal, and brought back with him a half seal in sign of vassalage, and obtained permission to coin small money of pewter, which money he ordered to be made as soon as he reached Malaca; and to it he gave the name of *Caixes*,<sup>2</sup> which are like our *ceitils*, and a hundred of them go

<sup>1</sup> Bengal.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. "Aos quaes se davão *duas Caixas*, que sam *tres reis* da nossa moeda" (*Hist. de Fern. Mend. Pinto*, 128, col. 4). *Bluteau*.—The Chinese

to the *calaim*, and each *calaim* was worth, according to an appointed law, eleven *reis* and four *ceitils*.<sup>1</sup> Silver and gold was not made into money, but only used by way of merchandise.

And when the king of China had taken his leave of Xaquendarxá, he sent with him a captain who was to accompany him back to Malaca, and in consequence of the

*Le* (? Portug., *Re*) is the European *cash*; 100 *Le* = 1 *Candarim* (? Portug. *Calaim*).

<sup>1</sup> We here obtain the value of the *Calaim* (as a coin), which is mentioned above, at p. 45. But, on the other hand, Bluteau quotes from the *Decadas* a passage where the word is used as equivalent to *estanho*, and calls it a fine kind of Indian pewter. According to the above, the monetary system of Malaca, as arranged by Xaquendarxa, would be—

1 *Caixe*, or *Cash*, Malay = 1 *Cecil*, Portuguese.

100 *Caixes* = 1 *Calaim* = 11 *Reis*, 4 *Ceitils*.

∴ 1 *Rei* =  $8\frac{1}{11}$  *Ceitils* or *Caixes*.

But from Bluteau's description of the *Cecil*, which I translate below, the correspondence between the *Rei* and *Cecil* is different from this deduction. "*Cecil*, or *Seitil*, as though one said *Sextil*, for of old it was a coin which was equal to the sixth part of an *adarme* ( $\frac{1}{6}$  of an ounce). Others say that *Cecil* is derived from *Ceita*, understanding thereby that this coin was taken from the city of *Ceita*. Others will have it that the coin was called *Cecil*, as though for *Settil*, because *seven* of them go to the copper *Real*. Francisco Soarez Toscano says, in his *Parallels*, p. 129, that king D. João I, in remembrance of his conquest of the city of Ceita, ordered copper money to be struck, which he then called *Septil*, now *Cecil*, of which *six* go to the copper *Real*, although they are no longer current in this kingdom, and, indeed, in the time of the said author they were only current in Guimaraens, where flax was bought and sold by the *Cecil*. On one side of this coin, the said king ordered to be placed the arms of Portugal; on the other, a city along the water side," etc. For the best information upon the native currency, the reader will do well to consult "*Recherches sur les Monnaies des Indigènes de l'Archipel Indien et de la Péninsule Malaie*, par H. C. Millies; Ouvrage Posthume, publié par l'Institut Royale pour la Philologie et l'Ethnographie de l'Inde Néerlandaise. La Haye. M. Nijhoff, 1871," 4to. For figures of these coins, see the work of Manoel Bernardes Lopes Fernandes, entitled "*Memoria das moedas correntes em Portugal*," etc.; among the "*Memorias da Academia Real das Sciencias de Lisboa, 2a classe*," p. 96, etc.

great friendship which sprung up between them on their road, Xaquendarxá married one of his daughters,<sup>1</sup> by whom he had a son whose name was Rajapute, from whom are descended the kings of Campar<sup>2</sup> and Pam. And a few days after his return to Malaca he died, and his eldest son, whose name was Modafaixa, reigned after him.

When Modafaixa came to the throne he again confirmed the treaties of peace which his father had made with the king of China, and of Siao and of Jaoa, and greatly ennobled Malaca, and always kept a fleet on the sea, and conquered many lands, and took the kingdom of Campar and of Pam, and of Dandargiri, and made [the kings of] them Moors by force and married them to three daughters of his brother<sup>3</sup> Rajapute. When he had done this he took the name of Sultan Madofaixa,<sup>4</sup> and soon after died, and one of his sons, named Sultan Marsusa, became king after him.

This king when he began to govern his kingdom built upon the mountain of Malaca great palaces in which he lived, and because he was afraid lest his uncle Rajapute, who was at Bentão, should rise up against him and deprive

<sup>1</sup> The text is "casou-o Xaquendarxá com huma filha sua", "Xaquendarxá married him to one of his daughters"; but from the context and pedigree, there is no doubt that the author of the *Commentaries* has translated wrongly here from some original account. The article should not be enclitic; the sentence will then become "Xaquendarxá married", etc., as I have given it; and this is borne out by the reading of the edition of 1576. "Casou ho Xaquendarxá", etc.

<sup>2</sup> "Vês, corre a costa que Champá se chama,  
Cuja mata he do pao cheiroso ornada."—*Lus.*, x, 120.

"Here (mark it!) runs the Coast that's called CHAMPA,  
Whose groves smell hot of Calambuco wood."—*Fanshaw*.

See also Yule's *Marco Polo*, ii, 248, Book III, chap. v: "Of the Great Country called Chamba"; which the learned editor identifies with "the whole coast between Tongking and Kamboja, including all that is now called Cochín China outside of Tongking".—*Ib.*, p. 250.

<sup>3</sup> See pedigree at the end of the chapter.

<sup>4</sup> Note this variant form of the name.



him of his kingdom by force, he went to that place and killed him with a creese, although he was now of an advanced age.

As soon as the kings of Pam and Dandargiri were informed of the murder of his uncle which had been committed by Sultan Marsusa they conspired against him, but as he was a cavalier he went up against them and overcame them, and compelled them to pay a double tribute, and married them with his two sisters, and he himself married a daughter of the king of Pam. These marriages produced great amity among them all, and by this daughter of the king of Pam the sultan had a son who died by poison; and afterwards the sultan married a daughter of his Lassamane,<sup>1</sup> by whom he had a son called Alaoadin. On the death of Sultan Marsusa, Sultan Alaoadin became king and married a daughter of the king of Campar, and this king was so rich and amassed so much gold out of the revenues of the port of Malaca, that it was estimated at a hundred and forty quintals<sup>2</sup> of gold.

He now contemplated his wealth and determined to go to the temple of Méca, and made ready many junks for the passage, intending to carry with him the king of Campar and the king of Dandargiri, whom he kept in his court because they were inclined to revolt, not permitting them to return to their own lands, and he had become lord over all that land because he was very powerful on the sea and very rich. And in this king's time Malaca became so noble a city that it was said to contain forty thousand inhabitants, amongst whom were people from all parts of the world. This Sultan Alaoadin married a daughter of his

<sup>1</sup> For the signification of this word, see next chapter.

<sup>2</sup> The *quintal* is equal to 4 *arrobas*, of 32 *arratels* each. The *arratel* contains 2 *marcos*, of eight *onças* each. The *quintal* is represented as equivalent to 58.7428 *kilogr.*, Fr. 140 *quintals* = 8824 *kilogr.*, nearly; that is, upwards of eight tons avoirdupois, English. At £3, English, to the ounce, this would amount to upwards of £860,000.

Bendará, who had been Quelim<sup>1</sup> in the time of his father, whom he loved very dearly, and by her he had a son who was called Sultan Mahamet, and by the daughter of the king of Campar he had a son whose name was Sultan Celeimão, and to this latter the kingdom appertained by right, because he came of the lineage of the kings.

When Alaoadin was ready to set out for Méca, he died of poison, and it was said to have been given to him by the intrigues of the kings of Pam and Dandargiri, because he tried to carry them away against their will. On the death of Sultan Alaoadin, a great dissension arose in the kingdom, because the daughter of the king of Campar, who was queen, wished that her son should inherit the kingdom, for it belonged to him by right. But the Bendará, who was very powerful, and had command of large sums of money, favoured the grandson of his brother who had been Bendará before him, and the kings of Pam and Campar favoured the former. At last the Bendará seized the kingdom for his relative; and as soon as Sultan Mahamet was in possession of the kingdom, he threw off the yoke of Sião and Java, and submitted himself to the king of China.

When the king of Sião found that the king of Malaca would not obey him, he came down against him with a fleet of a hundred sail. The king of Malaca getting knowledge of this, sent his Lassamane to intercept the fleet on the way, and the Lassamane proceeded to wait for him off the island of Pulapicão,<sup>2</sup> and routed the whole of the fleet. And from that time until Afonso Dalboquerque took Malaca<sup>3</sup>—twenty-two years after—they never came again.

<sup>1</sup> This word appears to be a titular designation and of Chinese origin.

<sup>2</sup> ? Panjang, or Pulo Panjang Island, in the Gulf of Siam, 9 deg. 9 min. N., 103 deg. 25 min. E.

<sup>3</sup> Col. Yule, in his Second Edition of *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, gives the substance of the following notes in vol. ii, p. 263, 264, which are necessary to understand this chapter.

Singapura was founded by an emigration from Palembang, itself a

This king Sultan Mahamet was very vain and very proud, and made a quarrel with his father for wishing to go to the temple of Méca, for he used to say that Malaca was the right Méca; and, being suspicious of his brother, Sultan

Javanese colony. It became the site of a flourishing kingdom, and was then, according to the tradition recorded by De Barros, the most important centre of population in those regions. The Malay chronology, as published by Valentyn (v, 352), ascribes the foundation of Malaca to a king called Iskandar Shah, in A.D. 1252, fixes the reign of Mahomet Shah, third king of Malaca, and first Mussulman king, from A.D. 1276-1333, and gives eight kings in all between the foundation of the city and its capture by the Portuguese in A.D. 1511, a space, according to those data, of 259 years. As Sri Iskandar Shah, the founder, had reigned three years in Singapura before founding Malaca, and Mahomet Shah, the loser, reigned two years in Johore after the loss of his capital, we have 264 years to divide among eight kings, giving thirty-three years to each. This certainly indicates that the period requires considerable curtailment.

Again, both De Barros and these *Commentaries* ascribe the foundation of Malaca to a Javanese fugitive from Palembang, called Paramiçura, and the latter makes Xaquendarxa (Iskandar Shah) the son of Paramiçura, and first convert to Mahomedanism. Four other kings (see pedigree here following) reign in succession, the last of them being Sultan Mahamet (Mahomed Shah), who was expelled by Afonso Dalboquerque in 1511.


The historian, De Couto, while giving the same number of reigns from the conversion to the capture, places the former about A.D. 1384. And these *Commentaries* allow no more than some ninety years from the foundation of Malaca to the capture of the city by the Portuguese. This would place the foundation about A.D. 1421. There is another approximate check to the chronology, afforded by a Chinese record in Amyot's *Collection*, vol. xiv, where we read that Malaca first acknowledged itself tributary to the empire in 1405, the king being *Sili-ju-eul-sula* (?). In A.D. 1411 *Peilimisula* (Parimiçura) came in person to the Court of China to render homage; and in 1414 the Queen Mother of Malaca came to the Court, bringing her son's homage. Now this notable fact of the visit of a king of Malaca to the Court of China, and his acknowledgment of the Emperor's supremacy, is also recorded in these *Commentaries*; wherein, it is true, the visit is attributed not to Parimiçura, founder of Malaca, but to his son and successor Iskandar Shah. This may be a question of title only, perhaps borne by both; but, we seem entitled to conclude with confidence that Malaca was founded by

Celeimão, he murdered him with a creese, and in like manner he murdered seventeen of the principal men, all of them his relatives, without any cause, and even killed his own son and heir, because he had asked him for some money to spend. The Moors, indeed, used to say that it was in retribution for these crimes that Afonso Dalboquerque deprived him of his kingdom.

a Prince whose son was reigning, and visited the Court of China in 1411. And the real chronology will be about midway between the estimate of De Couto and of the *Commentaries*; that is, the commencement of the fifteenth century.

### PEDIGREE OF THE KINGS OF MALACA,

*According to the "Commentaries".*



And when these men were dead, he seized all their property, amounting to about fifty quintals of gold, and took all their wives and daughters to be his concubines—about fifty women of great price. Thus there were in Malaca, from the first king who founded the city to the time of Sultan Mahamet, in whose time Afonso Dalboquerque took it, six kings, that is to say, Parimiçura, Xaquendarxá, Sultan Modafaixa, Sultan Marsusa, Sultan Alaoadim, Sultan Mahamet. And Malaca became so noble that they used to say, when Afonso Dalboquerque took it, that the city and the suburbs contained about a hundred thousand inhabitants, and extended a good league's length along the sea.

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## CHAPTER XVIII.

Of the customs and government of the city of Malaca.

This port of Malaca is very safe; there are no storms to injure it, and never was a ship lost there. It forms a point where some monsoons commence and others end, so that the inhabitants of Malaca call those of India people of the West, and the Javanese, Chinese, and Gores,<sup>1</sup> and all other of those Islanders, people of the East; and Malaca is the middle of all this, a sure and speedy navigation, such as Singapura never had, for in the shoals of Capacia many a ship has been lost. And those which come from the east to the west find here western merchandize, and carry it away with them, leaving that which they bring of theirs here instead, and in like manner do they who come from the west. By these means Malaca gradually increased to so great an extent, that whereas the place used once to be a village of Pacé, Pacé became at length a village of

<sup>1</sup> These are described further on in this chapter.

Malaca, for most of the Moors of Pacé came thither to settle.

Every year there used to come to Malaca ships of Cambaya, Chaul, Dabul, Calicut, Adem, Méca, Xaer,<sup>1</sup> Judá, Choramendal, and Bengala, of the Chinese, Gores, and Javanese, of Pegú, and all those parts. But those of Sião did not come to Malaca with their merchandize, because they were continually at war with the Malays. And I verily believe, according to information which I have obtained concerning the affairs of Malaca, that if there were another world, and another navigable route, yet all would resort to the city, for in her they would find every different sort of drugs and spices which can be mentioned in the world, by reason of the port of Malaca being more commodious for all the monsoons from Cape Comorim to the East, than any other ports that exist in those parts. But I do not describe particularly the other advantages that are possessed by this port of Malaca on account of the monsoons, which enable a navigable intercourse to be maintained in those parts independently of the shallows of Capacia, in order that I may not make too long a digression.

The Malays are proud men by nature, and esteem themselves highly for killing men adroitly with stabs of the creese.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xaer, or Shehr, a port on the coast of Arabia, between Adem and Dofar, 14 deg. 44 min. N., 49 deg. 40 min. E.

<sup>2</sup> Bluteau describes the *Crís*, or Creese, the national arm of the Malays, as a kind of dagger, with a flat blade, sometimes undulating at the sides, and poisoned. The poison is applied in two ways, either by steeping the weapon in the juice of herbs, and so applying the poison whenever it is required to use it; or, by incorporating the poison into the temper of the blade, in order that the metal may be thoroughly imbued with it. Of this latter kind, there are some specimens which cost as much as a thousand *patacas* (piastres), for the makers spend much time in their manufacture, using many superstitions and observing certain periods for the tempering. They strike a certain number of blows on certain days of the month for the forging, and sometimes the ceremony of this work lasts, with mysterious interruptions, for more than a year.



They are malicious, generally of little truth, yet the Gores always used to be truthful because they held it to be a high honour that men should trade with them, for they are a noble race, and one of good customs. The Malays are gallant men, they wear good clothing, they will not allow anyone to put his hands on their heads, nor on their shoulders. All their delight is in conversing about military matters, and they are very courteous. No one is allowed to wear yellow colours under pain of death, except only the king of the land, unless he be a person to whom the king gives permission to do so in order to show him honour. The Fidalgos, when they speak to the king, have to stand off from him at a distance of five or six paces.

In the hot season the poison which is communicated by the *kris* is so subtle, that, from a light prick or a mere scratch, it reaches the heart and kills. The only remedy is for the wounded person immediately—*comer do seu proprio esterco*.

Mr. H. Syer Cuming, F.S.A.Scot., whose collection of ethnographical objects is very extensive, has kindly given me the following notes concerning this weapon :—"The *Kris* may be regarded as the typical or national weapon of the Malays of Java and Sumatra. It is a dagger with a waved or serpentine double-edged blade, varying from less than eleven to full fourteen inches in length, and gradually widening from the point to the grip, where it has a rather sudden expansion, which is always more or less richly decorated on one side with a perforated device. This device occasionally takes the form of the head of a serpent, the body of the reptile constituting a sort of mid-rib, running nearly the whole length of the blade; which, it is well to state, is of fine watered or damasked steel, and it is a common practice to dip this blade in poison before going into action.

"The hilt, or grip, of the *kris* has a singular curve or bend on one side, and is generally wrought of a beautiful rich brown wood which takes a high polish; but ivory is sometimes employed. The grip is almost constantly carved; the decorations, however, vary from a few slight cuttings to elaborate designs.

"The wooden sheath of the *kris* is also of peculiar fashion, having a broad wing on one side to receive the sharp projecting portion of the blade, and it further serves as a support to the weapon when worn in the waist-girdle."

The lords who are adjudged to suffer penalty of death have the honourable privilege of dying by the creese, and the nearest relation of the sufferer is the one who kills him. If any man of the people die without heirs, his property goes to the king; and no one can marry without permission from the king or the Bendará. If anyone take his wife in adultery, he may kill within his house both of the parties, but not outside the house, neither can he kill the one without the other, but he must accuse them before the judge. In the case of a fine for injuries, when it has been imposed, the kings used to take half of the money, and the injured person the other half. In Malaca there were divers manners of administering legal punishment, according to the nature of the crime: some were thrust upon spits, others struck forcibly on the breast;<sup>1</sup> some hanged, others boiled in water; others roasted and given as food to certain men who are like wild men, from a land which is called Daru, whom the king brought to Malaca to eat those condemned to this death. And of every man who dies at the hands of the law, the king takes the half of the property when there are heirs, and the whole of it when there are none.

There used to be in Malaca five principal dignities. The first is *Pudricaraja*, which signifies Viceroy, and after the king this one is the greatest. The second is *Bendará*, who is the Controller of the Treasury, and governs the kingdom. Sometimes the *Bendará* holds both of these offices of *Pudricaraja* and *Bendará*, for two separate persons in these two offices never agree well together. The third is *Lassamane*; this is Admiral of the Sea. The fourth is *Tamungo*, who is charged with the administration of justice upon foreigners. The fifth is *Xabandar*; and of these there were four, one of each nation—one of China, another of Java, another of Cambaya, another of Bengala. And all the lands were

<sup>1</sup> *Acotovelados nos peitos*; lit.,肘击, or struck with the elbow.

divided among these four men, and every one had his portion, and the *Tamungo* was Judge of the Custom House, over all these.

One may well and truly say that Malaca, in point of fact, and merchant trade, is the most extensive place in the world, and her laws were always very strictly obeyed, and the city had need of great persons to govern it, as well in the administration of justice as also in the management of the public property, for it deserves this; but had the city been fairly well governed, Malaca had never ceased to be as it was of old. Yet I do not speak here of the numerous lands, islands, kingdoms, and provinces that lie round these parts, although I had certain information of them in the letters which I used to see from Afonso Dalboquerque to the king, D. Manuel, wherein he gave him account of all those parts of the world, for my intentions are to write only of the labours and conquests of Afonso Dalboquerque, and all else I leave to him who will do it better than I can. I will only here make mention of the Gores, as it is necessary I should do so for the sake of this history.

As for the Gores, according to the information which Afonso Dalboquerque [obtained] when he took Malaca—although now we have more correct accounts concerning them, at that period it was reported that their province was on the mainland—the general opinion of all is that their land is an island, and they navigate from it to Malaca, whence come every year two or three ships. The merchandizes which they bring are silk, silk-stuffs, brocades, porcelain, a great quantity of corn, copper, rock alum, and *frusseria*;<sup>1</sup> and they bring a great deal of gold in little cakes, stamped with the seal of their king. It could not be ascertained whether these little cakes were the money of that land, or whether they impressed them with that mark to show that it was a

<sup>1</sup> *Frusseria*; gold or silver dust in its native state, as obtained from washings at the river mouth, or in mines.

thing which had passed through the port whence they brought it, for they are men of very reserved speech, and do not give anyone an account of their native affairs. This gold comes from an island which is close to theirs; it is called Perioco, and in it there is much gold.

The land of these Gores is called Lequea;<sup>1</sup> the men are fair; their dress is like a cloak<sup>2</sup> without a hood; they carry long swords after the fashion of Turkish cimetars, but somewhat more narrow; they carry also daggers of two palms' length; they are daring men and feared in this land [of Malaca]. When they arrive at any port, they do not bring out their merchandize all at once, but little by little; they speak truthfully, and will have the truth spoken to them. If any merchant in Malaca broke his word, they would immediately take him prisoner. They strive to dispatch their business and get away quickly. They have no settlement in the land, for they are not the men to like going away from their own land. They set out for Malaca in the month of January, and begin their return journey in August and September. The usual course of their navigation is to beat up the channel between the Islands of Celate and the point of Singapura, on the side of the mainland. At the time when Afonso Dalboquerque set sail for India, after having captured Malaca, there had arrived two of their ships at the gate of Singapura, and they were coming on to Malaca, but by the advice of the Lassamane, who was the king of Malaca's admiral of the sea, they remained where they were, and would not pass up, having learned that Malaca had been taken by the Portuguese; but when the governors of the land were informed of their position, they

<sup>1</sup> Lew-Chew, or Loo-Choo, Islands, in the Chinese Empire, 26 deg. 30 min. N., 127 deg. E.

<sup>2</sup> *Balandrois*; the *balandrão* is an ample cloak used by several religious fraternities in Portugal.

sent a safeguard for them, and a flag of truce, and then they came on immediately.

This Lassamane was a man of eighty years of age, a good soldier, and of good repute and great knowledge : when he perceived that the king of Malaca was lost, he went and settled in Singapura, and after Afonso Dalboquerque was in possession of Malaca, he came down to the River of Muar and sent to ask a safeguard, declaring that he was desirous of returning to live at Malaca and serving the king of Portugal. Afonso Dalboquerque sent him the safeguard ; nevertheless he would not come, and it was thought that some of the Moors of Malaca, hoping to gain favours from Afonso Dalboquerque and obtain the government of the land, had written something to this Lassamane, whereby they had prevented his coming, for they feared that as he was a man of uncommon capabilities, Afonso Dalboquerque would seize the opportunity to make use of him for the governing of Malaca.

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## CHAPTER XIX.

Of the message which the great Afonso Dalboquerque sent to the king of Malaca, and of the council which he held with his captains concerning the letter which Ruy de Araujo sent him.

The great Afonso Dalboquerque perceiving the pride of the king, and the little dread he had of the Portuguese fleet,—remembering, too, the events which had happened to Diogo Lopez de Sequeira,—became very despondent when he reviewed the course of this business, looking at the falsehoods and deceit which the king of Malaca was practising upon him. And contemplating all these things, Afonso Dalboquerque sent word how he had many times begged that the Christians might be surrendered, for the king had no right to detain them forcibly, because they had not

been taken prisoners in fair war nor by way of reprisals, but rather, on the other hand, under cover of his safeguard and that of his governors; for when they were walking in the city unarmed, the king had ordered them to be put to the sword in the very streets by any who chose to kill them; and although the king had declared that he had ordered his Bendará to be put to death because he had been the cause of the murder of the Portuguese, yet he, Afonso Dalboquerque, had received information that this man had been condemned to death on account of a treasonable offence, of which he had been guilty, in plotting to stir up a revolution against the kingdom; and this was the truth, for all that the artful excuses about it had for the time been accepted, for after the death of the Bendará, the king himself had given orders for the Christians to be put to the torture, to the end that they should be compelled to become Moors, and some among them, who would not bear their sufferings, had renounced the Faith of Jesus Christ by force, yet he had pretended to take no notice of all these things, and put up with them to see whether it was possible to make a good peace and friendship with him. But since the king was so obstinate as to desire no kind of termination to this business, he, Afonso Dalboquerque, would have him to know that none of the men in the fleet could bear to stay there day after day, without having wreaked their vengeance upon the treason which had been done in that city towards the captain and soldiers of the king of Portugal, whom the king of Malaca had ordered treasonably to be put to death.

Along with this communication which Afonso Dalboquerque sent to the king of Malaca, he also wrote a letter to Ruy de Araujo, wherein he said how well aware he was of his obligation, and that of the captains and all the rest of the forces in the fleet, to die for the service of the king D. Manuel, his lord, and much more so in a war so just wherein



he had frequently justified himself; but that the king of Malaca had apparently obstinately made up his mind neither to deliver up the Christians nor to receive the peace and friendship which were offered to him on the part of the king of Portugal, for which reasons it was advisable to lay hold upon him, Ruy de Araujo, without any further delay; but if this state of affairs should grow more serious, they must put up with their hardships and bear them with patience, for he on his part was bound, insomuch as it was to the advantage of the king of Portugal's estate, to make an end of this business and match his forces against those of the enemy, and the longer he delayed, the more time they had for fortifying themselves.

Ruy de Araujo replied, God grant that neither the fleet of the king of Portugal, nor his Portuguese themselves, should receive any affront or discomfiture in order to make his life secure, for he was also on his part bound to die for the service of God and of his king, and for the liberty of his countrymen, and he held it to be a good fortune for him that Our Lord had placed him in a state where he could die for his Holy Faith; and, as for himself and his companions, he should not fail to do what was best for the service of the king of Portugal, for they were now quite resigned to anything that would happen to them; and he would have Afonso Dalboquerque to know that the king of Malaca was making ready as fast as was possible, and that it was the Guzarates who were at work day and night upon the fortification of the stockades, for these were the principal people who could not bear that the Portuguese should get a footing in the land; and if the Portuguese attack upon the city should be decided upon, it ought to be put into execution as quickly as could be, without wasting any more time in discussing the terms of agreement, or making demands for the surrender of the Christians; for he must know for certain that the king would not restore them to the Portu-

guese, except under compulsion; and he was now become so puffed up with pride when he surveyed the great number of foreign soldiers that he had, that he thought of nothing less than actually capturing the Portuguese fleet.

On receiving this reply from Ruy de Araujo, Afonso Dalboquerque summoned a meeting of all his captains on board of his own ship, and gave them an account of all this which was contained in the letter, and seeing that the king of Malaca was fixed in this determination, he desired them to declare to him whether an immediate attack should be made upon the city, or a further exchange of complimentary negotiations be carried on. The captains replied to him, that for days past they had not thought it right for him to be so long-suffering towards the king; for since the very day of their arrival, the replies of the enemy had always clearly indicated that they did not desire to come to any understanding or friendship with them, and all these delays which had been set up were to enable them to make their preparations and fortify themselves, as Ruy de Araujo had indeed often declared in his communications.

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## CHAPTER XX.

Of the requisition which the great Afonso Dalboquerque ordered to be made to the king, signed by himself and all the captains; and how the king sent him Ruy de Araujo and his companions whom he had there.

Notwithstanding the above-mentioned opinion of the captains, the great Afonso Dalboquerque thought right, for the better qualification of these proceedings in the sight of God, and of the kings of all that land (that they should not say the Portuguese were tyrants) that he should first of all order a final and formal demand to be drawn up, and signed by him and by all the captains, and after this certain im-

provided attacks with a show of battle ; and this demand was forthwith forwarded to the king of Malaca by the hands of a Moor, who was employed in going backwards and forwards with these negotiations.

The substance of the communication was to the effect that the king D. Manuel, his lord, had sent to the port of Malaca a captain, with certain ships, which came bearing more of merchandize than of men, out of a desire which he had of establishing peace and friendship with him ; but, in violation of the safeguard which both the king and his Bendará had granted to this captain, they had notwithstanding stolen all the property and murdered or imprisoned the Portuguese—as had already been the subject of complaint—and laboured as much as they possibly could to seize his ships, but miraculously Our Lord had delivered them from their hands, the king of Malaca should therefore know for certain that unless orders were issued for the immediate release of the Christians and restitution of the property which had been captured in the ships, that he (Afonso Dalboquerque) would certainly destroy him, and take his city away from him, and he held God to be judge between them that he and his governors were the cause of their own destruction ; for, by following the advice of the Guzarates—deadly enemies to the Portuguese—he (the king of Malaca) would not take any steps towards concluding terms of peace with him ; and, as for the present fleet which he had now with him, it had no thoughts about the monsoon—as the Guzarates had pretended to the king—neither was it losing any season of voyage ; nor was it searching for a cargo ; for the ships of which it was composed belonged to the fleet which the king of Portugal employed for the government of India, and it was of no consequence to them whether they remained one year or ten in that harbour ; and the king of Malaca should rest quite sure that unless he gave up all thoughts of prosecuting the war which he

wished to make upon the captains and men of the king of Portugal, he would very soon lose his estate ; and, as a material sign of all these things being in this position, Afonso Dalboquerque gave this token, that he shifted a ring he wore from one finger to another ; which he did forthwith in presence of his messenger, who took this declaration to the king.

And the king of Malaca lost no time in sending the messenger back again to declare that his heart was good and sound, and he did not remember about Ruy de Araujo and his Christians ; that the reason of not sending them was that he was having some clothing made for them ; and that he desired Afonso Dalboquerque would order his ships to withdraw from right in front of the port, in order that there might not arise any disputes between the Christians and the Moors, who had their ships there.

Therefore, although Afonso Dalboquerque was well aware that this was only an artifice of the king, nevertheless, in order not to give him an opportunity of taking hold of anything for future complaint, he ordered the small vessels to withdraw and lie off outside the port ; and told the Moor, his messenger, that he was waiting for Ruy de Araujo and his companions, and unless they were returned to him immediately, he should not trouble himself with any further parley or communications. The Moor went back with this message, and six days passed away without his returning with any reply to this. Afonso Dalboquerque, seeing this delay, would not wait any longer, and sent ten boats, with armed men in them, to set fire to some houses which stood close to the edge of the shore ; and to burn the ships of the Guzarates, in order that they should lose all hope of returning to their land so soon with a cargo, because they had taken so much trouble to prevent the settlement of differences between him and the king of Malaca ; and to burn also all the other ships that lay in the port, except

only those which came from ports to the east of the Cape of Comorim, if they belonged to Hindoos.

When these boats reached the houses they set them on fire immediately, and did the same to the ships. The king, now having experienced the determination of Afonso Dalboquerque, lost no time in sending back Ruy de Araujo and the Christians, and with them a Moor to treat for terms of peace, asking him to send back detailed statements of his complaints, and he would do whatever was desired of him. But although Afonso Dalboquerque knew very well that this would not produce any effect, nevertheless he sent back certain statements of his demands, and told the Moor to declare to the king that these were the conditions on which only he would make peace and establish himself in the land.

The king considered the articles, and conceded those of which Afonso Dalboquerque was most doubtful (which did not seem to him to be a good sign), viz., that he would agree to grant a site in the city on which to erect a fortress, and would pay in ready money for everything that had been taken from Diogo Lopez de Sequeira. Afonso Dalboquerque, employing artifices also on his side against the king, replied that although he attached greater importance to the other articles which he had sent than to those which the king had conceded, nevertheless he would consent to accept these concessions, that it might not be said that he was a hard man to please.

To this reply no answer was ever sent back from the king, but some Moorish spies came disguised like merchants, and brought for sale musk, chickens, and other things; and at other times there came the Moor who had been employed to convey the communications between the king and the Portuguese, discoursing of matters which were nothing to the purpose. He pretended that he came to apprise Afonso Dalboquerque of many junks that were approaching

from various parts, armed and with forces on board favourable to the king of Malaca, and of the great preparations for war that they carried. And when the Moor went off, there came out of the river a number of armed *paráos* making show of desiring to come to combat with our fleet; yet with all this, Afonso Dalboquerque bore with it for some days, to see if they desired to follow good advice. But when he saw their stockades bedecked with flags, and everything arranged in order of battle, and that the king, being a tyrant who was anxious to keep up his position at all risks, and spending a great deal of his treasure to keep up his power, and to maintain it, was so blind that he did not see the danger that he ran of losing his kingdom, he considered with himself that this was a judgment that had come upon the king, and that Our Lord desired to make an end of him for good and all, and to cast the Moors, and the very name of Mafamede, out of the land, and to have his Gospel preached in those regions, and their mosques transformed into houses of God's praise by means of the king D. Manuel and by the labours of his subjects, so he gave orders for an attack with armed boats and two barges with heavy bombards, with the object of viewing the men who rallied at the alarm, and seeing where they had stationed their artillery, and how they managed their defence.

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## CHAPTER XXI.

How the Chinese merchants, who were at Malaca, made their way to the great Afonso Dalboquerque; and of what passed with him; and of the council which he held with the Captains, Fidalgos, and Cavaliers of the Fleet to attack the city.

Among the foreign ships which were in the port of Malaca, to which Afonso Dalboquerque would not have any injury done when he ordered those of the Guzarates to be



burned, were five Chinese junks, whose captains and crews the king of Malaca had detained for some days past, intending to avail himself of them against the king of Daru, with whom he was at war, and this was their condition when Afonso Dalboquerque arrived with his fleet. But the king of Malaca, confident that the Chinese would never dare to fly away for fear of the Portuguese in the port, and also because he had quite enough to do to look after himself and his country, ceased to think about them.

When the Chinese perceived that they had greater freedom than before, they sought a means of escape, and gathered themselves together in their junks. The crews, who were left on land, seeing their captains in safety, a few at a time, each one as best he might, made their way to them, and these captains, when they had reassembled their men, being thoroughly indignant against the king for the robbery and tyranny which he had exercised upon them in respect of their merchandise, and also in order to obtain security for themselves, came and offered themselves to Afonso Dalboquerque with their crews and ships, to help him in his war.

He thanked them very much for their offers of help, but would not accept any assistance from them except the barques<sup>1</sup> of their junks, to be used for disembarking his men on land, for should their business not succeed in the way he hoped in Our Lord that it would, if the Chinese were in opposition to the king of Malaca in the matter, they might hereafter be ill treated by the king for the part they had taken.

The Chinese replied, that seeing he would not accept their services, they begged him very much of his kindness to grant them permission to go away to their own land, and wherever they might encounter Portuguese, those should be ever remembered for the favour he had done

<sup>1</sup> *Barcas.*

them in letting them depart at liberty and get away from such a bad set of people as the Malays were; and if Malaca should fall into his power, they would undertake that every year more than one hundred junks should come there with great quantity of merchandise; and with very courteous words they told him to take very good advice before he attacked the city, for there were inside it more than twenty thousand fighting men, Javanese, Persians, and Coraçones, men in whom the king reposed the greatest confidence; while of the natives, the king could have as many soldiers as he wished; and he had twenty war elephants, with their castles well armed, and plenty of artillery and arms of every kind, which the Guzarates had brought for him from Cambaya, and as for all other things necessary for the war, he was not in need of anything; and unless the city were taken by starvation (though the inhabitants had provided even for this contingency), by stopping the supplies which came to her from Jaca, they thought it very doubtful if any victory could be obtained against her; therefore they told him this, because they would be very sorry to see him in any peril.

Afonso Dalboquerque told them that he thanked them very much for their advice, but he was already quite determined to undertake the matter; and even if the king of Malaca's power were great, still greater was the power of God, for whose faith they were fighting; that he begged they would stay there a few more days to see what end came to Malaca, and then carry news to the king of China of all that might take place; and he would send them a galley in which they could be drawn up close by the place of disembarkation, so as to see the great spirit with which the Portuguese would attack the city, and their manner of fighting. The Chinese did as Afonso Dalboquerque ordered, and, with great concern that he would not have them serve him in that enterprise, went away to their ships and sent him the barques.

As soon as the Chinese had gone away, Afonso Dalboquerque summoned a meeting of all the captains, fidalgos, and noble persons of the fleet, and recounted what had passed between him and the Chinese, and told them how much he took it to heart that these Chinese had declared to him that they looked upon the impending undertaking as of doubtful result, and, in order to get over his affront, he had made up his mind to attack the city before they set out for China, and erect therein a fortress of convenient dimensions, with determination to maintain it, for this was what would conduce most to the service of the king their Lord; because, if they did not accomplish this, it was of little profit to stake very much upon the chance of capturing the city, seeing that Malaca was the principal seaport of the whole world, and thither resorted Moors from all parts in search for spices, especially from Cairo and Méca; as well as all the inhabitants of places to the eastward of the gates of the Straits. And these Malays were the people who did the most harm to the trade of India, so much so that the ships of Portugal, that were thither bound, ran great risk of being lost, unless it were a fleet of very large numbers, well provided with men and munitions of war. At all these things he begged them to look, and tell him, when their minds were quite made up, what they would have him do; because, if they did not consider it advisable to construct a fortress, he would not jeopardise the life of a single cabin-boy for all the Moors that there were in Malaca.

The captains, after many debates held concerning this matter, declared to him that they did not doubt that the service of the king would be furthered by their constructing a fortress in Malaca, with a view of securing the commerce of those parts, but the business would have to be undertaken when he had everything ready that was required, so that he could accomplish it in a short space of time; and that his plan should be to attack the city and inflict a

punishment upon the king for his misdeeds, and overcome that pride which he had manifested ; and, if after the capture of the city, the necessary materials for the construction of the fortress could be got together, they then could make it, provided that they did not let the proper time slip away for their returning to the assistance of India.

Afonso Dalboquerque approved of this opinion which the captains had arrived at, and dismissed them to their ships to make ready against the time when he should let them know the day he had selected for the attack upon the city.

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## CHAPTER XXII.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque, on the morning of St. James's day, attacked the city of Malaca, and what passed thereupon.

The great Afonso Dalboquerque was so devoted to the Apostle St. James, that after it had been agreed by all that the city should be attacked, he delayed the completion of his preparations for some days, with the object of putting his hands to this work on that saint's day, for he trusted that through the prayers and merits of the saint, Our Lord would give them victory over it, as He had done in the capture of Goa. And when the time was come, he summoned the captains and declared to them that he was determined to attack the city upon the following day, which was the day of the Apostle Saint James, and it was necessary, before doing so, to discuss where and in what order they must disembark, in order that every one should know what duty was assigned to him.

The captains began to give their opinions, but as there were various opinions among them, so that some said the attack should be made on one side and others on the other, Afonso Dalboquerque desired, before any final decision should be made, that Ruy de Araujo, who had consider-

able experience concerning the land,<sup>1</sup> should give his opinion.

Ruy de Araujo declared that in his opinion they ought first to attack the bridge before anything else, for if they took that and made themselves strong in it, our people would be placed just between the city and the inhabitants of Upe, and the power of the king divided into two parts; for one could not render any assistance to the other except by means of the bridge, which one hundred men, with small barricades that they could set up in it, could defend against every forcible attempt of the Moors that might be made; but if the attack upon the city were made at any other parts, as some of the Lords who were there present advised, Malaca was of such a size and possessed so many fighting men in her population, that he, for his part, held the matter as very doubtful of success, and all would run a risk of being lost.

Without listening to any further advice, as soon as Afonso Dalboquerque had heard Ruy de Araujo's words, he agreed with the opinion he gave, and immediately gave orders that the captains, with their men in two battalions, should proceed to attack the bridge. D. João de Lima, Gaspar de Paiva, Fernão Perez Dandrade, Sebastião de Miranda, Fernão Gomez de Lemos, Vasco Fernandez Coutinho, and James Teixeira, with other fidalgos and soldiers of the fleet, to disembark on the side of the mosque; while he himself, with Duarte da Silva, Jorge Nunes de Lião, Simão Dandrade, Aires Pereira, João de Sousa, Antonio Dabreu, Pero Dalpoem, Dinis Fernandez de Melo, Simão Martinz, Simão Afonso, and Nuno Vaz de Castelo-branco, with all the rest of the armed forces, would disembark on the city side; and after an entry had been effected through the stockades, one and all were to rush on towards the middle

<sup>1</sup> Compare this with what is written of Ruy de Araujo at the end of chapter xxiv, p. 111.

of the bridge, until they could estimate the strength of the enemy and in what direction their spirit led them, for in an affair of which they had not yet seen the result, he could not come to any other determination than ordering this only, that where they saw his flag flying, there all should concentrate themselves.

Having given these orders, he dismissed the captains to go and get ready, and on the following day, when they heard a trumpet sounded, come on board his ship so as to set forth therefrom.

Two hours before the break of day Afonso Dalboquerque ordered the trumpet to be blown, in order to awaken them, and they embarked immediately with all the rest of the men-at-arms and went on board his ship, and when a general confession had been made, all set out together and came to the mouth of the river just as morning broke, and attacked the bridge, each battalion in the order which had been assigned to it.

Then the Moors began to fire upon them with their artillery, which was posted in the stockades, and with their large matchlocks<sup>1</sup> wounded some of our men.

As soon as the first fury of their artillery was spent, the great Afonso Dalboquerque gave order for the trumpets to be blown, and with a war-cry of "Sanctiago", i.e., "Saint James", they all, with one accord, fell upon the stockades of the bridge, each battalion in its proper place, and from on this side and on that an infinite number of Moors rushed up, some with bows and arrows, and others with long lances, and shields like those of Biscay, blowing their horns<sup>2</sup> and trumpets, and for a good space of time they fought very bravely, and defended the stockades; but our men, who had disembarked on the side of the mosque, by dint of arms

<sup>1</sup> *Espingardões*; the *espingardão* was probably a large kind of *espingarda*, or matchlock, a word of frequent use throughout the text of the *Commentaries*.

<sup>2</sup> *Anafis*.



forced their way through them;<sup>1</sup> and at this very moment the king of Malaca came up mounted upon an elephant, and his son upon another, with a body of armed men, and elephants armed with wooden castles, containing many warlike engines, and compelled the Moors to return to the stockades which they had deserted.

D. João de Lima, Fernão Perez Dandrade, and all the others who were in that company were inspired with fresh vigour at the sight of the king, and without any fear of his elephants attacked the Moors in so spirited a manner, that they got possession of the mosque immediately. Afonso Dalboquerque, who remained on the side nearest to the city with all the other captains and men, attacked the bridge on that side, and although his division met with great resistance by reason of the presence there of a large part of the force which had accompanied the king, very well armed, many of them with bows, others carrying blowing tubes<sup>2</sup> with poisoned arrows, wherewith they wounded a great many of his men, nevertheless anxiously emulating the captains of the other battalion who had by this time become masters of the mosque and the head of the bridge, they fell upon the Moors so bravely that they got into their stockades by force of arms, and killed many of them, and put them to flight. On our side many were wounded, and some died of the poisoned arrows.

<sup>1</sup> ..... e defendêram as estancias; mas os nossos, que eram daquella banda da mesquita, por força darma os entráram; there is probably a typographical error in the latter part of this extract, for the *os* before *entráram* refers to *estancias*, and should be *as* to agree with this word.

<sup>2</sup> *Zarvatanas com setas ervadas*; this word is also written *Sarabâtana*, and *Zaravatana*, by Vieyra, who calls it "a sort of speaking trumpet".

## CHAPTER XXIII.

How Tuão Bandão, captain of the king of Malaca, perceiving the dispersion of the Moors, went to their assistance with a body of soldiers, and what passed thereupon; and how the king took to flight, and our men pursued him.

No sooner did Tuão Bandão, captain of the king of Malaca, who held a stockade on the bridge, bedecked with flags of his colours, perceive the discomfiture of the Moors, than he sallied out with seven hundred Javanese, and other two captains with him, and went to reinforce the bridge on the city side, with the intention of falling on our men in the rear. When Afonso Dalboquerque caught sight of them coming along one of the principal streets of the city, he dispatched from his company João de Sousa, Antonio Dabreu, and Aires Pereira in command of their men, with orders to fall upon the advancing body, and this they did so rapidly, that before the Moors could get up as far as the stockades, they fell upon them with the lance with such impetuosity that they made them turn and fly.

D. João de Lima, and other captains who were on the side of the mosque, when they saw these Moors, ran up to attack them in front, and there and then killed several of the body. The others, perceiving themselves cut off in front and in rear, all threw themselves into the sea. And the mariners, who were in the boats, came up without a moment's delay and put them all to death, so that not a single man was left, their captain, Tuão Bandão, being already dead, as well as the two captains who had set out with him; and when they had accomplished this business they went back to the stockades.

D. João de Lima, and the others who formed his company, seeing, after they had established themselves in the stockades, that the king was retiring by a side path up the hill,

set out in pursuit after him, fighting with the Moors at every step. The king and his son, who were mounted upon their elephants, saw that they were pursued by our men, turned back again with two thousand men whom they carried in their company. The Portuguese captains awaited their coming at the head of a street, and with great efforts and brave determination fell upon the elephants with their lances, as they were coming on in the vanguard, and it is related that Fernão Gomez de Lemos was the foremost in this action; and whereas elephants will not bear with being wounded, they turned tail and charged the Moors behind them and put them to rout. The elephant on which the king was riding, mad with the mortal wound which it had received, seized the black man who was guiding it with its trunk, and roaring loudly, dashed him in pieces, and the king being already wounded in the hand, sprang out of the castle, but escaped because he was not recognised; and thus he and his son, and the king of Pão,<sup>1</sup> his son-in-law, who had come to Malaca but a few days before to marry one of the king's daughters, retreated to the back of the city.

Afonso Dalboquerque, with the rest of his men,—having forced an entrance through the stockades,—followed up after the Moors along a street which led to the bridge, and killed many of them; but because the men of the city, who were fighting in the streets with our forces, were very numerous, Afonso Dalboquerque, fearing lest his party should begin to straggle, made them rally towards the bridge, and ordered them to erect a palisade on the city side; and gave charge over it to Jorge Nunez de Lião and Nuno Vaz de Castelo-branco, with orders for them to command one of the principal streets leading to the bridge with their artillery.

When the Moors saw this they gathered themselves to-

<sup>1</sup> This word is written *Pam* in the previous chapters.

gether in the other streets of the city, and Afonso Dalboquerque feeling himself at length free of them, gave orders that another palisading should be erected on the side towards the mosque, starting from the river to reach up to the mosque, in such a manner that the bridge remained in the middle [between this palisade and the one mentioned above]. And while these palisadings were in progress of formation, he sent Gaspar de Paiva with a hundred men to set fire to the city from that side as soon as the sea-breeze should begin to blow, and Simão Martinz with another party of a hundred men, to set fire to the king's houses which stood at the side of the mosque. When the fire gained possession of one part and the other, it raged so fiercely that it destroyed a great part of the city. As soon as the Moors beheld the flames, they retired a long way off from our men.

Here was burnt a wooden house, of very large size and very well built with joiners' work, about thirty palms breadth solid timber, all inlaid with gold, built up on thirty wheels, every one of which was as large as a hogshead, and it had a spire, which was the finishing-point of the building, of great height, covered with silken flags, and the whole of it hung with very rich silken stuffs, for it had been prepared for the reception of the king of Pão and his bride, the daughter of the king of Malaca, who were to make their entry through the city with great blowings of trumpets and festivities; and in the houses of the king, and the other houses round about, which were burned, there was consumed by fire a great store of merchandise and other things of great price, which the king had in his palace. And when this was completed, they returned again to the bridge where our men were stationed; and it was about two hours after midday, and as yet the men had not eaten anything.

The captains, to whom Afonso Dalboquerque had en-

trusted the duty of constructing the stockades, went to him and told him that the men, being tired, and suffering from the great heat, were by this time quite out of heart with their work, and they recommended that they should withdraw and take some rest. Afonso Dalboquerque put them off, for he hoped to get the barricades completed, and so pass the night there; but because they came again with more earnestness to press this, he made a virtue of the necessity; and, the sun being now gone down, he began to draw off his men to the boats. When the Moors perceived that they were withdrawing, they began to open fire with large matchlocks, arrows, and blowing-tubes, and wounded some of our men, yet with all the haste they made Afonso Dalboquerque ordered the men to carry off with them fifty large bombards that had been captured in the stockades upon the bridge; and when the men had returned to the ships, he ordered the wounded to be attended to—about seventy in number—but of those who were struck with the poisoned arrows, none escaped but one, Fernão Gomez de Lemos, who was burned with a red-hot iron directly he was struck, so that ultimately God spared his life.

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#### CHAPTER XXIV.

How the king of Malaca, after the Portuguese had withdrawn to their ships, began to reconstruct the stockades and fortified his position on the bridge; and of the message which Utemutaraja sent to the great Afonso Dalboquerque.

Directly that all had retired into the ships, the king ordered that the stockades should be reconstructed, and made stronger than they had been before, and placed in them double the quantity of artillery, of which there was a great supply in Malaca, as will be related hereafter, and ordered the bridge to be divided into sections with very strong

palisades, and erect others in one of the principal streets leading from the city to the bridge, and in them he placed much artillery, and on the other side of the mosque he did just the same, and on the shore side, where the landing-place was situate, he ordered his men to throw down many *chevaux-de-frise*, full of poison,<sup>1</sup> to prick our men when they made their landing. And because the Javanese, who composed the principal soldiery under his command, were discontented at not receiving their pay, in order to content them, he ordered that they should be paid all that was due to them of their pay, and three months in advance as well, for he was in great dread lest Afonso Dalboquerque should return again to attack the city. And while he was thus occupied with the fortifying of his stockades, a Javanese headman, who was called Utemutaraja,<sup>2</sup> who lived in the settlement of Upe, and had about five or six thousand Javanese slaves of his own or of his sons and sons-in-law, a very rich man, and one who traded very extensively to all parts of the world, sent a present of sandal woods to Afonso Dalboquerque, and secretly begged a safeguard for himself and for all that settlement wherein he lived, declaring that he desired to have peace and friendship with him, and to serve the king of Portugal in all that lay in his power.

Afonso Dalboquerque accepted his offer of friendship, and sent him the safeguard and sometimes some presents, always striving to keep him on our side. Now, although the agreement which had been made with this man stipulated that he should give no assistance, and show no favour to the king of Malaca, after three days, Afonso Dalboquerque sent and told him that he had been informed that after

<sup>1</sup> *Mandou lançar muitos abrothos, cheios de herva*, etc. The word *herva* is used in the concluding sentence of the previous chapter in the signification of *poisonous juice of herbs*; but in this passage, although I prefer the translation I give above, there is a possibility of the word being used in the sense of grass or prickly brushwood.

<sup>2</sup> The latter part of this name is evidently the titular designation *rajah*.



he had sent him the safeguard, he was nevertheless helping the king with his men to make the stockades on the bridge, which was not the thing that they both had agreed upon, neither was it according to the law of friendship for him to favour his enemies against him. Utemutaraja replied, that it was true he was rendering certain assistance of men to the king for constructing the stockades, but it was insignificant, and he only did so to put him off his guard, for by no other means could he live in this, to him, a foreign land, unless he performed this service.

But with all this provocation, Afonso Dalboquerque did not cease to adhere to his promise of safeguard, and ordered his captains that upon the inhabitants of the territory of Utemutaraja they should make no requisition; and this he did, not because he had deserved any better treatment than the others, but in order to have a fewer number of enemies in the city. And so also he gave the foreign Moorish merchants to understand, that he had not ordered a sacking of the city out of regard for them; yet, nevertheless, if the king would not give way in his opinions, he, on his part, could not restrain his men from destroying the city when they made a second attack upon it. And so from that time henceforward the merchants were the men who counselled the king not to desire war, but to come to terms, and make peace with Afonso Dalboquerque. But, as the king was now obstinately bent on his purpose, he did not fall in with their opinion, but told them that only a few days back they had given him exactly the opposite advice.

When a few days had elapsed, Afonso Dalboquerque, seeing that the king had not sent him any reply, though he had already tasted the power and capability of the Portuguese, became anxious, for he was forcibly compelled for a second time to risk his men in a danger like the past, to the end that he might achieve the taming of the king's pride; and he had not in the land any means of building a fortress

—which it was his chief intent to do—neither could Ruy de Araujo give any advice on these events, for all the time he had been in captivity he had been shut up in a house. And, on the other hand, he saw that leaving Malaca in the power of the Moors meant total destruction to the trade of India and to our ships. And with these perplexed thoughts, which were constantly present in his mind, not knowing in what kind of conclusion this enterprise against Malaca would result, he placed everything in the hands of Our Lord, for this was always the best remedy that he could find in all his affairs; and, putting his trust in Him, he began to give orders and make himself ready in some matters which were needful for the second attack upon the city.

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## CHAPTER XXV.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque prepared himself for renewing the attack upon the stockades which the king had set upon the bridge: and how the Chinese desired of him permission to return to their land: and of the ambassador whom he sent with them to the king of Siao.

When Afonso Dalboquerque perceived that the king, because of the little account he made of the Portuguese—not taking to heart the lesson of experience which he had had the first day they attacked the city—was again setting up stockades on the bridge, with men and artillery for its defence, he determined in his invincible mind to attack it again, and break their pride; and, with this object in view, he prepared a large junk, with many men and artillery,—because these vessels are very lofty,—and it was to be placed in a position overtopping the bridge, in order that our men might avail themselves of its shelter, and more securely be able to attack the stockades which the Moors had built. And he appointed Antonio Dabreu captain of the junk, and

ordered him to arrange in it lodging-places for the soldiers, and provisions and all other things that were necessary for that affair. For, if any great rain-storm should occur, they could take shelter in it, and the supplies, of which they were in great need, would not be lost. And for guard over this junk he appointed a *caravela*, whereof Simão Afonso was captain, and the great galley in which Duarte da Silva went as captain, for its protection. And when all this was ready he told Antonio Dabreu to sail up along the river and pass over a spit of sand which lay before the bridge, while he himself, with all the rest of the men, would follow up close behind. But because the junk drew very deeply in the water, and could not pass over the spit on account of the neap tide, Afonso Dalboquerque desired, in order not to lose any more time, to send another junk with less draught of water, but this also could not pass over, so he was compelled to wait for the spring tide.<sup>1</sup>

When the king of Malaca saw that the junk could not pass the sand-bank, and that for all that it remained there, and did not go back again, he sent four barges full of firewood, and pitch, and oil, to set it on fire, and as soon as the tide began to run down they set them on fire, and let them go on the turn of the tide down the river straight towards the junk, and this they did for nine successive nights.

Now, as Afonso Dalboquerque observed the order in which the Moors arranged themselves for the burning of the junk, he ordered the captains, when they had withdrawn each night, to make their arrangements for sleeping close by him in their boats, and with bowsprits and harpoons hung with iron chains to turn the fire-ships out of their course as they came on in flames, so as to prevent the junk from catching fire; and they carried out this order so well that this design of the Moors was of no effect. And while this delay was going on, waiting for the spring tides, Afonso

<sup>1</sup> Spring tides rise 11 feet, neaps 8½ feet, at Malacca in the Roads.—*China Sea Directory*, vol. i, p. 79, 1878.

Dalboquerque ordered the iron-smiths, whom he had brought from Goa, to set up their forges and begin to repair some weapons which were out of order, and they made a magazine for the crossbows, for they were in much need of it. And he ordered the Factor of the Fleet to get ready barrels,<sup>1</sup> hatchets, hoes, picks, and all that was requisite, in order that when they had gained the bridge they might immediately set up stockades therein, and to arrange for the construction of mantlets, to the end that under shelter of them our men might go in better security from the enemy's bombards, and when all was completed and ready, to cause everything to be embarked on board of the large barques and junks which he had taken.

And because Afonso Dalboquerque had been informed that the King had determined, as soon as our men disembarked, to send down a number of watchboats and many launches by night to set fire to our Fleet, he ordered Pero Gonçalves, the Chief Pilot, with all the mariners, to go and sleep on board the ships every night, and he would give orders for a good look out to be kept over them, for if any alarm should occur he could render assistance if required.

While Afonso Dalboquerque was engaged in arranging all these matters the Chinese Captains went to him and begged his permission for their departure, inasmuch as the season of their monsoon had arrived, and they begged also that he would of his kindness give permission likewise for their taking a little pepper which they had in their ships belonging to a Moorish merchant, a native of Malaca, from whom they had received very good treatment; and to do them a kindness he granted this permission, and gave orders that they should have given to them all the supplies which they needed for their voyage, and made them a present of a few things which he yet had left from Portugal, and desired them (seeing they were bent on going), to shape

<sup>1</sup> *Pipas.*

their course for Sião, for he wished to send in their company a messenger with letters for the King.

They were very happy at this result, and promised him that they would present the messenger to the King and return very soon with the reply, and would highly extol the prowess of the Portuguese and the little dread they had of encountering the enemy's bombards.

Afonso Dalboquerque lost no time in making ready Duarte Fernandez, who had been in captivity with Ruy de Araujo and knew the language very well, and by him he wrote to the King of Sião of the events which had taken place in Malaca, and how his determination was to destroy the city and build therein a fortress, and cast the Moors out, and how pleased he would be if the people of his land [of Sião] would come and live it, and that the King D. Manuel, King of Portugal, his Lord, having been informed that he was a Hindoo and not a Moor, had much affection for him and desired to have peace and friendship with him, and had ordered him [Afonso Dalboquerque], as to all the ships and people of that kingdom desirous of trading in his ports, that he was to grant them all the safeguard that they found necessary. And by this Duarte Fernandez he sent the King of Sião one of our swords, all mounted in gold and precious stones, made after our fashion; and Duarte Fernandez having been thus despatched, the Chinese set forth for their own land highly pleased with Afonso Dalboquerque.

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## CHAPTER XXVI.

The speech which the great Afonso Dalboquerque made to the Captains and men of the Fleet for the second attack upon the city, and what passed thereupon.

When the great Afonso Dalboquerque had all things ready that were necessary for attacking the city again, it

was reported to him that there were some among the Captains who were in the habit of saying that they did not think it of service to the King for them to maintain the city nor to build a fortress within it. On being apprised of this he ordered them to be called to his ship, with all the Fidalgos and Cavaliers of the Fleet, and said to them :—<sup>1</sup>

“Sirs, you will have no difficulty in remembering that when we decided upon attacking this city, it was with the determination of building a fortress within it, for so it appeared to all to be necessary, and after having captured it I was unwilling to let slip the possession of it, yet, because ye all advised me to do so, I left it, and withdrew ; but being ready, as you see, to put my hands upon it again once more, I learned that you had already changed your opinion : now this cannot be because the Moors have destroyed the best part of us, but on account of my sins, which merit the failure of accomplishing this undertaking in the way that I had desired. And, inasmuch as my will and determination is, as long as I am Governor of India, neither to fight nor to hazard men on land, except in those parts

<sup>1</sup> Correa's version of this speech, which is given in the *Lendas da India*, vol. ii, pp. 232-234, is worthy of perusal here as showing how the two reports of the same event, each professing to be derived from authentic sources, differ from each other : “Senhores capitães, e nobres fidalgos, bem sabem vossas mercês que todo o estado d'El Rey nosso senhor depende e está posto nas vossas mãos, em que está muy seguro de nom receber quebra, nem falta, em quanto as vidas tiverdes nos corpos ; do que darão bom testemunho os que viverem, e eu, que o tenho bem visto com meus olhos, nunca poderei dizer os grandes vossos merecimentos ganhandos com vosso sangue e tantos trabalhos, a que El Rey nosso senhor vos he em muyta obrigaç o, e satisfação que Sua Alteza nom faltará. Bem sabem vossas mercês que nós hiamos pera o estreito de Meca, a que nos Sua Alteza mandava hir, com intento de sequear aquella navegação, e passagem da pimenta e drogas que os mouros lá passavão, que lhe fazem grande avesso a seus tratos ; ao que nos hiamos com toda' vontade, e polo querer de Nosso Senhor tivemos contrastes de ventos que nom consentirão que lá fossemos, e arribamos com tanto trabalho, e porque se nom perdesse o gasto que era feito n'armada, per



wherein I must build a fortress to maintain them, as I have already told you before this, I desire you earnestly, of your goodness, although you all have already agreed upon what is to be done, to freely give me again your opinions in writing as to what I ought to do; for inasmuch as I have to give an account of these matters and a justification of my proceedings to the King D. Manuel, our Lord, I am unwilling to be left alone to bear the blame of them; and although there be many reasons which I could allege in favour of our taking this city and building a fortress therein to maintain possession of it, two only will I mention to you, on this occasion, as tending to point out wherefore you ought not to turn back from what you have agreed upon.

“The first is the great service which we shall perform to Our Lord in casting the Moors out of this country, and quenching the fire of this sect of Mafamede so that it may never burst out again hereafter; and I am so sanguine as to hope for this from our undertaking, that if we can only achieve the task before us, it will result in the Moors resigning India altogether to our rule, for the greater part of them—or perhaps all of them—live upon the trade of this

conselho de vossas mercês bem atentado, foy assentado, pois tinhamos tempo, que viessemos esta viagem a Malaca, pera livrarmos os cativos, e tomar vingança d'esta cidade, dos mortos, e roubos que erão feitos; onde Nosso Senhor aquy nos aportou, e sobre bons conselhos avidos cometemos esta guerra, que está no esta do que vedes, com que bem certos estaes que a cidade será nossa polo querer de Nosso Senhor. Mas parece que averá algumas pessoas que farão duvida que sendo tomada nom será possivel fazer n'ella forteleza e a sostermos, o que se assy nom fosse logo El Rey nosso senhor ficava com toda a perda, que são muytas; a saber: o gasto d'armada, perda de sua gente, e sobre tudo estas perdas sem nenhum fruto, que será grande sua perda, porque esta cidade he o celeiro de todolas drogas e riqas mercadarias, que os mouros de todas as partes da India e do estreito de Meca aquy vem buscar, e levão suas naos carregadas, e passão per antre as ilhas, e se colhem ao estreito muy seguro de os toparem nossas armadas, e as drogas que levão, que he grande soma, correm polo Cairo, e a Veneza, e d'ahy a ponente e levante, com que dão muyto abatimento ás drogas da casa da India, que vão ter a Frandes. Outras drogas passão a India, que nos vendem por tresdobro

country and are become great and rich, and lords of extensive treasures. It is, too, well worthy of belief that as the King of Malaca, who has already once been discomfited and had proof of our strength, with no hope of obtaining any succour from any other quarter—sixteen days having already elapsed since this took place—makes no endeavour to negotiate with us for the security of his estate, Our Lord is blinding his judgment and hardening his heart, and desires the completion of this affair of Malaca: for when we were committing ourselves to the business of cruising in the Straits [of the Red Sea] where the King of Portugal had often ordered me to go (for it was there that His Highness considered we could cut down the commerce which the Moors of Cairo, of Méca, and of Judá, carry on with these parts), Our Lord for his service thought right to lead us hither, for when Malaca is taken the places on the Straits must be shut up, and they will never more be able to introduce their spiceries into those places.

“And the other reason is the additional service which we shall render to the King D. Manuel in taking this city, because it is the headquarters of all the spiceries and drugs

do que aquy as comprão a troco de roupas de Cambaya que trazem; do qual trato de tantos anos os mouros de toda a India são grandes em muytas riquezas com que são senhores nas terras, e dos corações dos Reys e senhores, com a qual possança nos tem feitos tantos malles em Calecut, e por todolas partes da India, que se o poder grande d'estes mouros nom fôra, dormindo tiveramos a India debaixo dos pés. Pois que mór serviço podemos fazer a Nosso Senhor em favor de nossa santa fé senão punirmos estes mouros, e seus tratos aquy os confundirmos e apagarmos, que percão este tamanho bem como lhe aquy tomamos? E pois está tão manifesto que este serviço nom faremos, indaque tomemos esta cidade chea d'ouro, se a nom deixassemos segura com segura forteleza, que durasse pera sempre este tamanho serviço de Nosso Senhor, e d'El Rey, e seus vassallos que n'estas partes militamos; tomaremos estes tratos, com que nos faremos riquissimos assy como o estão os mouros, e com lhe assy tomarmos seus proveitos os hiremos deitando fóra da India, que será quando a Nosso Senhor aprouver.

“E pois tomando nós agora esta cidade, com sua tanta riqueza, será pera nós grande honra e proveito, e d'El Rey nosso senhor, que nos

which the Moors carry every year hence to the Straits without our being able to prevent them from so doing; but if we deprive them of this their ancient market there, there does not remain for them a single port, nor a single situation, so commodious in the whole of these parts, where they can carry on their trade in these things. For after we were in possession of the pepper of Malabar, never more did any reach Cairo, except that which the Moors carried thither from these parts, and forty or fifty ships, which sail hence every year laden with all sorts of spiceries bound to Méca, cannot be stopped without great expense and large fleets, which must necessarily cruise about continually in the offing of Cape Comorim; and the pepper of Malabar, of which they may hope to get some portion because they have the King of Calicut on their side, is in our hands, under the eyes of the Governor of India, from whom the Moors cannot carry off so much with impunity as they hope to do; and I hold it as very certain that if we take this trade of Malaca away out of their hands, Cairo and Méca are entirely ruined, and to Venice will no spiceries be conveyed except that which her merchants go and buy in Portugal.

mantêm, e sostem nossas gerações, e com seu tanto gasto aquy somos aportados com esta armada, e com os poderes d'ella ganhâmos, e El Rey tudo ficaria perdendo se lhe nom dessemos premicias do seu gasto e nossa obrigação, que lhe forçadamente devemos, que ha de ser aquy lhe fazermos sua forteza com nossos trabalhos, porque possamos dizer que ganhâmos esta cidade ás lançadas com nosso sangue, e lhe entregamos arrematada pera sempre em seu serviço, pedindolhe que este tamanho serviço nos pague a nossos filhos e gerações, do que elle se nom poderá escusar; tudo, senhores, vos he presente, porque cada hum por seu assinado me ha de dar sua determinação, pera me eu livrar ante Sua Alteza de quem me accusar. Pera que sem duvida lhes affirmo que indaque n'esta hora Malaca se me entregasse, com toda sua riqueza, a não tomaria se n'ella nom ouver de fazer a milhor, e mais forte, e possante forteza que ouver n'estes partes; pois Malaca he a mais populosa cidade da India, que está no meo e estremo de todolas riqas mercadarias e tratos que por ella correm. E pois, senhores, tudo lhe tenho apresentado, vossas mercês agora se determinem no que façamos, porque eu nada hey de fazer, senão o que per elles for assentado."

“But if you are of opinion that, because Malaca is a large city and very populous, it will give us much trouble to maintain our possession of it, no such doubts as these ought to arise, for when once the city is gained, all the rest of the Kingdom is of so little account that the King has not a single place left where he can rally his forces; and if you dread lest by taking the city we be involved in great expenses, and on account of the season of the year there be no place where our men and our Fleet can be recruited, I trust in God’s mercy that when Malaca is held in subjection to our dominion by a strong fortress, provided that the Kings of Portugal appoint thereto those who are well experienced as Governors and Managers of the Revenues, the taxes of the land will pay all the expenses which may arise in the administration of the city; and if the merchants who are wont to resort thither—accustomed as they are to live under the tyrannical yoke of the Malays—experience a taste of our just dealing, truthfulness, frankness, and mildness, and come to know of the instructions of the King D. Manuel, our Lord, wherein he commands that all his subjects in these parts be very well treated, I venture to affirm that they will all return and take up their abode in the city again, yea, and build the walls of their houses with gold; and all these matters which here I lay before you may be secured to us by this half-turn of the key, which is that we build a fortress in this city of Malaca and sustain it, and that this land be brought under the dominion of the Portuguese, and the King D. Manuel be styled true king thereof, and therefore I desire you of your kindness to consider seriously the enterprize that ye have in hand, and not to leave it to fall to the ground.”

When the great Afonso Dalboquerque had brought his harangue to an end in the words which I have recounted, the Members of the council held among themselves divers opinions, some leaning to this, and others to that side, and

the result of the meeting was that the majority again declared that it would be of service to the King to take the city of Malaca and cast the Moors out of it, and build a fortress therein. The others were of a contrary opinion, and declared that the city ought not to be again attacked, for it was very doubtful if the undertaking could be accomplished, and that the vengeance which had been meted out to the Moors for their treatment of Diogo Lopez de Sequeira and his men was sufficiently severe, and even if they had all things necessary for the construction of the fortress there was not time enough for its completion, for they were already at the beginning of the monsoon, and it was absolutely necessary to support India, for no one could tell how affairs at Goa had gone on since they had set out from that city.

Afonso Dalboquerque, perceiving these differences of opinion which were held in the council, yielded to the majority and resolved to attack the city and fortify himself in it, and as for all other doubts which were raised by the opposite party, to put them into the hands of Our Lord Jesus Christ that He might order them all as best to his service, and he commanded that a formal resolution should be drawn up by the Secretary, whereunto he put his signature, as did also all the Captains, Fidalgos, and Cavaliers who were there.

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## CHAPTER XXVII.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque again attacked the city according to the resolution which had been arrived at, and how he entered the bridge by force of arms and fortified himself on it.

Having taken the opinions of the Captains, Fidalgos, and Cavaliers of the Fleet, under their signatures, as I have related, the great Afonso Dalboquerque made up his mind to attack the city, and taking it, by the aid of our Lord, to

fortify himself therein. And because the Moors were in an advanced state of preparation, and had arranged a better system of defence than they had on the first occasion when our men made an entry into the city, he decided with all the Captains to attack the bridge with his whole force in one company.

Having agreed upon this method of attack, all went away to their respective ships to get ready, waiting for the day when it would be high water in the spring tides, so that the junk could get up to the bridge; and when the time was come—on a Friday, two hours before morning—Afonso Dalboquerque gave orders for the signal which he had agreed upon, to wake them, and they, as they were already prepared, came on board his ship, and from it set forth all together in their boats; and when Antonio Dabreu in the junk had now arrived within a crossbow-shot from the bridge, the Moors began to open fire upon him from one side and the other with large matchlocks,<sup>1</sup> blowing tubes, and poisoned arrows; and with bombards which threw leaden shot as large as an *espera*<sup>2</sup> they swept the decks of the junk from one side and the other, and as Antonio Dabreu did not seek therein any place of safety where he could avoid the shots which they kept on pouring into the junk, he was the first who was hit with a bullet from a large matchlock, which struck him on the jaw and carried away many of his teeth and part of his tongue.

Afonso Dalboquerque, who was in his boat close by the junk, seeing Antonio Dabreu wounded, ordered him, more by force than by his own wish, to be taken to the ship to have his wounds dressed, and appointed Pero Dalpoem to go on board the junk and act as Captain of it until Antonio Dabreu was well again. When the delay that had thus arisen had

<sup>1</sup> *Espingardões*.

<sup>2</sup> *Espera* or *Esfera*, an ancient kind of artillery—*Bluteau*, s.v. But see also vol. ii, p. 129, note 5.




passed away—not much time having been wasted—they went on again a second time with the junk leading the way, in the order which they had appointed, and when the junk drew up alongside, as it was very lofty and quite overhung the bridge, as I have already said, the Moors, not being able to bear the severe handling which our men gave them from the round top of the mainmast<sup>1</sup> with many canisters of gunpowder, and darts,<sup>2</sup> and matchlocks, fled, deserting the bridge, and withdrew to the stockades which they had on the bridge, on this side and that.

Afonso Dalboquerque, perceiving that the Moors were beginning to fall into confusion, ordered the Captains to press on more quickly at the oars, and all united in a body set to work to fall upon the stockades, according to the preconcerted arrangement. And although they found behind them a great force of Moors, who defended them for a considerable space of time with signal bravery, nevertheless our men got into the stockades and routed those who held them. In this affair of entering, many of our men were wounded and two or three killed, but it was at the cost of many Moors, who there lost their lives; and Afonso Dalboquerque, seeing himself now master of the bridge, remained where he was quietly with his flag and a part of his force, and gave orders to certain of the Captains to go and take the mosque, and to others to attack some palisades which the Moors had set up at the mouth of a street which led to the bridge, and that neither the one party or the other should leave their stations without his express orders.


When the Captains arrived at the palisades, although they met with some amount of resistance, yet they bore themselves so valiantly that they discomfited the Moors and got possession of the works. The others, however, to whose lot it fell to assault the mosque, found they had a heavy and

<sup>1</sup> *De cima da gavea*; see Jal, *Glossaire Nautique*, s.v. *Gavea*.

<sup>2</sup> *Lanças de arremêço*.



VIEW OF MALAGA.



troublesome task before them, for in that place of defence there was the King with a large body of men and elephants, and the defence was maintained so vigorously that a considerable space of time elapsed without our men being able to get in. Afonso Dalboquerque, seeing from the bridge the circumstances in which our men were situated, made his way with all haste at the head of all his forces to succour them, and because at the mouth of a large street which led to the mosque, where he was, there were many Moors pressing on the flanks of certain Captains that were following the King, who was in flight with three thousand men armed with shields, he stayed himself there with his flag and his men, and sent the Captains word to remain quiet and rally towards the position he had taken up, for there were yet many Moors on their flanks, and then they withdrew at once; and as soon as the junction of these forces had been carried out, Afonso Dalboquerque left in charge over the mosque and stockades Jorge Nunez de Lião, Nuno Vaz de Castelo-branco, James Teixeira, and Dinis Fernandez de Melo, with some of the men, while he himself, with the rest that remained, returned towards the bridge; and he ordered the Captains who were stationed on one side and on the other to stay where they were and not fight with the Moors, even if they came on and attacked them, until he had fortified the bridge; and ordered four large barques which he had, with great bombards, to pass over to the other side and sweep the field on one side and on the other, and cause the Moors to keep off so that the men could more securely work at the stockades; and having arranged this he ordered them to take out of the junk all the munitions which he had brought, and began upon the stockades; and as all went to work with willing hands, in a short space of time he had made two very strong palisades, one on the side of the city, the other on the side of the mosque, with barrels filled with earth, and wood, and he arranged in them many

guns: and ordered that the bridge and the junk should be covered with palm leaves, for the benefit of the men, for the sun was very strong and he was fearful lest they should all fall ill from the hard work they had to perform.

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## CHAPTER XXVIII.

How the great Afonso Dalboquerque ordered relief to be given to our men who were stationed at the mouth of the street which led to the bridge: and how Utamutaraja and Ninachatu, and other merchants, seeing the overthrow of the city, came and placed themselves in his hands.

While the great Afonso Dalboquerque was thus occupied in this eagerness to complete the fortification of the stockades which he was making upon the bridge, he saw that the Captains whom he had ordered to take up positions at the mouths of the streets were undergoing, rather than disobey his commands, much discomfort from the attacks made upon them by the Moors with bombards which they had placed upon the terraces of their houses, and with matchlocks with which they were firing upon them, so he dispatched with great haste Gaspar de Paiva, Fernão Perez Dandrade, Pero Dalpoem, Antonio Dabreu, who was now by this time well of his wound in the jaw, to go and succour them with their men, along one of the streets of the city, and D. João de Lima, Aires Pereira, Simão Dandrade, Simão Martinz, and Simão Afonso, along another street which led up to a place where the Moors where at lance-thrusts with our men, and to patrol through all the city and not to give quarter to a single person they met, while he himself would come on behind them in support, with his royal standard; and although the Moors were very numerous, the Captains fell upon them so valiantly that, not being able to resist the fury of the onset with which they were attacked, they

turned their backs and threw themselves into flight, and some, indeed, among them, who were nearest to our men, cast themselves into the sea, thinking that thereby they ensured their safety.

The mariners, whom Afonso Dalboquerque had ordered to man the skiffs and row up and down the river, came up at once and put to death every one whom they could get at; and when it was sundown the Captains withdrew to the bridge, where they now had their stockades very strongly built on one side and on the other, and Afonso Dalboquerque took up his quarters in the middle, and they passed the whole of the night on the watch. And he ordered the Captains of the barques that were stationed in the river to keep up a continual fire upon the city all through the night with their bombards, and Pero Gonçalvez, chief pilot, to take all the seamen to the ships to sleep there, and carry out the same instructions regarding the cannonade, and in this manner they remained all night. And it was a terrible thing to look at the city, for on account of the constant firing it seemed as if it were all on fire.

When morning came, the Moors, terrified at the unexpected misfortune which they witnessed, dared not appear in the streets, and this went on for a period of ten days running without any cessation by night or by day, and during this time our men were continually spilling the blood of the Moors, for inasmuch as the hunger they suffered was extreme, they risked their lives to go and look for food in the city, and there they lost their lives. And when they perceived the troubles that had fallen upon them, and the great peril they were in of losing their lives, and the hopelessness of their case, some began to come to Afonso Dalboquerque and beg for mercy; and the first who came were the Pégus, and these he received very kindly and gave them a safeguard to enable them to prosecute their voyage, and permission to carry with them their property, and in



like manner he allowed all the merchants who came from Cape Comorim to the eastwards, who had no ships there, free exportation of their merchandize, and they began to start their trade again, and revive the navigation from their lands to Malaca, and this was the principal reason why he did so.

Utemutaraja, as I have already said, who had a safe-conduct from Afonso Dalboquerque, seeing the destruction of the city, and fearing that he should incur displeasure because his son had gone over to the assistance of the King against our men—although indeed he was well rewarded for it, for he was severely wounded and many of his men were killed—came and made excuses for the behaviour of his son, making a show of being highly delighted at the ruin which had fallen upon the King. He received him with benignity, but nevertheless gave orders to the Captains to go always armed with all their men, and keep a good look out, for there could be no reliance placed upon him. Ruy de Araujo, remembering the kindnesses which he and the other christians had received at the hands of Ninachatu, a Hindoo by nation, during their captivity, brought him to Afonso Dalboquerque, begging that he would show him favour and honour him, for he could not repay him in any other way for the kindness of the treatment he had experienced. Afonso Dalboquerque entertained him, and told him that he would promise, before he left for India, he should be rewarded in accordance with what Ruy de Araujo had said of him.

And when Afonso Dalboquerque found himself less troubled by the uproars which the Moors caused by day and night, and that there was no longer in the city any force which could resist them, and as a recompense for past labours, he gave permission to everyone to sack the city, and free power to keep or dispose of everything they took, only warning them not to touch the houses or the subter-

ranean storehouses<sup>1</sup> of Ninachatu. When the city had been sacked, certain merchants, who had fled away to their country houses, seeing the kind way in which Ninachatu had been treated, sent and begged a safe-conduct from Afonso Dalboquerque that they might come to the city; and he granted this to all, except the Malays, who were natives of the country, for as to these he gave orders that all should be put to death wheresoever they were found.

In this second time of taking the city, many of our men were wounded, and some of those who were wounded with poison died, but all the others were cured, because Afonso Dalboquerque took very good care to give orders for their cure, and of the Moors, women and children, there died by the sword an infinite number, for no quarter was given to any of them. Three thousand pieces of artillery were taken, and among them there were about two thousand in bronze, and one very large gun which the King of Calicut had sent to the King of Malaca. The rest were of iron, of the fashion of our *berços*, and all this artillery had its proper complement of carriages, which could not be rivalled even by that of Portugal. Large matchlocks, poisoned blowing tubes, bows, arrows, armour-plated dresses,<sup>2</sup> Javanese lances, and other sorts of weapons, it was marvellous what was taken, besides much merchandize of every kind.

<sup>1</sup> *Gudões*. Storehouses or rooms built partly above and partly under ground. For example, in Correa's account, when Afonso Dalboquerque laments that the fire will destroy the riches of the city:—"Se o fogo nos der a cidade, elle levará todo o bem que ella tem de riqueza, com que a gente ficaria com trabalho e sem proveito." Ruy d'Araujo lhe dixe: "Senhor, posto que se queime Malaca, inda o melhor ficará, que está nos gudões, que são casas de pedra fortes e meas feitas debaixo do chão."—*Lendas da Índia*, tom. ii, p. 236. And again, during the progress of the sacking: "Os capitães, com suas quadrilhas de seus navios, ajuntarão e metião fato em grandes casas pera depois o mandarem embarquar. Estas fazendas estavam em casas que tinham meas feitas debaixo do chão, per cyma argamassadas por resguardo do fogo."—*Ib.*, p. 247.

<sup>2</sup> *Laudeis de laminas*.

All this, and more which I leave, not to be prolix, Afonso Dalboquerque ordered to be divided among the Captains and among all the people of the Fleet, without taking anything for himself, except six large lions in bronze which he took for his tomb, and the bracelet, which I have already described,<sup>1</sup> and young girls of all the races of that country, and some toys, all which he took to send them to the King D. Manuel and to the Queen D. Maria, but they were lost in the ship *Flor de la Mar*, on the voyage back to India, as I shall narrate hereafter.

Let not those who read this writing be astonished when I say that in Malaca were taken three thousand guns, for Ruy de Araujo and Ninachatu declared to Afonso Dalboquerque that there were eight thousand in Malaca, and this may well be believed, for in Malaca were much copper and much tin, and the gun founders were as good as those of Germany; on the other hand, the city was a league in length, and when Afonso Dalboquerque disembarked they aimed at him from on all sides, whence it appears that even this number was insignificant in comparison to what was required for the defence.

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## CHAPTER XXIX.

Of how, after the Prince of Malaca had withdrawn from his father, he came to the river of Muar and fortified himself therein with a number of stockades, and the great Afonso Dalboquerque sent a force against him, and put him to flight.

The great Afonso Dalboquerque, being desirous of setting the affairs of Malaca in order, determined to appoint Ninachatu, because he was a Hindoo, Governor of the Quilins<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 61, 62.

<sup>2</sup> In the view of Malaca given by Correa, *Lendas da India*, vol. ii, p. 250. The "povoacã dos quyllys" is marked on the left of the city, and separated from it by a palisade. See also *supra*, p. 81, note 1.

son of late Amar Singh Thapa, was an officer in one of the battalions of the French Legion in the Sikh service. He was most probably a medium of communication between those parties in the two courts who were willing to establish an official intercourse. His presence in the Sikh army also enabled the Maharaja to recruit Gurkha soldiers for his army.

The members of the Nepalese mission of May, 1837, were at first treated with bare civility but very soon the Maharaja's attitude towards them changed. The members of the mission left no stone unturned. They addressed him in the most flattering terms as the lamp of the Hindus, an *Avatar*, etc. "The Sikh chieftain replied in a gratified manner that he considered the interests of the two states as identical and invited a continued intercourse and presents of elephants from Nepal. The Maharaja wrote a letter to the Ruler of Nepal acknowledging the present sent with Captain Karbar Singh, expressed himself pleased with the expression of friendship and desired its continuance."<sup>36</sup> Whether these sentiments were real or dissembled on the part of the Maharaja, they offer a strong contrast to the receptions usually given to the communication of the Nepalese before the journey of Captain Karbar Singh. Prior to that time no one ever came openly to Lahore from the Court of Nepal and if any one did arrive he was generally dismissed without an interview.<sup>37</sup>

Wade feared that if an intercourse was continued between Lahore and Nepal, other states might follow the example of the latter power and try to ally themselves with the Sikh Chieftain. Ranjit might thereby seek to establish a balance of power as against the British Government.<sup>38</sup> But the most interesting episode in this regard was connected with Motabir Singh, a refugee from Nepal, nephew of the Nepalese Prime Minister Bhim Sen, who fell from power in 1837. In 1838, Ranjit Singh received an application from Motabir Singh that he had been discharged from employment by the Government of Nepal, that he had come to

Ludhiana and wanted to come to the Punjab. Captain Wade detained him. Azizuddin and Gobind Ram were asked to enquire of Captain Wade about Motabir Singh. Wade's reply was that the Governor-General objected to the secrecy observed by Motabir. He had permitted him to go on condition that he consented to be accompanied by an English agent. Ranjit told Azizuddin to report to Wade that he had no design relating to Motabir Singh but only wanted to see his '*Kaydah*' of fighting because he cherished the plan of conquering Kabul. Then if the Governor-General agreed he would appoint Motabir as a servant.<sup>39</sup> About this time Nepalese relations with the British Indian Government were not very cordial and when in 1840 war with Nepal seemed imminent overtures were made by the British Government to Motabir who was then employed in Lahore and was a person of considerable influence in the army as also in the Durbar. The British Government wanted to support him in Nepal as a claimant for power or as a partisan leader. But as war clouds disappeared, he was cast aside. Ranjit's eagerness to welcome Motabir is thus not without some political significance.

Ranjit Singh undoubtedly approved of the conquest of Ladak, which made him the neighbour of the Court of Nepal. He was not an infant in the art of diplomacy, the last man who would be won over by mere flattery. Therefore his changed attitude towards the Nepal mission<sup>40</sup> may be regarded as a real change of policy.

In 1814, during the war between the Gurkhas and the British, Amar Singh Thapa, the Gurkha general, wrote a letter to Ranjit in which he mentioned that the English were contemplating the conquest of Multan and they were on terms of friendship with Shah Mahmud of Kabul, who was Ranjit's enemy, and it was proper for Ranjit Singh to send him military assistance.<sup>41</sup> The Sikh chief no doubt turned down this request. But in a private conversation with Bhai Gurbaksh Singh, Dhanna



Singh Malwai and others, he used the following very significant words—"Though apparently sincere friendship is supposed to exist between myself and the English people, yet in reality our relations are merely formal and conventional. Therefore, I had thought out to myself that in case the English should act differently in their dealings with me, I would call upon the Gurkhas and make friends with them and in case they showed any hesitation I intended to make over the fort of Kangra to them to win their comradeship. Now they have been expelled from the mountains and it cannot be said when they would cherish a desire for the above-mentioned region. I never expected such a thing to happen that the mountainous region would be evacuated by them so suddenly."<sup>42</sup>

By the treaty of Sagauli, the Nepalese ceded Garhwal and Kumaon to the west of the Kali river and most of the Tarai. Ranjit lost all prospect of a direct contact with them. This might explain why Ranjit approved of Gulab Singh's conquest of Ladak in 1834, when the new outlines of British policy of prescribing limits to his power became clear to him. In 1834, a Nepalese agent arrived at Amritsar. In 1837, a mission came openly to Lahore from the Court of Nepal. It was well-received. About this time, Nepalese relations with the British Indian Government were not very cordial. The Sikh conquest of Ladak opened up the possibility of a direct intercourse with Nepal provided further advance could be made down the course of the Spith. If we take into consideration the words used by Ranjit Singh in 1814, this sudden importance of Sikh-Gurkha contact will be seen in its proper perspective. In this connection we should note that Wade's despatch to the Chief Secretary contains the following significant paragraph—"The information gained by me in my late visit to Lahore was that among other objects of ambition Raja Gulab Singh had in taking Ladak, one was to extend the conquest down the course of the Spith until they approached the north-eastern confines of the Nepalese



possessions in order that he might connect himself with that Government ostensibly with the view to promote the trade between Lassa and Ladak, which the late commotions in Tibet have tended to interrupt, but in reality to establish a direct intercourse with a power which he thinks will not only tend greatly to augment his present influence but lead to an alliance which may at some future period be of reciprocal importance."<sup>43</sup>

When the official Nepalese mission came to the Punjab in 1837, Wade wrote. . . . "With whatever views the Nepalese may have now opened a communication with the Sikhs, it is evident to me from the pains which they have taken to establish relations with a people whose territory is not contiguous to their own, that they have some stronger motive than a mere exchange of compliments. . . . To suppose that Ranjit Singh is attached to us by any other principle than that of self-interest would be a delusion which neither I nor my able predecessors in office Sir David Ochterlony and Captain Murray have allowed ourselves to entertain."<sup>44</sup> Ranjit possibly visualised an anti-British compact with the warlike Gurkhas in case the British drove him to extremities.\*

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\* Even Burma was not outside the range of his interest and inspite of the distance, he strove to keep himself informed of what took place there. In 1838, Ranjit observed to a member of the British mission, "I have heard that Burmese fought well and beat your sepoy's".

In 1814, the Magistrate of Chittagong reported that a party of Burmans had arrived there, the head of the party was a confidential man of the king of Ava, despatched under the pretence of trade on a mission to the Sikh country. The Collector wrote, "I imagined from what I gathered that it must be Ranjit Singh".

In 1818, a letter from a minister of the Burmese king to the Governor-General wanted permits for certain persons to proceed to the Punjab to collect original sacred writings.

In 1823, some Sikhs, claiming to be agents of Ranjit Singh, came to Amarapura (Capital of Burma). They said that as a result of shipwreck they lost their papers and presents from their master. They proposed a treaty offensive and defensive to drive the English out. They were honourably received but during the war they were suspected and sent back with letters and a sum of money.

The king of Burma gave credence to rumours regarding Ranjit Singh. Ranjit was sometimes pictured as the hero of a victorious war with the British or as forming a formidable coalition with the Turks and the Persians against them. The British Resident had to deal with these rumours officially. (Osborne—Court and Camp, p. 105. Political Cons., June 23rd, 1814; No. 42 Bengal Secret and Pol. cons., Vol. 361; Aug. 1831).

## NOTES

1. Shahamat Ali, *History of Bahawalpur*.
2. Ibid.
3. Sethi, *The Lahore Darbar*—Wade to Mackeson, July 17, 1834.
4. Political Proceedings, 20th October, 1831, No. 70.
5. Ibid, 17th June, 1831, No. 41.
6. Masson, *Travels*, Vol. I, p. 430.
7. Lieutenant Pottinger's Memoir on Sind.
8. Burnes, *Travels*, Vol. I, pp. 224-26.
9. Political Proceedings, 1st July, 1831, No. 43.
10. Ibid, No. 43.
11. Cunningham, *History of the Sikhs*, p. 193.

Metcalfe's Minute.... "It is a trick in my opinion unworthy of our Government.... it is just such a trick as we are often falsely suspected and accused of by the native powers of India."

12. Burnes, *Travels*, Vol. I, p. 231.
13. Political Proceedings, 12th October, 1835.
14. Ibid, 3rd October, 1836, No. 31.
15. Ibid, 28th November, 1836, No. 16.
16. Cunningham, *History of the Sikhs*, p. 205.
17. Vigne, *A Personal Narrative*.
18. Political Proceedings, 21st July, 1837, No. 18.
19. *Umdat*, III, 533, 536.
20. Hearsey's Note, Vol. XVII, 1835, *Asiatic Journal*.
21. Journal of Gholam Hyder Khan, 1819-1825, *Asiatic Journal*, p. 170.

22. Letters of Moorcroft, No. 1, *Asiatic Journal*, XXI, 1836, p. 232.
23. Ibid, No. 3, June 11, 1822.
24. Hearsey's Note, Vol. XVIII, 1835, *Asiatic Journal*.
25. Letters of Moorcroft, No. 1.
26. Political Proceedings, 27th October, 1821, No. 23.
27. A letter of Guthrie, one of the unfortunate companions of Moorcroft, refers to the career of one Agha Mehdee and a Muhammadan assistant or servant of his and their activities in the interest of Russia in the region of Leh or Ladak. (*Asiatic Journal*, 1828, February, p. 157, dated, Leh, 1st August, 1821).

Agha Mehdee had according to Guthrie come once before to Ladak with a view to securing shawlwool goats in order that they might produce the material and manufacture shawls in Russia. This Agha was originally a Jew, then he became a Christian. He was discerning and sagacious. He was so successful in his first mission that he was sent once again with introductory letters to the chief of Leh and other states on the borders of India and with valuable presents. After his arrival at Yarkhand Agha Mehdee became a Muhammadan and successfully baffled for the time being the designs of Moorcroft and his companions to visit Yarkhand. He then marched to Leh but on the way he died. His assistant arrived in Ladak but not being so sagacious as Agha Mehdee, being addicted to sensuality, he squandered away the large sum at his disposal and gave up the intention of returning to Russia.

According to Mr. Guthrie, Agha Mehdee had imperial letters to the Raja of Ladak and Maharaja Ranjit Singh. He thought that the Czar Alexander contemplated an invasion of China and as Ladak and Kashmir were localities favourable for the Russian army the friendship of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and the chief of Ladak was sought. But, as narrated above, the plan, if there was any, fell through. The story is interesting though we are not in a position to say how far the surmises as to the political nature of the mission of Agha Mehdee are correct.

28. Ibid, 3rd January, 1838, No. 26.
29. Hugel, *Travels*, pp. 101-102.
30. Victor Jacquemont's interview with Maharaja Ranjit Singh at Lahore. *Modern Review*, 1931, November. Translated by B. R. Chatterjee.
31. Political Proceedings, 23rd May, 1836.
32. *Umdat*, III, p. 306.
33. Political Proceedings, 21st Nov., 1834, No. 154.

34. Ibid, 12th June, 1837, No. 41.

35. Ibid, 12th June, 1837, No. 41.

17th January, 1838, No. 29. "I observed to Govind Jus that the avowed object of the Nepalese Agents in wishing to visit the Punjab was to present a consecrated bell at the shrine of Jawlamukhi, while the real one seems to have been an exchange of presents with the Maharaja which, according to the relations with the Government of Nepal, require the previous sanction of our Government."

36. *Umdat*, III, p. 504.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid, 20th October, 1837.

39. *Umdat*, Vol. III, Part III, pp. 486-87.

40. *Umdat*. The Nepalese vakils had been shown the fort of Govindgarh.

41. Punjab Government Retord Office Monograph, No. 17, 1814 (40), p. 182.

42. Ibid, 1815 (4), p. 192.

43. Political Proceedings, 12th June, 1837, No. 41.

44. Ibid, 20th October, 1837, No. 6-.

## CHAPTER VIII

### RANJIT SINGH'S GOVERNMENT, INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY

The *Catalogue of Khalsa Durbar Records*, Vol. II, gives us a good idea of Ranjit's system of Government in its actual working. We can also glean some information from the writings of contemporary authors and from the references to the previous administration contained in the reports of the British officers engaged in making a settlement after the annexation of the Punjab. Besides these, there are, in the National Archives of India, many contemporary and semi-contemporary records which contain information on the Punjab supplied to the British Political Agent at Ludhiana or by him to the Governor-General. Though these do not refer generally to civil administration, yet much valuable information bearing on civil administration can be gleaned from them.

During the period 1799-1839 the Punjab had the constitution pictured by Carlyle,—“Find in any country the ablest man that exists there, raise him to the supreme place and loyally reverence him, you have a perfect government for that country, no ballot box, parliamentary eloquence, voting, constitution-building or other machinery whatever can improve it a whit”. But in theory and to some extent in practice Ranjit was not the supreme embodiment of all economic and political authority. One great limitation was to be found in the living principle of a commonwealth. Some check was also exercised by the order of the Akalis, and by the martial nobility of the Punjab, though they were, to a great extent, restrained by him and then there were the common people possessed of arms.

The theocratic commonwealth or the *Khalsa* of which each individual Sikh considered himself as a member, was a potent force and Ranjit Singh always showed due deference to it. Guru Gobind Singh had invested the sect with the dignity of 'guru-dom'. The three factors of the religious life of the Sikhs were the love of God, reverence for the Guru and the ideal of a commonwealth. In course of the gradual evolution of Sikhism the first two had been merged in each other and when the personal Guruship was abolished by Guru Gobind Singh and the tenth Guru declared that the Sikhs would find the Guru in the *Khalsa*, the commonwealth became the most potent factor of the Sikh religious life. A drum which Guru Gobind Singh had constructed was named Ranjit and the one-eyed Sikh ruler also professedly regarded himself as nothing more than a mere drum of the commonwealth for the assertion of the political supremacy of the *Khalsa*. He might have been absolute, but he always acted in the name of the *Khalsa*. He did not assume the title of king but rather the impersonal designation of *Sarkar* to denote the source of orders. In referring to his government he always used the term *Khalsaji* or *Sarkar Khalsa*. On his seals he had the inscription 'God the helper of Ranjit'. Ranjit's deference to the *Khalsa* was not like the seeming deference showed by Julius and Augustus Caesar to the name of the Roman Republic, when they established Caesarism. The Senate was at that time, to all intents and purposes, dead, whereas the Sikh religion was in Ranjit's time fully alive and the *Khalsa* a reality.

• The Akalis were a product of the extreme interpretation of the teachings of Guru Gobind Singh in which he referred to "Kritnash, Kulnash, Dharamnash and Karamnash."<sup>1</sup> They did not own any earthly superior and represented in a peculiar manner the religious element in Sikhism. In addition to their other military activities, they acted as the armed guardians of Amritsar, took upon themselves the direction of religious ceremonies and also acted as censors of private morals. Their contempt for



foreigners knew no bounds. They were a standing menace to the stability of Ranjit Singh's government and embroiled him in interstate complications.<sup>2</sup> The attack on Metcalfe's escort is a case in point. Burnes says that Ranjit had to place detachments of troops in the ferry stations on the Sutlej to prevent the fanatics from crossing over to British territories. They also took the law into their own hands and inflicted cruel punishments. Burnes also mentions a village to which the fanatics had put fire.<sup>3</sup> On several occasions they even made attempts on the life of Ranjit Singh. Yet Ranjit dared not crush them, though he had the means to do so. All that he could do was to moderate their fanaticism. They were formed into a band of irregular cavalry, retaining their own peculiar equipment and dress and when these fanatics began their ravages, regular troops were employed to bring them back. His Akali troops were always employed on dangerous or desperate service. The Akalis were greatly respected by the Sikhs and partly because of this and partly because of his own superstition he dared not defy the religious susceptibilities of his people and abolish the order of the Akalis. As it has been said, he considerably moderated this nuisance but he could not exterminate it.

When Ranjit Singh became the sole and supreme ruler of the Punjab, his aim was to keep his big sardars under his complete control. He weakened all powerful chiefs by confiscations, fines and forfeitures. He did not approve of hereditary wealth. When his officials died, he used to seize their estates, though normally he left sufficient for the maintenance of the family. We cannot find fault with this practice from a political point of view, as feudal tenures were the bane of all governments. His big standing army overawed the nobility, the review at Dusserah of the troops of the feudal chieftains and the enforcement of strict rules of feudal dues gave him a hold on the troops in the service of the chiefs. The yearly review during Dusserah was like an annual oath of fealty. The new nobles created by Ranjit

Singh became a powerful check upon any lingering opposition that the old Sikh chiefs still cherished towards monarchy. But the fatuity of his later years was responsible for a lapse from this attitude of alertness and this enabled the Jammu brothers to firmly entrench themselves in the hills. He allowed too much power to accumulate in the hands of Dhian Singh, Gulab Singh and Suchet Singh, who were in a position to seize Kashmir and to retain Jammu and a large district which extended over inaccessible mountains from Attock to Nurpur in the South-east and thence north to Ladak besides large estates in the Punjab.<sup>4</sup>

Moreover the Sikhs of the Punjab were soldiers to a man and Ranjit never attempted (and it was of course beyond his powers) to disarm them. It speaks much in favour of the popular character of the military monarchy. "Patriotism", as Acton says, "consists in the development of the instinct of self-preservation into a moral duty," Fully armed and forming the bulk of the regular army, the Sikh people could not altogether sink into the languid indifference of private life. If military courage is democratised, as it was in the Punjab, the government cannot afford to flout the opinion of the people. It can ignore the masses only when military courage is the monopoly of a ruling caste or of an aristocracy, as the Spartans ignored the helots, as the feudal nobility ignored the commonalty of Europe in the middle ages.

*Central Government.*—The centre of the whole system, the pivot of the whole structure of government was, of course, the Maharaja. The direction of affairs lay entirely with him. At first there was no regular system of accounts at Lahore. The revenue was managed by the Amritsar banker Ramaniand, who held the Octroi of Amritsar and farmed the salt mines of Pind Dadan Khan. Bhowani Das, a high revenue officer under Shah Shuja, joined Ranjit in 1808.<sup>5</sup> He at once effected a great improvement, established a pay office for the troops and a finance

office, of both of which he was made the head. Gradually Bhowani Das arranged the civil and military business of the government into twelve daftars or departments. Bhowani Das received great assistance from Ganga Ram, who had served under the Maharaja of Gwalior. Ranjit placed him at the head of the military office and made him Keeper of the Seal. In the earlier records the dates used on the top of the papers are in Turkish calendar months and years but after 1815, the practice of using Turkish dates gives place to the use of Indian chronological terms. Dewan Ganga Ram seems to have brought greater simplicity and definiteness in the system of keeping records.<sup>6</sup> When Ganga Ram died, Deenanath received charge of the Royal Seal and in 1834, on the death of Bhowani Das, he was made the head of the civil and finance office. Bhai Ram Singh, Govind Ram and Fakir Azizuddin also assisted Ranjit in civil matters. The Fakir also acted as the Chief Secretary for foreign affairs. The letters of business were also frequently written by him. Though illiterate Ranjit frequently criticised and corrected the diction of his Secretaries. Misr Beli Ram was in charge of the Regalia and the Treasury. Khushal Singh was in charge of the Deodhee in which he was later replaced by Dhian Singh.<sup>7</sup>

- o From the financial point of view the Punjab was divided into districts leased out, granted or directly administered. Deenanath is said to have remarked that "originally Maharaja Ranjit Singh had fixed money assessment for every village but gradually the syetem as he grew old had been subverted and that for many years there had been seven great districts—Cashmere, Peshawar, Wuzeerabad, Multan, Pind Dadan Khan with the salt mines, Kangra with a portion of Manjha and Jalandhar Doab and in these the governors did what they liked".<sup>8</sup> The affairs of the country were in the hands of three classes of officers—(1) Men of wealth, position and influence who were sent to the distant provinces as farmers of revenue—Hari Singh, Sawan Mal, Dehsa Singh, Lehna Singh, Avitable and others. They managed the

whole business connected with their territories and very seldom reported any case to the court. When they occasionally made any reference, the orders of the Maharaja were communicated by issuing *purwanas*.

(2) The military chiefs who held feudal demesnes on the condition of sending contingents in the field had also unlimited authority within their jurisdiction.

(3) The Kardars or agents whose power varied according to the influence they possessed at the court. The pay of these local tax-gatherers and other secondary officers varied and was mostly uncertain. It was tacitly understood that they were to live by the perquisites of their own appointments.<sup>9</sup>

*Local Government.*—So far as Lahore was concerned the Malladari system was re-established, every *malla* or quarter being put under one of its influential members. The office of the *Kotwal* or chief police officer was conferred on a Muhammadan. The village communities were left undisturbed in the enjoyment of their ancestral rights.

*Financial Administration.*—The arrangements for auditing of accounts were for many years defective. It was, however, not until late in the Maharaja's reign that financial order was restored. "He trusted to his memory for remembering complicated accounts of expenditure and for many years periodically allowed the rough memoranda of those who were responsible to him to be destroyed."<sup>10</sup> This state of the accounts facilitated embezzlement. Ranjit Singh knew this quite well. He, therefore, sometimes called upon his servants to pay him fees or aids and, if they refused to disgorge, he would plunder them. This was not in many cases unjustified. When he confiscated the properties of his dead officials, he, in most cases, merely balanced his accounts. "Sardar Hari Singh Nalwa used to pocket the

proceeds of his frontier government by reporting constant raids by or against the Yusufzais, the result being that he accumulated eighty lakhs of rupees which Ranjit Singh seized on his death."<sup>11</sup> "Sawan Mal collected ninety lakhs of rupees in the space of nearly twenty years, though not engaged in trade or in any speculation in which rapid fortunes are made."<sup>12</sup>

*Land Tax.*—According to the Sikh system the government share was assumed to be half at least of the gross produce. There are instances in which as much as fifty-four per cent. was demanded. Whenever revenue was collected in kind a deduction of ten to fifteen per cent. must be made for expenses, fraud and waste. Normally, however, the public demand may be said to have varied between two-fifths and one-third of the gross produce. There were various methods of assessment, Kunkoot, Batai, *i.e.*, appraisalment or division of produce in the field also money rates and assessment per well.

In 1847, Mr. Elliot submitted a note on the revenues and resources of the Punjab. His figures, though they refer to a later period, give us an idea of the land revenue that was possibly realised in the days of Ranjit Singh.

			Rs.
Doab Baree	..	..	17,81,800
„ Rechna	..	..	40,12,300
„ Jech	..	..	12,39,400
„ Sindsagar	..	..	19,85,700
Hazara	..	..	3,00,000
Peshawar	..	..	15,32,500
Bannoo Tank	..	..	65,000
Dera Ismail Khan	..	..	6,04,700
Multan	..	..	19,71,500
			<hr/>
			1,34,92,900
			<hr/>



From the Jallandhar Doab which was then in British possession and which was previously included in Ranjit Singh's dominions the collections were estimated by Temple as amounting to Rs. 13,20,024. To this should be added 9 lakhs from Kashmir. This brings total land revenue of Ranjit Singh's time to 1,57,12,924. To this we should add collections from the cis-Sutlej territory estimated at 17 lakhs<sup>13</sup> and from the hill regions. Thus land revenue collections must have been approximately 1,75,00,000<sup>14</sup>. The estimate of Mr. Elliot agrees approximately with that of Raja Deenanath, who furnished an abstract to the Board of administration in Lahore in September, 1847. Raja Deenanath put it in a different way—

Number of Dists.	Mode of Collection.	Amount of Revenue. Rs.
8	Farmed out to Kardars ..	25,49,873
8	Assessed, the engagements being made with the heads of villages ..	18,23,556
43	Revenue collected by division and appraisement of crops ..	89,44,658
		<hr/> 1,33,18,087 <sup>15</sup>

*Excise and Customs.*—Throughout the whole country there was a net-work of preventive lines. At the same set of stations excise duties, town duties, customs duties and transit duties were all levied without any distinction as to whether the goods were domestic or foreign. No distinction was made between luxuries and necessities. The whole country being intersected by preventive lines, both lengthwise and breadthwise, no goods could escape government duties for they were checked at least a dozen times in the customs and excise offices on the way. Even many agricultural commodities of the Punjab were liable to pay these taxes after



their full share of the land revenue had been paid. Ranjit's taxation embraced "everything, every locality, every thoroughfare, every town and village, every article wherever sold, imported or exported, domestic or foreign".<sup>16</sup> This had at least one great merit. It was not uneven. Moreover, the customs levied were not so objectionable in their total amount as for the worry and delay which they involved. The merchants frequently contracted with a third party for the conveyance of goods from the starting point to destination. The taxation by the chiefs could not be excessive and arbitrary, as in that case, the merchants would change their routes and convey their goods through the territory of a less exacting chief. In spite of the handicaps mentioned, commerce was in a flourishing condition.

There were in all eight salt mines of which four only were worked, their names being—Khur Chotana, Korah, Kerah, and Makraj. Gulab Singh farmed the salt mines. According to Agha Abbas Shiraz, writing in 1837—"Formerly the tax on salt amounted to four lakhs, after the visit of Captain Wade the farm rose to 8½ lakhs, afterwards to twelve lakhs, then to fourteen at which I found it".<sup>17</sup> According to record No. 357 of the Miscellaneous Section of the Foreign Department, excise and customs returns under Ranjit Singh may be analysed thus:

	No. of article.	Yield Rs.
Imports ..	7	3,62,697
Exports ..	19	9,74,861
Imports and Exports ..	4	1,37,739
Miscellaneous ..	18	1,61,817
		<hr/>
		16,36,114 <sup>18</sup>

To this should be added the taxes from salt monopoly approximately 8,00,000 rupees. This brings the total customs revenue approximately to 24,00,000 rupees. The excise and customs revenue from Kashmir yielded eighteen lakhs.

✓ Ranjit Singh, of course, did not understand the advantage of doing away with internal barriers. But we should not find fault with him when we consider the environment in which he was brought up, his want of education, and his ignorance of the principles of political economy. That his government was anxious for the economic welfare of the governed will be apparent from the following extracts:—

“Last year owing to the effects of the famine, grain was distributed to the zemindars and others both for sowing and subsistence.”<sup>19</sup>

“Kharak Singh was ordered to proceed to Multan and to take care that the cultivation along the way was not damaged by the people.”<sup>20</sup>

“Remission of the rent of Rs. 5,000 was made in the case of Rotas for the continuance of the Maharaja's camp. . . . for the passage of the troops a remission of 15,000 rupees to be made to the zemindars of Gujrat”.

“The Ghorcharahs and others were almost all dismounted. His Highness said that he had ordered them to send their horses away that the country might not be distressed by supporting them which led me to enquire whether he had any regulations to restrain his troops from destroying the crops in the line of march. He stated that he had the most prohibiting orders in force on the subject and took prompt and severe notice of any infraction of them. His attention to the preservation of crops from depredation is remarkable. Few chiefs exercise a more rigid control over the conduct of his troops than he does.”<sup>21</sup>

We learn from Dewan Amarnath that when Khushal Singh brought a sum of money from Kashmir in 1833 Ranjit expressed great surprise and told him that in view of the great famine in Kashmir there would have been no dereliction of duty if he had brought no money. He then sent to Kashmir thousands of asses with wheat and made arrangements for the distribution of corn from the mosques and the temples.<sup>22</sup> Conscious that the stain of the misrule of Khushal Singh would ever remain on his government, Ranjit tried in every way to improve the state of things. "He directed four companies of Sepoys to collect all the Kashmir people in the plain outside the city and they would each receive until further orders two seers of coarse flour, that as soon as the whole were assembled from an adjacent country, they would be escorted back and blankets and largesses would be distributed on their arrival there."<sup>23</sup>

"M. Ventura was ordered to reach Peshawar with all possible haste to make M. Avitabile return the two hundred rupees he had unjustly taken as a fine from the Khutrees of the place and rebuild at his expense, not exceeding 15,000 rupees, the houses of the people demolished by him."<sup>24</sup>

After the capture of Multan Ranjit Singh "began to encourage the silk manufacture of the city. He began to make presents of Multan silk goods at his court and thus their consumption was greatly encouraged. It became fashionable among the Sardars to wear sashes and scarfs of Multan silk".<sup>25</sup> Ranjit once proposed to despatch 30|35 boats *via* Bombay, with the produce of the Punjab, to try what market they would find. Ranjit also showed much desire to promote the prosperity of his subjects, to induce them to extend their trading operations turning the treaty regarding the navigation of the Indus to the best account,<sup>26</sup> and Wade himself admits that he was well-inclined to the interests of the merchant so far as his "limited ideas in the sphere of commerce and industry would allow".<sup>27</sup>

Finally we should note one thing in particular about Ranjit Singh's financial administration. The revenues of the country might have been strained by his system of taxation but in some respects the government gave back with one hand what it took with the other. The employments of the state were numerous and every Jat village sent recruits for the army, who sent their savings home. Village life had not ceased to be attractive and most of those who had come to Lahore and Amritsar had their families in villages. Many a village paid half its revenue from the earnings of these military men. Again, the presence of a vast army created an immense demand for manufacture and commerce could thus bear up against heavy taxation. The growth of the flourishing commercial city of Amritsar is a case in point.

*Judicial Administration.*—There were no special officers for the dispensation of civil justice or for the execution of criminal law. The chiefs generally judged both civil and criminal cases and thus no regular courts of law were required.

There was no written law. Still some sort of justice was dealt out. "Private property in land, the relative rights of landholders and cultivators, the corporate capacity of village communities were all recognised. Under the direction of local authorities, private arbitration was extensively resorted to. The Qazis and Qanungos exercised privately and indirectly those functions which had descended to them since the Imperial times. The former continued to ordain marriage ceremonies, to register testaments and attest deeds, the latter to declare recorded facts and expound local customs".<sup>28</sup>

The Maharaja made extensive tours and he heard appeals; he generally severely rebuked the governors of those regions in which too many appeals were made. He also heard appeals in courts. Justice was not so much a national as a local concern. It was left to the feudatories but as they were men of the locality

they could not go far. "Custom and caprice were the substitutes for legal codes". Fines were levied in almost all cases. Imprisonments were unknown and capital punishments were rare. In distant and disturbed provinces like Peshawar and Hazara, however, the case was different.<sup>29</sup>

Many defects there were undoubtedly in Ranjit's judicial administration and police system, but to his credit it must be acknowledged, if Masson (writing in 1826) is to be believed, that the predatory propensity of the Sikhs was to a great extent kept under restraint. "Time was that a Sikh and a robber were synonymous terms, now few thefts are heard of and seldom or ever those wholesale forays to which the chiefs were so much addicted."<sup>30</sup> On the testimony of Hugel we can assert that the Punjab was even safer than Hindustan, then under British sovereignty. The Maharaja compelled every village near which a robbery took place to a very strict account and they were made to pay the value of the stolen goods.

*Diplomatic service.*—By an arrangement with the Lahore Government, Wade had a news-writer, Lala Kishan Chand, at Lahore; Rai Govind Jas was the Sikh agent at Ludhiana. Ranjit was also supplied with political information from Afghanistan and Sind. He had also news-writers in almost all the important places of his realm. These news-writers reported independently of the Kardars, the Jagirdars or the Governors and sometimes even reported against them. They served as a great check upon the local agents. The most important of the diplomats of the Lahore Court was Fakir Azizuddin, who was employed by Ranjit Singh in all his important international transactions. Azizuddin, who was sent on a complimentary mission to Lord William Bentinck in 1831, and who also played a prominent part in the interviews of Ranjit with Bentinck and with Auckland, was one of the two agents who deluded Dost Muhammad in May, 1835. Fakir Aziz-ud-Din's son Fakir Shah Din was also sometimes assigned a minor diplo-

matic role. According to Elphinstone even in the days of Ahmad Shah Abdali one of the defects of the Afghan government was that it had little information about the neighbouring states. But the Sikh ruler, personally, was one of the most well-informed of men and his government was quite well-acquainted with the affairs of the countries it was interested in. "His curiosity is in striking contrast to the general apathy of the nation," so wrote a foreign observer.

In making an estimate of Ranjit Singh's civil administration we should note in particular the relations between his government and the Muhammadan subjects. As early as 1801 we find Ranjit Singh nominating Kazi Nazimuddin as the head of all the Muhammadans who recognised his government. Mufti Muhammad Shah was appointed as his adviser in matters relating to mortgages, sales and contracts. Imam Bux was made the head of the city police. He had many trusted Muhammadan officers like Azizuddin, Nuruddin, Chaudhuri Qadir Bakhsh and others. During a great part of Ranjit Singh's reign the custodian of the celebrated Sikh fort at Gobindgarh in Amritsar was Imamuddin. When Ranjit appointed Nuruddin as the Governor of Gujrat the high caste Hindus wearing the sacred thread protested against this but to no purpose.<sup>31</sup> The great Sikh ruler was superior to communal prejudices. He even publicly expressed his regard for Muhammadan saints. His custom was to favour the Syads in the matter of assessment.<sup>32</sup> Sometimes Muhammadans who could reproduce the entire Quran from memory were ordered to be brought and they were asked to reproduce the contents of the Holy Quran for days together and the Maharaja would pay them liberally.<sup>33</sup> Ranjit Singh maintained the established Muslim tradition of State-grants to Ulemas and holymen. There is an important entry in the Diary—News of Ranjit Singh's Court—25th August, 1825. . . . . "The Kazis, Syads, Alams and Fakirs of Peshawar were given good khilats and each was given a jagir for his maintenance when the Maharaja annexed Peshawar."<sup>34</sup>



In this connection we should further note the following incident:—On the 20th August, 1825, Mirza Bagun Beg, "*Kumidan-i-Topkhana*", with others approached Ranjit Singh and protested to him on behalf of his Muhammadan officers against his order that there must not be any "*Tazia*" on the street in connection with the Mohurram festival. He pleaded in favour of the Muhammadans that they were taking out *Tazias* from time immemorial. He further submitted that if the Maharaja had any prejudice against the Muhammadans he should first dismiss his Muhammadan officers. The Maharaja told them to build "*Tazias*" in their own houses but not to exhibit them in public. Ranjit Singh then asked Azizuddin whether he too expressed sorrow in that fashion at the time of the Mohurram. Azizuddin replied in the negative.

Two days after Kharak Singh told Ranjit Singh in the open durbar that the Muhammadans of the town and the Muhammadan soldiers of the Maharaja were very dissatisfied because they had been ordered not to take out "*Tazias*" in the streets. The Maharaja then gave orders to the Kotwal to proclaim that any one willing to take out "*Tazias*" could do so and the Maharaja would not object.<sup>35</sup> It was of course the force of Muhammadan public opinion that compelled the Maharaja to yield. But if Ranjit Singh had been a bigot, he would certainly have stood by his previous decision. Well might the Muhammadans pray in their mosques for the recovery of Ranjit Singh as they did when the Maharaja fell ill in 1826.<sup>36</sup> Burnes wrote in his report, "I have always observed the Sikh to be more tolerant in his religion" and Metcalfe admired Ranjit Singh for his unprejudiced use of talented men of all religions.<sup>37</sup>

There were many defects undoubtedly in the administrative system of Ranjit Singh. Though forms and institutions were evolving they were yet in their infancy. To a large extent it was a government of discretion. <sup>+</sup> The kingdom was not united by

laws and adorned by arts. There might have been also a partial abuse of delegated authority. His own mind, again, does not seem to have been suited to enlarged views but only to the minute details of civil policy. ^The greatest defect of his system lay in the fact that the treasury was in many cases filled with the help of the standing army and it was with its help again that control was exercised over distant provinces. The personal influence of the head of the state formed the only hold upon the discipline and affections of the troops. But the greatest merit of Ranjit Singh was that he knew where to let men and things alone. His mind unlike that of many other autocratic rulers was not obsessed by the idea of centralisation. In his government, there was centralisation, but it was mainly financial. The Sikh Government was prepared not only to allow subordinate rights to remain but also to preserve them. Temple says in his report on the settlement of the district of Jalandhar: "As things stood there have been no convulsions, no confusions of rights and properties. The springs of society had been overstrained perhaps but they only required removal of the pressure, no delicate readjustment was needed." It may not be out of place to mention here two British testimonies in favour of Ranjit's civil administration. "In a territory compactly situated, he has applied himself to those improvements which spring only from great minds and here we find despotism without its rigours, a despot without cruelty and a system of government far beyond the native institutions of the east, though far from the civilisation of Europe."<sup>38</sup> "It gave hope to all, roused emulation, brought out the energies of the employees and prevented their hanging on as excrescences and nuisances. As a military despotism the government is a mild one and as a federal union, hastily patched up into a monarchy, it is strong and efficient."<sup>39</sup> Life and property were secure. The towns like Lahore and Amritsar had certainly increased in wealth; manufactures and trade were more thriving and the people were not at all over-anxious to migrate to British territories.

Temple's picture of Ranjit Singh's system of government may be thus summarised—it was rough but firm. Its yoke though onerous, was not galling. Its justice was rude but the people had the power and resolution to resist any very great injustice of delegated authority. The aristocracy, accustomed to arbitrary absolutism on occasions, had its own way for the most part, the yeomanry, prepared to sacrifice much, was jealous of its essential rights, the peasantry, inured to hardship, clung tenaciously to the ancestral fields and homesteads. Property in land survived despite all changes and the village communities preserved their constitutions in tact.<sup>40</sup>

*A Supplementary Note on Kashmir Administration under  
Ranjit Singh*

*Kashmir.*—Was divided into twenty parganas, had twenty collectors, ten thanas and four hundred inhabited villages.<sup>41</sup> The different kinds of coins in use were:—(1) The old rupee valued at only ten annas according to Hindustani rates. This rupee was minted in Kashmir and had the Emperor of Delhi's name on it. The transactions in the shawl market were made in this rupee. (2) There was another kind of rupee, associated with the name of Hari Singh and as such called Hari Singhee. On one side of these coins was written 'Sri Akal Jiu' and on another 'Hurree Singh'. This was worth twelve annas—rents, taxes and customs duties were paid in this coin. (3) The third kind of rupee was called Nanaksahee; it passed current at sixteen annas throughout the dominions of Ranjit Singh but was valued at 14½ annas at Delhi. The troops were paid in these coins.

According to Moorcroft the whole of the revenues in Kashmir amounted to thirty-six lakhs per annum. Land-rent, grain and saffron amounted to twelve lakhs and twenty-four lakhs were collected from duties on shawl and merchandise. Converted into terms of Indian money it would amount to

twenty-seven lakhs. Ranjit told Wade in 1827 that Kashmir was the most productive of all his provinces and gave him a net surplus of 25 lakhs a year.

The whole of the military establishment of the Sikhs in Kashmir (1822) was 4,000 of which 1,000 were horsemen. The Afghan force before had numbered 16,000 to 20,000.<sup>42</sup>

According to Moorcroft the duty levied on shawl was about fifteen per cent. of the prime value.<sup>43</sup> We know the details of the organisation of the shawl department from other sources. Before 1833 duty on shawl was levied according to the number made and stamped in a year. The rate was three annas in a rupee. In 1835, General Mian Singh established the 'Baj' or fixed amount to be paid by each shop. This method was continued by Sheikh Ghulam Mahiuddin who, however, increased it to Rs. 120 per annum.<sup>44</sup>

Moorcroft, who was not a friendly critic of Ranjit Singh and his administration, was of opinion that Ranjit Singh used to rackrent the poor Kashmiri. This allegation may be partly true. But we have specific instances of his interest in the welfare of the Kashmiri. Some of his deputies like Jamadar Khushal Singh and Ghulam Mohiuddin were, however, over-rapacious. The Sikh Chief himself was intelligent enough to know that it would not be to his best interest to kill the goose that lay the golden egg. But he never attempted scientifically to tackle the problems of civil administration. Had he done so he would have known that it was necessary to establish a rigid monopoly of rice trade as a preventive against famine. Kashmir was almost inaccessible for heavy transport and as such in case of a failure of the crop, there would be a famine and no speedy relief would be possible. Such famines occurred during the administration of Ranjit Singh and no measure of relief could in such cases suffice.

## NOTES

1. Glossary of the Punjab Tribes and Castes, Vol. I, p. 698.
2. P. P. 31st July, 1823. Murray to Wade.

Para 3. An Akali attempted the life of Sir David Ochterlony. The notorious Akali Phoola Singh headed the attack made on Mr. Metcalfe in Amritsar, crossed the Sutlej and created disturbances in these states several times.

(1) In 1809, he attacked Lt. White, who was in an official capacity conducting a survey to the west of Ludhiana.

(2) In 1814-15, he was plundering the western districts and fortified himself in a place from where he was ejected by the forces of Raja Ranjit Singh.

(3) In 1817, Phoola Singh was again with several hundred followers and two guns laying waste the country west of Ludhiana and exacting contributions from the inhabitants and finally submitted himself to a force from Lahore. Raja Ranjit Singh suffered him to retire to Anandpur, situated in the north-eastern frontier of the protected states, whence by the order of the Resident he was removed across the Sutlej and favoured with a *jagir* by the Chief of Lahore.

A repetition of like outrages and violence has occurred in the person of Nayan Singh and his associate Khushal Singh.

3. Burnes, *Travels*, Vol. II, p. 91, Ranjit Singh's 'purwana' to his officers, "take most particular care that the Nihungs and such other wrongheaded people are kept at a distance".
4. Hugel, *Travels*, p. 288.
5. Lepel Griffin, *The Punjab Chiefs*, re Bhowani Das.
6. Shahamat Ali, *The Sikhs and the Afghans*, p. 16.
7. Parliamentary Papers, Acting Resident to Secretary, September, 25, 1847.
8. Foreign Department Miscellaneous, No. 356, Report of the Board of Administration, Lahore, p. 17.
9. Parliamentary Papers, Acting Resident to the Secretary, September, 25, 1884.
10. *Calcutta Review*, 1844.
11. Parliamentary Papers, the Acting Resident to the Secretary to the Government of India, Lahore, December, 27, 1847.

12. Foreign Department Miscellaneous, No. 157, p. 165.
13. Andrew D'Cruz, *Pol. Relations Bet. Br. Govt. and Native States in 1840*.
14. Foreign Department Miscellaneous, No. 351.
15. *Ibid*, 357, p. 165.
16. Steinbach, *The Punjab*.
17. Agha Abbas Shirazi, *Journal of a Tour*.
18. Foreign Department Miscellaneous, No. 357, p. 219.
19. Political Proceedings, 31st May, 1836, No. 57.
20. *Ibid*, 29th August, 1836, No. 57.
21. *Ibid*, 7th August, 1837, No. 94.
22. *Zafarnama*.
23. *The Englishman*, December 25, 1833.
24. *Punjab Akhbar*, 10th March, 1839.
25. Burnes, *Travels*, Vol. I, p. 96.
26. Political Proceedings, 9th November, 1937.
27. *Ibid*, 21st November, 1836, No. 30.
28. Foreign Department Miscellaneous, No. 156, p. 21.
29. *Ibid*.
30. Masson, *Travels*, Vol. I, p. 426.
31. *Zafarnama*, 1809, p. 54.
32. The Resident to Lieutenant Edwards, 13th November, 1847.
33. *News of Ranjit Singh's Court*, 20th and 22nd August.
34. *Ibid*.
35. A very interesting incident in connection with Ranjit Singh's relations with the Muhammadans was a complaint made by Shah Ayub. He complained before the Maharaja that Sultan Muhammad Khan had married the daughter of Shahzada Ashraf. His complaint was that it was a disgraceful thing that a Wazir should marry the daughter of a Shahzada. Ranjit Singh said that the Lahore *Adalat* would try the case. Then he proposed to refer the matter to Captain Wade. Even in their disgrace the descendants of Ahmad Shah retained their false notions of prestige but curiously enough did not feel a sense of shame in referring such matters to an alien ruler who was no co-religionist (*Umdat-ut-Tawarikh*, II, pp. 293-94).



36. *Zafarnama*, 1826, p. 172.
37. Foreign Department Miscellaneous, No. 305, Thompson—Metcalf letter of May 9, 1831.
38. Burnes, *Travels*, Vol. I, p. 285.
39. Lawrence, *Adventures of an Officer*.
40. Temple, *Men and Events of My time*.
41. Asiatic Journal, Vol. XVIII, 1836, Moorcroft's journey to Balkh and Bokhara.
42. Ibid; also Hugel, *Travels*, p. 123.
43. Ibid.
44. Panikkar, *Gulab Singh, Punjab Political Diaries*, Vol. VI, pp. 44-45.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE ARMY OF RANJIT SINGH

Ranjit Singh created a regular disciplined professional Sikh army in the place of part-time levies of predatory horsemen. The strength of the regular army was 4061 in 1811—2852 infantry and 1209 artillery. In 1838 this Regular Army—*Fouj-i-Ain*—numbered 38,242—infantry 29,617, cavalry 4,090, artillery 4,535 and the total expenditure for this Regular Army amounted to Rs. 3,74,101 per month.\*

The cash monthly payment system was borrowed from the East India Company. Formerly the Jagirdar (assignment of territory in lieu of pay) and faslanadar (harvest-time payment) systems had been more general. The harvest-time payment system gradually disappeared. But the monthly payments were not regularly made. The troops as a rule were in arrears for five or six months. They were normally paid five times a year. Men served so long as they were physically fit. There was no regular pension but thirty per cent of the vacancies were filled from the members of the family of the retiring soldiers. A kind of

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\* Average salary per month.

				Rs. As.		Rs. As.	
Kumidan	Commandant	..	..	60 0	to	150 0	per month.
Mahzur	..	..	..	30 0	to	60 0	"
Subadar	..	..	..	20 0	to	30 0	"
Jamadar	..	..	..	15 0	to	22 0	"
Havildar	..	..	..	13 0	to	15 0	"
Naik	..	..	..	10 0	to	12 0	"
Sarjan	..	..	..	8 0	to	12 0	"
Phuviya	..	..	..	7 8	to	10 0	"
Sepoy	..	..	..	7 0	to	8 8	"

allowance was sometimes granted to the families of the dead and the wounded. In the pay-rolls we come across a section entitled "Dharmarth" in which payments are recorded to the families of dead and wounded soldiers to the mother, wife or widow, son or brother.

In 1839, W. Barr met at Rajpora a Sikh in Ranjit Singh's service—an officer with 67 horsemen under him. He received two rupees per diem for pay and subsistence. He was in action at Jamrud where he received a desperate sabre cut for which he received a large present. He said, "The Maharaja is extremely liberal to those who are wounded in his service and if he hears of a Sardar failing to reward such he immediately disgraces him."

Besides the regular army there was the irregular cavalry—*be-qawaid fauj*, the salaried *Ghorcharah*. Their number was 10,795 in 1838. These troops had to provide for themselves and their horses. They were divided into *derahs*, subdivided into *misls*, each varying from 15 to 70, usually members of one clan. These troops reminded Hugel of the time when the fate of empires hung on the point of a lance. There were frequent inspections of horses with reference to descriptive rolls. Pay and allowance of a trooper was regulated by the condition of his horse. In case the horse died, the trooper drew the pay of a footsoldier till he provided himself with another. Not even the most highly placed official could expect any lenient treatment if any lapse was noticed. "This type of organisation kept intact the spirit of clannish union and its old tendency of fighting under the immediate command of a natural leader, while it did not deny to the *misldar* the lessons of co-operation." Besides the regular army and the irregular cavalry there were also contingents furnished by the jagirdars. These jagirdari troops were employed on comparatively unimportant punitive expeditions.<sup>1</sup>

Some of the Englishmen who visited the Punjab in the thirties of the nineteenth century adversely criticised Ranjit's army administration. There were others who expressed their appreciation of it. Lawrence said, "The building completed, the Maharaja does not think the same care necessary for its preservation as for its construction. There is no undisputed punctual pay." The efficiency of Ranjit's military machine in the closing years of his rule is acknowledged by Osborne. He wrote, "The Sikh army can be easily moved. No wheel carriages are allowed on a march. Their own bazars carry all they require and 30,000 of their troops could be moved with more facility and less expense and loss of time than three Company's regiments on this side of the Sutlej." The average monthly pay of the infantry and artillery was 7.8 in 1811, when service in the regular army was not at all popular and recruits were difficult to find. The average for the infantry and artillery was 7.7 and 7.2 respectively in 1838 when service in the regular army was very popular and recruits were so easy to find. Ranjit Singh did not take advantage of the popularity of the service to lower the pay to any considerable extent. The scale of pay from the commandant to the sepoy in the Sikh service compared very favourably with the corresponding ranks in the Company's service. Some consideration was shown to the family of the dead and the wounded.

✓ It must certainly be acknowledged that irregularity of payment was one of the greatest defects of Ranjit's military organisation. Burnes wrote, "For some years past the army has been irregularly paid—due to the growing friendship with the British Government or the increasing avarice of age." He had introduced the monthly payment system in imitation of the British. But this was absolutely an innovation. It demanded such an efficiency of the revenue system as the Sikh monarchy had not yet attained. As Wade remarked in 1835, in another connection, "The merit of our (British) regulations consists in their general application to the system of government for which they are intended

and that they are not calculated for partial adoption, that where the elements of rule are so different as between the British government and his, the details of the one can never be suitably engrafted in part only on the other."<sup>3</sup> This is the best explanation of the partial failure of the *Mahdar* system. It became practically something midway between the old *faslanadar* system and the British monthly system of payment.

### EUROPEAN OFFICERS

The idea of appointing European officers to train Indian armies was an old one. As early as the seventeenth century European officers were greatly in demand in India as artillery experts. Balaji Baji Rao for the first time began the practice later popularised by Mahadji Sindhia. With the appointment by the Peshwa, in the fifties of the eighteenth century, of Muzaffar Khan and Ibrahim Khan who had been trained by Bussy, began the history of the trained battalions under the Indian chieftains, the most prominent among these being Haidar Ali, Tipu Sultan, Jaswant Rao Holkar and above all Mahadji Sindhia and Daulat Rao Sindhia.

Ranjit followed this tradition. In the British records we come across the names of twenty European and Anglo-Indian officers who served under Ranjit. In Colonel Gardner's list of Ranjit Singh's white officers we have about forty-two names. In Carmichael Smyth's appendix occur thirty-nine names. Ventura and Allard, the famous European Officers of Ranjit Singh, made their first appearance in the Punjab in 1822. Before them there were two white officers in the Punjab service—James and Gordon.<sup>4</sup>

"Their admission created a new era in his government", said Wade, the British Resident at Ludhiana, referring to the coming of Allard and Ventura. But this is a mistaken view. The idea of training soldiers in the European fashion had occurred to Ranjit Singh long before the coming of these officers and, in fact, descriptive pay rolls in the *Khalsa Durbar records* prove

that battalions trained in the European fashion existed since 1807. There were three battalions initiated in the methods of European drill in 1807.<sup>5</sup> Ranjit himself told Wade in 1827 that it was not until after the flight of Holkar to the Punjab that he thought of training a regular army. He went incognito to look at a review of Lord Lake's army. Allard, Ventura and Court thus played the same part in the Punjab under Ranjit Singh as did Gordon and Lefort in Russia under Peter the Great. They were only entrusted with the task of carrying out details. They did not originate any new idea or initiate any new scheme. "They merely gave a moderate degree of precision and completeness to a system already introduced."<sup>6</sup>

When Allard and Ventura made their first appearance in the Punjab, they were naturally regarded by all sections of the population as undesirable intruders. Run Singh, the Commander of the Gurkha battalion, even went to the length of disobeying an order of the Maharaja, asking him to submit to the orders and wishes of the Frenchmen. The Maharaja had to promise an increase of pay before he could persuade the Gurkhas to comply. Kharak Singh, the heir-apparent, requested the Maharaja to assign quarters to the Frenchmen at a decent distance from his own.<sup>7</sup> The Maharaja also was at first distrustful but according to Steinbach, "a submissive and judicious letter from these officers removed the apprehension of the Maharaja and he, with the spirit and originality of a man of genius, admitted them into his service. The good conduct and the wise management of these gentlemen speedily removed Ranjit Singh's prejudices against the Europeans and the door to employment being thrown open, several military men entered the service of the Maharaja".<sup>8</sup> Ranjit Singh gave the Frenchmen his unreserved confidence and handed over to them one of the gates of Lahore for their egress and ingress. But even as late as 1826 some Sardars of the Sikhs refused to serve under Ventura and Allard and threatened to resist them by force.<sup>9</sup> But we learn that gradually friendly relations were



established between the 'Firinghee' officers and the Punjab Sardars and this state of things continued so long as the European officers were required by the Maharaja to adhere strictly to their military duties. But as grants of land were made to them, it led to heart-burnings among the Punjabi Sardars and dissensions became frequent. To take one instance, the Maharaja made a free grant of the village of Muranpur to Ventura. It was almost a depopulated and deserted village in the vicinity of the *jagir* of Kumar Kharak Singh. Ventura repeople it, and, as it became prosperous, emigration from the Kumar's village to this settlement became frequent. In order to put a stop to this, Kharak Singh's men once attacked and plundered Muranpur and even violated the tomb of Ventura's son which was situated there. Ventura appealed for redress. Ranjit wanted him to take the law into his own hands but that was not possible in view of the relation in which an officer stands to the heir-apparent. Ventura thought himself ill-treated and applied for discharge.<sup>10</sup> The matter was somehow patched up. When once Ranjit Singh showed some intention of conferring the government of Kashmir on Ventura there was a chorus of protest from his courtiers.<sup>11</sup> Such instances may be multiplied. The Maharaja himself was not a little responsible for this ill-feeling between the Sardars and the 'Firinghee' officers. We read in the *Englishman* of 1833 that the Maharaja asked Mr. John Holmes,<sup>12</sup> an Anglo-Indian Officer, in open court how much he thought Khushal Singh Jamadar had looted from the revenue of Kashmir. Mr. Holmes evaded the question and said that he was a mere soldier and knew little or nothing about revenue. Thus pretty often Ranjit Singh would unknowingly rouse jealousy against his white officers in the bosom of his Sardars. But one exception must be made in favour of Allard, who was loved both by the Punjabis as also by the Europeans in Ranjit's service. The Maharaja loved him very much and as a token of his regard presented him with a Persian sword. For the blade alone the Maharaja paid Rs. 5,000, the hilt

being of gold studded with jewels. W. Barr testifies to the fact that the death of Allard cast a gloom over the whole of the capital.

Ranjit Singh's European officers were recruited from various nationalities. In Gardner's list of foreign officers, we come across Italians, Frenchmen, Americans, Englishmen, Anglo-Indians, Spaniards, Greeks and Russians. A German and an Austrian name also occur. As the Sikh Sardars were jealous of these foreign officers, the latter should have presented a united front. But this was not to be. The motley host remained to the end a heterogeneous body. It is quite apparent from Gardner's language against Ventura that there was no love lost between them. As Major Hugh Pearse notes, "The French and Italian officers in Ranjit Singh's service held much aloof from those of the other nationalities and this must have contributed to the unfriendliness".<sup>13</sup> Ranjit once told Wade with reference to Oms, a Spaniard, that the French officers would not associate with him. There was some difference between them and they disputed each other's merits.<sup>14</sup>

Ranjit Singh tried to create a permanent interest for the Punjab among his European officers. He did not like that his 'Firinghee' officers should remain unmarried or, if married, have their wives and children in their native country. He wanted them to marry and settle with their wives and children in the Punjab. While conversing with Wade, Ranjit once remarked with reference to the application of a European that the applicant had been asked to bring his family if he wanted to get the appointment.<sup>15</sup> After Messrs. Allard and Ventura had come to the Punjab, they married and settled in the country and Ranjit encouraged them to do so. In the opinion of the Maharaja, "Firinghees who were single men were apt to think of their own country, grew discontented and applied for their discharge at a time when probably their services could not be dispensed with."<sup>16</sup> The European officers were at first required not to eat beef, not to shave their beards and not

to smoke tobacco. The third condition, however, was not always insisted upon.

As early as November, 1831, Wade wrote to the Secretary to the Government of India, "His Highness expresses himself desirous of preventing further resort of Europeans in his service."<sup>17</sup> If Wade is to be believed the Sardars said that they would rather see more battalions added to the large force under the command of Messrs. Allard and Ventura than an additional number of Europeans. When Allard (Junior) in 1832 wanted to enter the Punjab service, Ranjit offered him a much lower salary than he had expected, and naturally he did not enter the Punjab service. It was not his growing avarice that accounts for Ranjit's unwillingness to pay the big salaries that were demanded by the European adventurers who wanted to come to the Punjab during the latter part of his reign. His unwillingness to take more foreigners in his service was due to his consciousness that Ventura, Allard and Court as trainers had fulfilled their mission. But those who were already in his employ did not meet with a shabby treatment solely because they had to a great extent done their work. The British records convey the impression that the European officers of Ranjit Singh were restive towards the latter part of his reign. Even Ventura is said to have once offered his services to the British Government through McGregor and later directly to Wade. But this restlessness can be explained solely on the ground that the Punjab service was undoubtedly insecure, dependent on the life of one man, whose health had been already undermined.

Ranjit Singh looked upon his European officers as men of varied talents and he regularly made them undertake additional duties of different natures. Ventura and Avitabile were artillery instructors and also Governors of provinces. Harlan, though usually employed in civil duties, had also to command troops. Honigberger was a doctor but he had also to superintend a gunpowder factory and Ventura was even called upon on one occasion

to construct a steam-boat.<sup>18</sup> Primarily, however, they were wanted for their specialised knowledge of military science.

The European officers of Ranjit Singh were advocates of the policy of conquest. Their spirit is well expressed in the following lines from a British record which refers to it—"Why keep us and your battalions at Lahore? We are of no use at this place. Send us across the Attock to Peshawar and we will take possession of Kabul for you." But Ranjit always put them off with promises that he would think over their proposal. They also wanted that Ranjit should try to conquer Sind. They hoped by this means to establish direct relations between Ranjit Singh's dominions and France and thereby secure easy ingress and egress. The British Government looked with suspicion upon the influx of foreign officers, specially Frenchmen, into the Punjab.

Under the successors of Ranjit Singh the foreigners found themselves in an atmosphere of suspicion, treachery and bloodshed. The shifting party politics of the country made their position very unsafe. The Sardars disliked them, the rulers distrusted them and, for reasons not well-known, they were also unpopular with the soldiery.<sup>19</sup> After the accession of Kharak Singh the mutinous soldiers plundered the house of General Court. Both Court and Ventura had narrow escapes. Lieutenant-Colonel Foulkes was put to death and Lieutenant-Colonel Ford was plundered, ill-treated and died of broken heart. After such unfair treatment, with assassination, and with 'horror on horror's head', Ventura, Avitabile and others thought it prudent to retire from the Punjab. The allegation made by Gardner that the departure of Avitabile and Ventura was 'pusillanimous and ignominious' is not justified. Admitting that he himself was treated with honour and respect, that was no reason why Ventura and Allard would not find reasons for hasty departure. They had occupied higher positions under Ranjit and as a consequence had more enemies. Admitting that "they had eaten the salt of

the Punjab and their departure at this critical juncture disgusted the army which wanted efficient control",<sup>20</sup> it was only human that they should try to leave behind them a region which was weltering in blood.

In this connection, we should not fail to take note of the fact that the Europeans and particularly the French group led by Ventura were supposed to be in opposition to Kharak Singh. As Hugel says, throughout India the General was supposed to be not on good terms with the Crown Prince. The French officers led by Ventura were, according to rumour, partisans of Sher Singh, whose success against Syad Ahmad almost made him a rival of Kharak Singh as successor to the Maharaja. Sher Singh was very friendly with the Europeans and particularly with French officers in his father's service.<sup>21</sup> He used even to eat sitting up to table on a chair. Their previous opposition to Kharak Singh should be regarded as one of the factors responsible for their eagerness to depart on the demise of the Maharaja.

*Estimate:*—It is perhaps necessary to discuss whether the introduction of trained battalions was in itself a better policy from a military point of view than the traditional method. The Maratha military system largely degenerated when the trained battalions were introduced and the downfall of the Marathas was to a great extent due to this degeneration. But the defects of the Maratha military system in the closing years of the eighteenth century were conspicuous by their absence in the Sikh army as organised by Ranjit Singh.

The Maratha army was denationalised on the introduction of the western system. The regular forces under Sindhia and the Peshwa were composed entirely of the non-Marathas—the Telingas, the Najibs and the Alygholes whose morality was very low. But Ranjit was quite successful in making the western system popular among the Sikhs. The pay-rolls show that up

to 1813 the bulk of the regulars consisted of the Hindusthanis, the Gurkhas and the Afghans, whereas those of 1818 and onwards reveal that the Punjabi element was becoming more and more predominant.<sup>22</sup> Though till the end Ranjit Singh took recruits from different communities it was the Sikhs who formed the bulk of the army and the history of the *Khalsa* army after the death of Ranjit Singh showed that the rank and file possessed a strong *esprit-de-corps* which may perhaps be most easily realised by the analogy of a trade union.

In 1827 Wade saw the parade of some regular battalions at Amritsar. He noticed that the Sikhs were intermixed with some *Poorbiahs*. He was told that "this was done in order to counteract any mutinous disposition which the one or the other might evince".<sup>23</sup> Ranjit took particular care to fashion his army in such a way that communalism and localism could not hamper the growth of the military spirit. This process of intermixing was completed in the army reorganisation of 1836. Such was the power of the leaven of collective energy that it welded the *Poorbiahs*, the Sikhs, the Gurkhas, the Muslims and the Hindus together, creating a picked professional army of more than 38,000 men.

As to the western officers of the Maratha regular army, it has been said, "if the men were bad their officers were worse. Their inconsistency earned Dudrenec and his colleagues the unenviable epithet of *Dagabaj* or traitor from Yasavant Rao Holkar. They were of low birth, had little education and no morals. In a war with the English the Maratha employer could not rely on his English captains. When war broke out in 1802, not only the English but also the French officers of the Maratha army took advantage of the Governor-General's offer. They had come to seek fortune and not to lose it."<sup>24</sup> Ranjit Singh, if we can interpret his motives from his actions, knew it quite well that to rely much on the westerners for officering his army, would be to build upon a foundation of quicksand.



Ranjit Singh once went out on a walk. Three Englishmen, who had come in the company of Macnaghten, met him by accident and a conversation ensued. After a while the conversation turned upon his European officers. Ranjit said that his European officers had given him a deed of agreement and made a promise on oath that they would fight for him whoever might be his enemy. The Maharaja asked the three Englishmen whether the European officers would fight honestly for him in the event of an Anglo-Sikh war. Their reply was in the negative. They said that the 'Francisi' and the 'Firinghee' officers would not fight with the English and the French but with all other European powers except these two. Ranjit referred to the promise on oath. The ready reply was that the Maharaja must not rely upon their promise because their principle was self-interest and gain, and a promise with them not even a hair's worth. Still the Maharaja declined to be convinced and referred to the excellent service they were rendering him.<sup>25</sup>

But the Maharaja was very much distressed over this frank speech of the Englishmen. On returning to the fort Ranjit Singh expressed his grief to Dhian Singh and Fakir Azizuddin that most likely the three Englishmen had spoken the truth. This conversation makes it clear that the Maharaja had thought of the possibility of his European officers behaving in a lukewarm manner in the event of an Anglo-Sikh war, in which the regular army would play the most important part. It explains the assertion of Lawrence that the European officers were retained as mere drill masters and it also explains why the matter was so managed as to afford them little influence".<sup>26</sup>

When Wade came to Lahore in 1836 he found that the Sikh army had been formed into brigades each consisting of three or four battalions of infantry and a portion of cavalry and artillery. In the Durbar records of 1836 we find many trained Sikh generals for the regular army. The Lahore generals were Ram Singh,

son of Jamadar Khushal Singh, Gujar Singh, Tej Singh, nephew of Khushal Singh, Ajit Singh, Ventura, Court, Misr Sukh Raj, Mian Udham Singh.<sup>27</sup> His disinclination to take more Europeans in his service towards the close of his reign is a point whose significance must not be lost sight of. Further, in Carmichael Smyth's appendix we come across the names of 39 foreign officers of whom twelve were Frenchmen, seven Anglo-Indians, four Italians, four Germans, three Americans, two Spaniards, one Russian, one Scotch and only three Englishmen. Ranjit relied most upon the Frenchmen from a knowledge of the traditional hostility between the Frenchmen and the Englishmen and he was not certainly oblivious of the fact that the Englishmen, as officers in his employ, might not be safely relied upon. The British Government encouraged British subjects, as a matter of policy, to take service with the Maratha powers in order to safeguard Britain's interest, whereas it looked with great suspicion upon the influx of foreign officers into the Punjab, chiefly because of Ranjit's distinction of nationality in the choice of his military officers. As most of the foreign officers had left the Punjab service before the outbreak of the Anglo-Sikh war it is not possible to guess how faithful they would have proved. From one or two cases of desertion we should not generalise. Allard, Ventura, Court and Avitabile were not certainly persons of doubtful credentials like most of the European officers of the Maratha army. As Jacquemont says, the Maharaja was remarkably shrewd in seeing through dubious adventurers and getting rid of them. Still we cannot assert with certainty whether they would have remained true to Ranjit if an Anglo-Sikh war had broken out during his lifetime. At least the attitude of Avitabile during the first Anglo-Afghan War does not encourage an optimistic view. Ventura is said to have offered in 1848 to fight the Sikh state while the second Anglo-Sikh war was in progress.<sup>28</sup>

The artillery of the Sikhs was much better than that of the Marathas, who relied mainly on the rejected artillery of other

powers. Naturally, it was the weakest branch of the Maratha service. But Ranjit Singh had foundries of his own where guns were cast within the Lahore fort as well as in other parts of the town at Shah Dera. The artillery was one of the best served of the branches of the Sikh army. Moreover, unlike the Marathas under Sindhia and other Chieftains, the Sikh arms and equipment were not of a heterogeneous character, the *Ghorcharas* and the *Jagirdari Fouj* being of course expected. As a result of western discipline "the rank and file of Sikh army became, under the training of the skilled officers, the finest rank and file in the world. They wanted but officers to be invincible".

It has been said that as a result of the introduction of western methods the Maratha army resembled an eagle with its wings clipped, fighting with the English merely with its talons. It lost its mobility, its speed. The traditional method would have stood the Marathas in better stead. A like opinion is also expressed with regard to Ranjit's regular army. In view of the fact that most of his important conquests were made by his unreformed army and his reformed army became in the end an intolerable burden, which overwhelmed the civil constitution and brought about not only its own ruin but also that of the state, some people have expressed the opinion that Ranjit should have retained the traditional method. Let us judge the question purely from a military point of view. The trained battalions were undoubtedly intended by Ranjit against the British and the reformed Sikh army more than sufficiently justified itself during the First and Second Sikh Wars.

The Sikh army fought with a discipline and a stubbornness unequalled in British experience of Indian warfare. The Sikhs were led in the first Anglo-Sikh War by Sardars who were not unnaturally charged with "something worse than incapacity". Betrayed by their leaders in "Pheeroo Ka larai", the soldiers of Ranjit Singh did not disgrace their master. This memorable battle

is best described in the words of Subadar Sitaram, a soldier of the invincible Anglo-Sepoy army:

"This was fighting indeed; I had not seen anything like it before. Volleys of musketry were delivered by us at close quarters and returned as steadily by the enemy. In all former actions I had been in, one or two volleys at close distance were all the Sarkar's enemies would ever stand; but these Sikhs returned volley for volley and never gave way until nearly decimated. They had their regiments placed between their guns and behind them: their fire was terrible, such as no Sepoy had ever been under. The Sarkar's guns were almost silenced, and the ammunition waggons blown up. I saw two or three European regiments driven back by the weight of the artillery fire; it was like the *bursat* (rains); they fell into confusion; several Sepoy regiments did the same. One European regiment was *kafoor hogia* (evaporated). I now thought the Sarkar's army would be overpowered and fear filled the minds of many of us . . . it was a dreadful night; the English had not left the ground and the Sikhs had not been driven from their breast-works; it was *boerd* (a drawn game)."<sup>29</sup>

"After the battle of Firuzshuhur whilst the English army was cooking their food . . . a report came that the whole of the Sikh cavalry was coming down upon us and soon a fresh army was seen marching upon us. The fight began again but the Sarkar's guns were unable to fire as they had expended all their ammunition. The Sarkar's *icbal* (good fortune) was indeed great for without any apparent reason the Sikh army retreated. There was enough cavalry to have surrounded our force and totally destroyed it . . . The Sahebs were as much astonished as any one."<sup>30</sup>

The Sikhs fought the battle of Sobraon in 'circumstances of discreet policy and shameless treason' to use the memorable words of Cunningham. But their indomitable courage and determination must have filled the victors with amazement. It was noticed with surprise that no Sikh asked for quarter in this war.

It was bad generalship that lost the battles of Gujrat and Chilianwala and it was treachery even more than bad generalship that lost the battles of Sobraon and Firuzshuhur. It does not seem plausible that the guerilla method of warfare of the Sikh feudal chieftains, which availed them against Ahmad Shah Abdali, could have stood the Sikhs in good stead as against the British power. According to Lawrence, "the Maharaja would have shown more foresight if he had devoted the same attention that he did to the European tactics to rendering his troops really efficient after their own fashion, if he had erected fortifications around Lahore and Amritsar on European models and there planted his guns encumbering his troops in the field with but a few, perfectly equipped light artillery."<sup>31</sup> But the trained battalions of Ranjit were not certainly the outcome of a mistaken policy and it is difficult to agree with this conclusion. In the fullness of their triumph over a worthy enemy leaders of the British army must have been admiring that organising genius which had transformed a rabble of horsemen into the most efficient fighting machine. Ranjit Singh's mistake was the postponement of the inevitable war, not the introduction of trained battalions.

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#### NOTES

1. This description of the Regular Army is based on *Catalogue of Khalsa Durbar Records I and Hisabnama-Fouj-i-Ranjit Singh*.
2. Ibid.
3. Pol. Pro. 24th August, 1835, No. 59.
4. Foreign Department Miscellaneous, No. 128.
5. K. D. R. II, p. 145.
6. Sita Ram Kohli, *Army of Ranjit Singh (Journal of Indian History)*.
7. Political Proceedings, 22nd August, 1823, No. 19.
8. Ibid.
9. Steinbach, *The Punjab*, p. 62.
10. Gardner, *Memoirs*, Appendix.
11. Political Proceedings, 17th December, 1830.
12. Ibid, 7th November, 1836.

13. John Holmes joined service as commandant on Rs. 150/- p. m. and ultimately rose to be Colonel. For two years, Samvat 1892 and 1893, he was Kardar or Collector of revenues of Gujrat. Catalogue of K. D. R. Vol. I, p. 27.
14. *Memoirs of Alexander Gardner*, Appendix by Major Hugh Pearse.
15. Political Proceedings, 20th April, 1827, No. 7.
16. Ibid, 29th April, 1827, No. 7.
17. Ibid, 4th November, 1831, No. 19.
18. Ibid, 17th July, 1837, No. 33.
19. Lawrence, "*Adventures of an Officer*". The matter has been so managed as to afford them little influence, they have instructed regiments which have been removed and replaced by others sent to be taught and in like manner taken away. This statement, if true, explains want of popularity but not unpopularity. Probably the European officers were more strict.
20. *Memoirs of Gardner*, p. 202.
21. Jacquemont, p. 304; consultation, 29th July, 1821, No. 415.
22. Sita Ram Kohli, *Army of Ranjit Singh, also Catalogue of Khalsa Durbar Records*, Vol. I.
23. Sethi—*The Lahore Darbar*. Wade's observations on the Court of Lahore.
24. Sen, *Military System of the Marathas*, Chapter VII.
25. *Umdat-ut-Tawarikh*, Vol. III, p. 570.
26. Lawrence, *Adventures of an Officer*, Vol. I, p. 227; also p. 42.
27. *Catalogue of Khalsa Durbar Records*, p. 33. In the pay-rolls of 1837-1838 we also find Avitabile mentioned as a general.
28. *Adventures of an Officer*, Lawrence. According to Lawrence, somehow or other the foreigners all managed to keep up communications with Ludhiana.
29. Sita Ram—*From Sepoy to Subadar*, Trs. by Norgate; Ed. by Phillot, pp. 96-98.
30. Ibid.
31. Lawrence, *Adventures of an Officer*, 1845, p. 237.



## CHAPTER X

### THE SIKH DURBAR

Ranjit's courtiers have been described as a band of adventurers. But most of them were very able men, whose loyalty to him was beyond question.

*Mohkam Chand.*—He was originally no soldier. His father was a trader and he himself served as a munshi under Dal Singh of Kakkoo, and then under Sahib Singh Bhangi of Gujrat.<sup>1</sup> Disgusted with the latter master, he offered his services to Ranjit Singh and in the Punjab of those days career was open to talent. That the one-eyed Sikh ruler could quickly discern such talent is proved conclusively by his choice of Mohkam Chand and later of Dewan Chand. In Ranjit Singh's sleepless perseverance in self-aggrandisement his chief helper was Mohkam Chand.

As a general, he was uniformly successful and from 1806 to 1814 the annexations of Ranjit were due not only to his own irresistible cunning but also to Mohkam Chand's military talents. In his cis-Sutlej expeditions, in the conquest of Sialkot and the Nakkai country and the territories of Tara Singh Gheba and in the subjugation of the hill states between Kashmir and the Punjab, (*e.g.*, Rajori, Bhimbur, Kaloo) and finally for his victory on the Chuch plains, Ranjit owed much to Mohkam Chand. To this able lieutenant he was also largely indebted for the successful establishment of the fort of Philour and for the efficient administration of the Jalandhar Doab. It is also doubtful whether Ranjit Singh could have got Shah Shuja under his control without the assistance of this resourceful general. It is also significant that the second Kashmir expedition undertaken in the teeth of the opposition of Mohkam Chand proved a failure. But it should be remembered that the brightest episode in this unsuccessful Kashmir expedition was the stand made by Ram Dayal, a grandson of Mohkam Chand and heir to his fulfilled renown.

Mohkam Chand's record was not merely that of a successful general but also that of a very excellent administrator. His government of the Jalandhar Doab, to which reference has already been made, was the most popular and at the same time efficient. As a governor he was the most regular in his payments to the Lahore exchequer, yet he never oppressed the people. Between 1806-1814 he was the man next in importance to the Maharaja in the Lahore state. When Ranjit Singh was wavering between the policy of peace and war over the cis-Sutlej question he sought to utilise the unique position occupied by Mohkam Chand. He himself talked of peace while Mohkam Chand made preparations for war. He told Metcalfe that, "The Dewan for his advanced age and the general control he had over all affairs was a privileged character and very difficult to manage."<sup>2</sup> Metcalfe of course never made the mistake of thinking that the Raja was being thwarted by his officer.

Wade describes Mohkam Chand as "the first of the Raja's officers who succeeded in planting his authority in the valuable acquisitions to his power".<sup>3</sup> In 1814 he died full of honour amidst the regrets of the grateful Sikh Durbar. He gave to the state very devoted servants in the persons of his son Moti Ram and grandsons Kirpa Ram and Ram Dayal.

*Dewan Chand.*—This Brahmin was another of the finds of the Maharaja. Between 1814-1825 he was the officer on whom Ranjit Singh largely depended for the success of his military operations. He was the actual Commander-in-chief of the armies that conquered Multan and Kashmir. He was also largely responsible for the successful siege of Mankera. After the triumphant campaigns in Multan and Kashmir, Dewan Chand advised the Maharaja that Peshawar should be the next object of attack. When Sada Kaur's possessions were annexed one of her men, the qiladar of Atal resisted. But Dewan Chand took the place by force. His administration of Pakhli and Damtaur was not,

however, very successful and Hari Singh was appointed in his place. Dewan Chand had also been to Bannoo and Tank. He was moreover prominent in the battle of Nowshera. From 1814-1825 he was in charge of the Ordnance Department. The title of *Jaffar Jang* was conferred on him after the conquest of Multan, and after the conquest of Kashmir he got the appellation 'Fateh Jang' or 'Nasrat Jang'. He was given a *Jagir* with an income of Rs. 50,000.<sup>5</sup>

He died on *Sravana* 5 (July 18), Samvat 1882/1825 of cholera.<sup>6</sup> He was a very able general, an excellent companion, and a liberal and gifted man. When the Maharaja heard the news of his death he mourned the loss of Dewan Chand for several hours in his Durbar and told his courtiers that he had not another such man in his service.

*Hari Singh Nakwa*.—Originally a personal attendant,<sup>7</sup> he received recognition for his boldness, intrepidity and address and rose to the very high rank of a governor and became one of the greatest noblemen of the Punjab. He had earned the title 'Nalwa' for having cloven the head of a tiger that had seized him.<sup>8</sup> He could both read and write Persian and was very well informed as regards the policy of the East India Company and the state of Europe. So the Maharaja at times requisitioned his services in connection with the missions that he sent to the British Government. He was both feared and respected and, according to Masson, his deportment and intrepid conversation resembled those of Ranjit Singh.

On the Chenab, guarding and administering, as the second in command to Dewan Chand against the Kukkas and Bumbas, as an administrator in Pakhli and Damtaur, he was everywhere successful. His best administration was of course that of Kashmir, which he held for two years, proving himself one of the ablest of the Sikh Governors there. But Hari Singh has left his impress

on history as Ranjit's Viceroy on the western frontier, the most difficult charge of a Sikh Viceroy. The robbers slaughtered without mercy, the Kabul monarchy overawed, the turbulent Afghan tribes kept down by his movable columns—this was the record of Hari Singh on the western frontier. His work there so much pleased the Maharaja that on one occasion he remarked, "To rule a kingdom it is necessary to have men like you".<sup>9</sup> When Abbas Mirza of Persia asked Mohanlal whether the Sikh army could compare in courage and discipline with his, Mohanlal's reply was—"If Hari Singh Nalwa were to cross the Indus, His Highness would soon be glad to retreat to his original government of Tabriz"<sup>10</sup>—a reply which proves clearly the impression created by him on the western frontier.

Hari Singh was a *Jagirdar* with an income of three lakhs and sixty-seven thousand rupees of annual revenue. His son did not inherit his ability and he was given only a minor post. The vast sum of money accumulated by him was confiscated by the Lahore ruler. But for this we must not regard Ranjit as ungrateful. Undoubtedly Hari Singh was a very trusted and able officer. But in money matters he was not always honest. It has been said about him on good authority, that he would report raids and appropriate the money without undertaking these. On one occasion while the Maharaja was reviewing the troops under Hari Singh's charge he found the battalions below their full strength. Yet Hari Singh had been drawing money from the treasury at the usual rate. He was heavily fined.<sup>11</sup> But it must be said in favour of Hari Singh that his conduct was in keeping with the notions of service morality in those days and in spite of such lapses Hari Singh must be regarded as a very faithful and trusted servant, far superior in every respect to many other people in the service of Ranjit Singh. When the Maharaja shed tears on hearing the news of the death of Hari Singh, the tears were very sincere and when he described the deceased Sikh Governor as a great 'Nimak halal'<sup>12</sup> the epithet was also justified.

Wade's account of Hari Singh's death at Jamrud best illustrates the unshaken courage of this soldier even in his death—"He received four wounds, two sabre cuts across his breast, one arrow was fixed in his breast which he deliberately pulled out himself and continued to issue his orders as before until he received a gunshot wound in the side from which he gradually sank, and was carried off the field to the fort, where he expired, requesting that his death should not be made known until the arrival of the Maharaja's relief."<sup>13</sup>

*Khushal Singh*.—He was at first a menial, then an ordinary sepoy in Dhonkal Singh's regiment on five rupees a month, then a Jamadar or Lieutenant, next the Palace-steward or Deodhiwala.<sup>14</sup> From this coveted post he was displaced by Dhian Singh but he remained the aide-de-camp of the Maharaja. This is the life-story of the man who did not, after all, justify his phenomenal rise and who richly deserves the epithet of an upstart. His original name was Khushal Ram and he was a Gour Brahmin. The story is that the Maharaja gave him the 'pahul' and at that time promised that he would never degrade him from his position.<sup>15</sup> This seems plausible and explains why the Maharaja continued to favour him in spite of obvious lapses. The *Jagir* which he enjoyed towards the close of his life has been estimated by Shahamat Ali as worth four lakhs two thousand six hundred and seventy rupees.<sup>16</sup> He was dismissed from his charge of the *Deodhee* and Dhian Singh was appointed on the recommendation of Dewan Chand. He was, however, restored to favour shortly afterwards though not to his position as Deodhiwala.

In most of the military expeditions he took part along with others. So it is very difficult to assess his merit as a commander. His greatest military exploit was the conquest of Dera Ghazi Khan. But as an administrator he was a failure; his record of Kashmir administration was the blackest in that province. In a time of great scarcity, he so far fleeced the people along with Bhai

Gurmukh Singh and Shaikh Gulam Muhiuddin that it drew severe reprimands from the Maharaja. The Jamadar paid to the treasury three lakhs in cash and five lakhs worth of 'pashmina' and at the same time filled his own pocket as much as he could. In this connection Ranjit Singh once in open durbar suggested that the property of such an offender "who had burnt the fire of persecution", should be confiscated.<sup>17</sup> On another occasion as Sawan Mal sent repeated letters of recommendation from Captain Wade, the Jamadar protested against this piling up of recommendation from the agent of an alien Government; Ranjit Singh's retort was that to secure a recommendation from the Jamadar, a bribe would have been necessary but not so in the case of Captain Wade.<sup>18</sup> Khushal Singh was, moreover, very indiscreet in his speeches. On one occasion he quarrelled with Wasa Singh. There was a free fight between the followers of both the leaders. On being informed of this the Maharaja rebuked Khushal Singh for not having informed him about the misunderstanding earlier. Khushal's reply was that he was accustomed to do many things without informing the Maharaja. The Maharaja was so offended that he remarked that such deeds made one sink.<sup>19</sup> The Jamadar thereupon begged forgiveness and was forgiven.

These incidents show that the Maharaja knew the real worth of Khushal Singh. Still he remained a very prominent person in the Lahore durbar and, in 1839, was one of the Sikh leaders selected to co-operate with the British in the First Afghan War. His son and his nephew were generals in the Sikh army.

*The Jammu Brothers.*—The Jammu brothers—Gulab Singh, Dhian Singh and Suchet Singh—were sons of Kishore Singh and grandsons of Zorawar Singh. Their grand uncle was Mian Mota, the administrator of Jammu (1808). Mian Mota was the elder brother of Zorawar. If the *Gulabnama* is to be believed, Gulab Singh, dissatisfied with his grandfather, at one time contemplated joining Shah Shuja, but he had to give up the project. Ranjit Singh who had heard of Gulab's prowess, sent for him and Gulab



Singh joined the service of the Sikh monarch in 1810 and he later on brought his younger brothers. In 1816, Mian Gulab Singh Jamwal is shown commanding a small number of 'sowarian Jamwal' (the Jamwal cavalry). In the rolls of the previous years up to the end of Sambat 1871, he is shown as one of the troopers in the Jamwal cavalry where the name of his brother Dhian Singh is also borne on the list at Rs. 3/ per day.<sup>20</sup> Their rise was very rapid. The Jammu brothers were accomplished courtiers. The three made a common cause. Dhian Singh became such a favourite that he displaced Khushal Singh as Deodhiwala. The three brothers became Rajas—Gulab Singh of Jammu, Dhian Singh of Bhimbur and Kussal, Suchet Singh of Ramnagar.<sup>21</sup> Gulab Singh remained away from Court in his estate of Jammu and was there left entirely to himself. The brothers at Lahore pushed their common cause. The infatuation of the Maharaja for Heera Singh, the son of Dhian Singh, proved an additional encouragement in their bid for power, position and wealth.

During the later years of the Maharaja these brothers were the most potent influence in the Lahore Durbar. Indeed, Dhian Singh may very well be described as the Prime Minister. He was the channel of petition and representation. It is even said that he used to hold a miniature durbar of his own in his own house in order to facilitate the transaction of business with His Highness and that he made references only in cases of importance.<sup>22</sup> Gulab Singh is described by Jacquemont as "a soldier of fortune, a lion in war, with the plainest, noblest and most elegant manners".<sup>23</sup> A writer in the *Calcutta Review* describes Dhian Singh as "cautious and wily in some matters, open and fearless in others, ruthless yet not openly cruel."<sup>24</sup> Of course these brothers knew very well how to dissimulate and the combination which they formed—Dhian the civilian, Suchet the soldier and Gulab Singh combining a portion of the talents of both—was the most irresistible faction in the later days of Ranjit Singh.

These Jammu brothers were anti-British—"cold and repulsive towards Europeans" as Fane puts it. There is no doubt that the brothers wielded greater influence with Ranjit than any other family in the kingdom. Masson therefore asserts that though this was not agreeable to the Maharaja, he was not willing to acknowledge his own error. It was popularly believed that he would have seized them and they, aware of this, did not attend the Court at the same time.<sup>25</sup> The Jammu brothers had practically an entrenched position in the hills. They perhaps expected that after the death of the Maharaja, they would establish an independent power in Jammu and the hill countries and would put themselves at the head of an anti-foreign, anti-English national party in the Punjab. It is inconceivable that in the existing circumstances they could think of ousting the family of Ranjit Singh. They perhaps hoped to set up phantom kings and rule in the manner of the Sayyid brothers or the Peshwas. We even hear from Burnes that Dhian Singh fortified his home in Bhimbur by strengthening it with guns taken from Lahore, but no one dared disclose these facts to the Maharaja.<sup>26</sup>

What Gulab Singh was doing in Jammu and the surrounding hill regions, Sawan Mal was doing in Multan. There, so far away from the centre of royal power, he went on entrenching his own position. The Dogra party was anti-foreign and pro-national, whereas Sawan Mal knowing the hold of the British alliance on Ranjit Singh sought British support and pretty often Wade from Ludhiana and Mackeson from Bahawalpur would write in his favour to Ranjit.<sup>27</sup> He was in a comparatively weak position because Gulab Singh had his younger brothers at Court to further his own influence and support him whereas Sawan Mal stood alone. There was no love lost between the anti-English Dogra Governor of Jammu and the pro-English Governor of Multan.

In the thirties of the nineteenth century we hear pretty often of '*fashads*' or open quarrels between Gulab Singh and Sawan Mal and between their people. On the advice of the Maharaja a show of amity was restored by Khushal Singh, Ram Singh, Azizuddin and others acting as mediators.<sup>28</sup> Though Dhian Singh had so great an influence over the Maharaja, Sawan Mal's power continued undiminished and the inference is natural that the Maharaja regarded him as a make-weight on the Dogras. The Sindhianwalas, relatives of Ranjit Singh, described as *Jagirdars* of the second class (Sardaran-i-Namdar), served as a real balance against the Dogras as the subsequent history of the Punjab showed.

*Azizuddin.*—Azizuddin along with his brothers Imamuddin and Nuruddin played an important part in the Punjab under Ranjit. Their career testified to the capacity of Ranjit to rise above religious prejudice. The brothers were Ansari or Bokhari Sayyids.<sup>29</sup>

Azizuddin began his career as a physician to the Sikh ruler. He is said to have been a pupil of Lala Hakim Rai, the chief physician of Lahore when Ranjit occupied that city. Ranjit found him an excellent adviser and raised him to what was practically the rank of a minister of foreign affairs. He was an excellent negotiator, possessed very considerable literary ability and played also the part of a secretary. The interpretation of the Maharaja's words was always difficult, especially in view of the Maharaja's partial paralysis of tongue and no one was able to do this better than Azizuddin.

He styled himself as a *fakir* and adopted the dress of a *fakir*. This he regarded as an armour in the Court of Lahore, which was in its later days so full of intrigues. His politics was timid. As a diplomat he was invariably employed by Ranjit Singh in his embassies to the British Government and

was used as an intermediary in his own meetings with the representatives of the British Raj. His greatest achievement as a diplomat was the defection of the brothers of Dost Muhammad which he so cunningly brought about when Dost came to wage a holy war with Ranjit but was compelled to fly without striking a blow.

His personal attachment to Ranjit Singh was very great. On the occasion of Ranjit's attack of paralysis, the Fakir was most unremitting in his attention and McGregor says, "Had Ranjit been his father he could not have evinced a greater solicitude." He is described by Lepel Griffin as one of the ablest and certainly the most honest of all of Ranjit Singh's courtiers.

His brothers Nuruddin and Imamuddin were also very much trusted by the Maharaja. The former was employed in public works, arsenal and commissariat matters while the latter was in charge of Gobindgarh, the most important Sikh stronghold, and governor of the surrounding country.<sup>30</sup>

With so much power in their hands, had these Muhammadan officers been so inclined they might have added one more party to the list of three that arose on the death of Ranjit Singh. In addition to the Court, Dogra and Sindhianwala parties there might have been a Muhammadan party resting on the support of the Fakir brothers, the Muhammadan officers in charge of the artillery and the Muhammadan population of the Punjab. To the honesty of Azizuddin and his younger brothers there is no better testimony than this that the confidence Ranjit reposed in them was never misused. According to Honigberger, the Fakir, the Prime Minister Dhian Singh and Dewan Dina Nath, Minister of Finance, constituted the triad of which the Privy Council was composed in the later years of Ranjit.

Besides these people mentioned, other important persons in the Punjab under Ranjit Singh were Bhowani Das, Ganga Ram and Dina Nath. Misr Beli Ram was in charge of the *Toshakhana*. He secured high appointments for his brothers Ruplal, Meghraj, Ramkissen and Sukh Raj. In domestic politics and court intrigues he was arrayed against the Jammu brothers. Bhowani Das had been a revenue officer under Shah Shuja. He came to the Punjab in 1808, organised a pay office and a finance office. Ganga Ram had served under the Maharaja of Gwalior and he was placed at the head of the military office and made Keeper of the Privy-seal. Dina Nath, a nephew of Ganga Ram, became Keeper of the Privy-seal on his death and head of the civil and the finance offices on the death of Bhowani Das. Another very important person was Desa Singh Majithia, governor of the Jalandhar Doab.

Cunningham says, "Ranjit has laid himself open to the charge of extravagant partiality and favouritism as is the case with all despots and solitary authorities,"<sup>31</sup> but in the same breath he says that the mind of Ranjit Singh was never prostrate before that of others. The fact that Ranjit never allowed the anti-English Dogras to influence his attitude towards the English proves conclusively that so far as policy was concerned, no reigning favourite determined it. It has also been shown that in matters of policy no favourite dared undertake anything on his own account. Neither did the rancorous enmity of the Dogra brothers prejudice the Maharaja's relations with Sawan Mal.

A mere enumeration of the names of the prominent persons of Ranjit's Court proves conclusively that he knew how to rise above communal narrowness. Mohkam Chand, Dewan Chand, Azizuddin and his brothers, Hari Singh, Sawan Mal, and Desa Singh were all very able men. The two elder Dogras were also very efficient though they were not so honest as Mohkam Chand and Dewan Chand. In their case Ranjit's departure from his usual

attitude of vigilance had its nemesis. His sons paid very dearly "for the engrossing and prejudicial influence which he allowed the Dogra brothers to attain".

Cunningham asserts that as Ranjit "had placed himself in some degree in opposition to the whole Sikh people, he sought for strangers whose applause would be more ready if less sincere,"<sup>32</sup> but as has been shown in details in the preceding chapters, Ranjit's administration was the nearest approach to the ideal of popular monarchy that was possible in those days and in those circumstances. Apart from personal whims in the choice of favourites, we must note one thing about policy. All that was cultured and refined had disappeared from the Punjab long before Ranjit came into power; therefore in his attempt to establish order out of chaos he had to look for administrators outside the Punjab because his own land was then all but bare of talent.

The *Umdat-ut-Tawarikh* gives us a very vivid impression of the Lahore Durbar. The patient reader gets a very good picture of the Maharaja in the midst of his courtiers, in council and in conversation. In the young days of the Maharaja the Court etiquette was not perhaps so well-established and in 1809 Metcalfe referred to the sublime confusion caused by the eagerness of the councillors to display before their master their zeal, their skill and their acuteness but in 1827 Wade wrote about "the order and regularity of the whole assembly, the deference with which the Sardars treated the Maharaja and the courtesy they observed towards each other. There was no rude familiarity and confusion, every one seemed to know his place and to be conscious of the station he filled". But whether in 1809 or in 1827 the intelligent visitor at the Durbar could easily see for himself that the Maharaja seldom "divulged his plans till they were ready to be carried into execution". With limitations imposed by his physical infirmity this statement is true of the last years of his life as well.



## NOTES

1. Lepel Griffin, *Punjab Chiefs*, Vol. I, p. 202.
2. Sec. cons., 13th March, 1809, No. 45.
3. Wade, *On the Punjab and Adjacent Provinces*.
4. Kohli, *Army of Ranjit Singh; Catalogue of Khalsa Durbar Records*, Vol. I.
5. *Umdat*, p. 264.
6. *News of Ranjit Singh's Court*, 1825.
7. Shahamat Ali, *Sikhs and Afghans*, p. 53.
8. Hugel, *Travels*, p. 254. "His conversation proved him to have thought and reasoned justly".
9. *Umdat*, III, p. 140.
10. Mohanlal, *Travels* (Memoir first published in the *Calcutta Observer*, XIV).
11. *Umdat*, II, p. 379.
12. *Ibid*, III, p. 395.
13. Wade to Macnaghten, May 13, 1837 quoted by Sethi—*The Lahore Darbar* p. 299.
14. Hugel, *Travels*, p. 287; Shahamat Ali, *Sikhs and Afghans*.
15. Shahamat Ali, pp. 28-29.
16. *Ibid*.
17. *Umdat*, III, p. 179.
18. *Ibid*, p. 313.
19. *Ibid*, 320.
20. *Catalogue of Khalsa Durbar Records*, II, p. 50.
21. Carmichael Smyth, p. 256.
22. Shahamat Ali, p. 26.
23. Jacquemont, *Travels*.
24. *Cal. Review*, 1844.
25. Masson, *Travels*.
26. Burnes, Vol. I, pp. 287-88.
27. *Umdat*, III, pp. 254, 291, 313.
28. *Ibid*, pp. 254, 436.
29. Lepel Griffin, *Punjab Chiefs*, Vol. I, p. 97.
30. *Umdat*, II, p. 252.
31. Cunningham, p. 178.
32. *Ibid*.

## CHAPTER XI

### PERSONALITY AND PLACE IN HISTORY

Ranjit Singh in court and camp is a fascinating study. Great activity of mind and body was the prominent feature of his character. He has been described as the very embodiment of practical sagacity despite unlettered ignorance. Crude, dynamic and vigorous, this fostering despot was a very concrete and compact man and though there are so many anecdotes about him they do not build up into a legend.

Ranjit had many demonstrable and conspicuous defects. His mental make up showed a puerile curiosity combined with remarkable intelligence and rare sagacity. Even in his mature life we find irrational behaviour along with commendable self-restraint. Unable to read and write he exercised a minute criticism in correcting the diction of his expert secretaries. The style of letters written in ornate Persian, read out to him by his secretary Fakir Azizuddin, would be improved by him in open durbar. Himself illiterate, he respected the acquirements in others and issued strict orders at the time of his first Peshawar campaign for the preservation of the extensive library of the Mussalman saint at Chamkanni (Masson). Habitually reserved in matters of business, he would joke with dancing girls in open court as it illbehoved a monarch. A professing Sikh, he would go to Amritsar for his devotions, pay his respect to Brahmins and visit the tombs of various Muslim saints as well. Accustomed to act singly and independently practically in every important matter he would make a show of consulting his courtiers whenever it suited his interest.

Jacquemont tells us that this great ruler with his prodigious memory knew the name, position and history of from ten to

twelve thousand villages in his kingdom. In course of a discussion with Wade on the terms of the navigation of the Sutlej, Ranjit Singh "himself counted his different districts along the right bank from Harikepattan to Mithankot together with the names of his local officials and the force stationed in each". The precision with which he did this showed how much he depended on himself for regulating his administration. He knew every detail and with his indefatigable capacity for work he would give suggestions and instructions on minute points. The most inquisitive of men, his conversation was a 'nightmare' even to a man of the intellectual capacity of Jacquemont, whom he asked "a hundred thousand questions about India, the English, Europe, Bonaparte, this world in general and the other one, hell and paradise, the soul, god, the devil and a thousand things besides." William Macnaghten, Auckland's Chief Secretary wrote in May, 1838, that the Maharaja "passed from war to wine, and from learning to hunting with breathless rapidity". Though some decline of his remarkable mental faculties is noticeable in his later years he remains, when all is said, one of the most remarkable personalities in British Indian history.

In his military expeditions Ranjit Singh was accustomed to issue instructions to his officers in such details that little or no initiative was left to them. A book of military *purwanas* covering the period from 14th November, 1833 to 18th December, 1834, shows how indefatigable was his capacity for work, how thorough was his grasp of details, how keen was his solicitude for his men. A good general, who showed conspicuous personal bravery at Nowshera and remarkable tenacity at Mankera, he was more conspicuous in the organisational than in the operational part of campaigns. One of his French officers described him as a man without passions. This remark, however true of Ranjit Singh as a politician, is certainly inapplicable to him as a soldier. He was seen to weep as some of his old soldiers approached him with petitions and showed him their wounds. The personal devotion

and loyalty that he inspired smoothed the path of duty. But few chiefs exercised more rigid control over the conduct of their troops than he did.

Ranjit Singh was not 'an adventurer of genius in a temporary political vacuum'. He was to Guru Gobind Singh what Lenin was to Karl Marx, what Omar was to Muhammad. "Guru Gobind Singh called in the human energy of the Sikhs from all other sides and made it flow in a particular direction. By this means the Sikh nation was poured into the mould of a special purpose and acquired solidity . . . he converted the spiritual unity of the Sikhs into a means of worldly advancement. An ephemeral outburst of passion, a temporary sense of need made Guru Gobind Singh exalt the channel . . . the result was that the Sikhs got a contrivance for a close union among themselves but lost their progressive power." There is such a thing as the logic of history. The exclusively military turn given to the Sikh character resulted after the Sikh wars of liberation and the establishment of a theocratic confederate feudalism in the founding of a military monarchy, when a strong man arose who could compel the entire system to gyrate round himself and Sikh valour flared up brightly.

There has been an age-long controversy between collectivistic and individualistic historiographers. The former assign to collectivity the power that is creative of ideas and institutions, the latter attribute it to the individual of genius. Both are true in what they include and false in what they exclude. Admitting that the development of capacity in a nation is more a question of opportunity than of ability, we must at the same time recognise that the Jats who formed the backbone of the Sikh community were principally soldiers and became even more so as a result of the reforms of Guru Gobind Singh. Therefore power, as Ranjit Singh the last great constructive genius among the Sikhs understood it, was not moral but military. But an Indian chieftain who could secure the support of all sections of his people—

Sikhs, Hindus and Muhammadans,—who could defend the North-Western frontier against a powerful Afghanistan and unruly border tribes and administer it successfully, who could train an army whose fighting qualities came as a revelation to their famous opponents, who could to a certain extent furnish Indian nationalism with what it greatly needs—a tradition of strength—must always stand in the forefront of great men of Indian History.

Among Ranjit Singh's principal achievements we must count his very successful defence of his kingdom against the Afghans. We know that Afghanistan was at one time a part of India. But India lost it once for all. She would also have lost the North-Western Frontier region, the Punjab and Kashmir but for the rise of the Sikhs and the consolidation of Ranjit's sway in those regions. It is a certainty that if the disorganised misls had retained their hold over the Punjab, at least the North-Western Frontier region and Kashmir would have become a part of Afghanistan under the Barakzais.

Ranjit Singh is a supreme example of an intellect without a conscience. He forgot that force, stratagem and policy alone can create only a very rude organisation. He did not breathe into the hearts of his people any noble sentiment that would have held them together after his death. Shivaji like Ranjit Singh had incapable successors. But the history of Maharashtra after his death presents a striking contrast to that of the Punjab after the death of Ranjit Singh.

Ranjit built up a state. But as a builder his imperfections are apparent. Like many other great men Ranjit Singh so completely centralised everything pertaining to his government in himself that his disappearance caused not a vacancy but a void in which the entire structure of government was submerged. He left the jagirdars weak and the army too powerful for his weak successors to control. With the help of the standing army was

the treasury in some cases filled and control exercised over distant provinces. The personal influence of the head of the state was the only hold on the discipline and affection of the troops. The army, as subsequent events proved, had a very strong *esprit-de-corps* which may be explained by the analogy of a trade union. The army considered itself as the visible embodiment of the *Khalsa* or the commonwealth. But "habituated at once to violence and to slavery, the soldiers are very unfit guardians of a legal or even civil constitution. Valour will acquire their esteem and liberality will purchase their suffrage. But the first of these merits is often lodged in the most savage breasts, the latter can only exert itself at the expense of the public and both may be turned against the possessor of the throne by the ambition of a daring rival" (Gibbon).

Ranjit Singh was very unfortunate in one respect. The very able generals of his choice—Mohkam Chand, Dewan Chand, Hari Singh Nalwa, Ram Dayal—all died even during his lifetime. Only crafty designing men, either weaklings or traitors, survived to command his forces. Naturally the army grew out of control. After the death of Nau Nihal Singh, there remained nobody with an undisputed claim to the throne. Disputed succession encouraged intrigues. The Punjab became a scene of the wildest disorder.

The one great external cause of Ranjit's failure is found in his relations with the British Government. Very early in his career he had entered into a treaty with the British Government. But in almost all cases, as Bismarck has put it, a political alliance means a rider and a horse. In this Anglo-Sikh alliance, the British Government was the rider and Ranjit was the horse. The English limited Ranjit's power on the east, on the south, and would have limited him on the west if that were possible. Evidently a collision between his military monarchy and British Imperialism was imminent. Ranjit Singh, the Massinissa of



British Indian history, hesitated and hesitated forgetting that in politics, as in war, time is not on the side of the defensive. When the crash came after his death under far less able men, chaos and disorder had already supervened and whatever hope there had been when he was living, there was no more when he was dead. In his relations with the British Government Ranjit Singh is seen at his worst. He never grandly dared. He was all hesitancy and indecision.

But at the same time we must acknowledge that Ranjit's failure was inherent in the very logic of events. "All causes that were not the cause of Rome were destined to be lost. The central power, once dominant, could only grow and all the outside forces could only shatter themselves against Rome as enemies or augment the strength of Rome as vassals." This remark about Roman Imperialism is true of British Imperialism in India as well.

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## APPENDIX A

### SHAH SHUJA IN LAHORE (1813-1815)\*

The Durrani monarch Shah Shuja lost his throne in 1809. As he was deserted by his chiefs and his people he had to desist from operations. He was carried off a prisoner to Kashmir where Ata Muhammad Khan, the Afghan Governor, would only offer him release if he gave the Koh-i-noor. The Shah refused to surrender this jewel. He was released from captivity by Mohkam Chand, Ranjit Singh's general, and was brought to Lahore. Shah Shuja remained there for about two years (1813-1815).

After his arrival in Lahore Shah Shuja was assigned for his residence the haveli of Sada Singh (Sawa Singh) and another haveli for his harem. If necessary, intercourse between the two residences could be interrupted. On the second day after his arrival, Ram Singh came. He demanded the Koh-i-noor. Shah Shuja replied that it was not with him, but when real friendship would be established he would give it. Ram Singh asked for it again next day. The same reply was given. There was an altercation. After this the free movement of Shah Shuja's people was at an end. At times Ranjit's men would permit his attendants to go out, at times they would not. They would supply food or would not according to their pleasure. Thus one month passed. Every day they would ask for the Koh-i-noor and the Shah's reply always was—"when friendship will be established it will be given". The confidential servants of Ranjit Singh enquired if the ex-king wanted ready money and was willing to enter into a treaty for the world-famous diamond. The Shah answered in the affirmative and after some days about fifty thousand rupees was given in

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several instalments. The confidential agents of Ranjit Singh again asked for the Koh-i-noor. Shah Shuja replied that when a treaty would securely lay the foundations of unity he would give it to the Maharaja. Two days after Ranjit Singh himself came, expatiated at length on his friendship, took an oath on his holy granth and the sword and made a paper grant of the districts of Kot Kamalia, Jhang Sial and Khulenur to the ex-king and also offered assistance in troops and treasure if the Shah attempted to recover his throne and also assured him that the friendship now established would continue even if he succeeded in reconquering Kabul. There was an exchange of turbans. Shah Shuja then gave him the Koh-i-noor. On the second day after this Shah Shuja returned the visit. There was music and dancing to soothe the feeling of the ex-king.

But Ranjit did not fulfil his part of the contract. When Shah Shuja sent his people to the districts assigned, Ranjit's people would not let them manage. The Lahore ruler was approached and he said that he would give these to the ex-king next year. In the meantime Mulla Sher Muhammad, Shah Shuja's "pesh namaz" (imam), was alleged to have written a letter to the Kabul Wazir. Shah Shuja sent him to Ranjit Singh who had him imprisoned. Sher Muhammad was tortured and very badly treated. Shah Shuja released him by payment of 12,000 rupees. At last it was known that Mulla Zafar and Abul Hasan, two men in the train of Shah Shuja, who were enemies of Sher Muhammad, had done this. They had accompanied the family of Shah Shuja to Lahore, had appropriated his money and joined Ranjit Singh's party. They were at the root of the Koh-i-noor affair and were responsible for the present troubles as well.

Ranjit then asked the ex-king to accompany him to Rohtas and Shah Shuja had to accompany him. Ranjit went to Rawalpindi with the ex-king in his train. He was told that Fateh Khan was at Peshawar and Ranjit would go there. But Ranjit

abandoned this expedition and returned to Lahore, leaving Shah Shuja with prince Kharak Singh and his agent Ram Singh. The latter even sent thieves to steal his belongings. They were caught. Kharak Singh asked for the Shah's camp-beds and other personal belongings which the Shah had to give. As Ram Singh and Kharak Singh started for Lahore he was asked to accompany them and on the way he was surrounded by 300/400 Sikh sowars and lost all his belongings including jewels, silk goods, gilt swords, small guns and gold and silver coins. When he reached Lahore he was compelled to part with half of his belongings which were taken by Ranjit Singh's men. Thus the Sikh chief violated all his promises. Even after this spies continued to watch him and guards surrounded his dwellings.

The Shah decided to fly. His family escaped to Ludhiana in the costume of Indian women who frequented his harem but he himself was being closely watched. Ranjit was surprised when he heard about the flight of the Shah's family. The precautions were now redoubled. Eight persons guarded his haveli at night: But he made a hole through the ceiling and changed room after room seven times in succession. Leaving a faithful attendant to sleep on his bed, the ex-king with his immediate attendants escaped in the dress of a fakir, reached the bazar, thence the riverside. As the city gates were guarded he must have escaped through one of the nullahs of the city. The boatmen previously engaged were there and the ex-king escaped to the hills. After an ineffective attempt on Kashmir with the assistance of the Raja of Kishtwar the Shah finally reached Ludhiana where he had his family. The ex-king thus placed himself under British protection. This was in September, 1816.

After his escape Ranjit seized the money which the ex-king had deposited with the bankers at Lahore. In his anger the Shah in his autobiography describes the Sikhs as "men whose very foundation is evil".

This is the version of the ex-king himself of the life which he led at Lahore during the months he lived there under Sikh protection (*Tarikh-i-Shah Shuja*, f. 56—f. 69). The *Tarikh Sultani's* version is not materially different from that of the ex-king (*Indian Antiquary*, XII and XVII). This version of events is also substantially corroborated by contemporary newsletters (*Events at the Court of Ranjit Singh*). In one of these letters dated 4th March, 1814, we find that "Ram Singh came in and reported that he had gone to the *dera* of Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, had demanded the jewellery, had then sent five maid-servants into the ladies' apartments inside the palace, that they had brought everything that they could find in the interior such as jewellery, turquoise, pearls, small boxes, carpets and the like and Hazrat Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk had wept and cried aloud that he could not resist the will of god". But there are two material points of divergence. In a letter dated 8th June, 1813, we read "Ghafoor Khan Afghan came from Jhang Sialan, paid his respects, presented one gold ducat as *nazr* and stated that he had been in service at Jhang for a very long time but that since the control of Hazrat Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk had been established there he had been dismissed from his post and did not know where to go from the door of the Noble Sarkar".

This letter shows that the districts promised must have been assigned to Shah Shuja and his control established there. Subsequently on account of reasons as yet unknown these must have been resumed. Shah Shuja tells us that Sher Muhammad was falsely accused of writing to Azim Khan. But we read in a letter dated 23rd June, that "Pir Baksh in charge of the police station came in and stated that Mulla Hasan and Qazi Sher Muhammad Khan, the companions of Hazrat Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, had written some letters on their own accord and under their own seals to Sirdar Fateh Khan Wazir, that as the messenger carrying these letters had been brought to him as a captive, therefore he submitted those letters to the Noble Sarkar.—It was written in them



that the Noble Sarkar was all alone at that time in Lahore, that he had no troops with him, that if he the wazir would send his troops it would not be difficult to capture Lahore”.

It was well known that after Shah Shuja had been seized by Ata Muhammad Khan, the lancet was frequently held over his eyes and he was threatened with instant death with a view to extorting the Koh-i-noor from him (Burnes, *Travels*, III). Wafa Begam, wife of Shah Shuja sent a petition to Ranjit Singh to the effect that the Afghan Wazir was talking of taking Kashmir and in that case her husband would be taken to Kabul and his eyes would be taken out. So Ranjit was requested to rescue him. Ranjit was also told that the Koh-i-noor was in Kashmir with the Shah and if he was taken to Kabul the priceless jewel would be taken along with him (*Zafarnama-i-Ranjit Singh*, 1812). Thus it seems quite probable that Wafa Begum promised Ranjit Singh the world-famous jewel if he succeeded in rescuing Shah Shuja from the hands of the Afghans and the Sikh ruler could claim it in return for the services rendered. Ranjit later told Wade, British Agent at Ludhiana, that Shuja-ul-Mulk was rescued because the Koh-i-noor had been promised as the price. But the ex-king was not a simpleton like Muhammad Shah, the Timurid, so that a wily exchange of turbans would bring the Sikh ruler the world-famous jewel. In this Koh-i-noor transaction “the character of Ranjit Singh more unscrupulous than cruel was curiously displayed in the measures he adopted. No greater severity was employed than appeared absolutely necessary to overcome the obstinacy of the Shah and none was omitted that promised the accomplishment of the end” (Osborne—Introduction). It required more self-denial than is to be expected that with the world-famous diamond in his grasp he would not try to secure it merely out of respect for “the shade of that which once was great”. Reverence for the past was not his weakness. It is relevant to quote in this connection a historic estimate of the value of the Koh-i-noor. “It is so valuable that a judge of



diamonds valued it at half of the daily expenses of the whole world". This precious jewel, as seen by visitors who came to the Sikh Durbar after 1814, was of the shape of a small hen's egg set as an armlet with a large diamond on either side of it.

Shah Shuja was not a helpless dependent ex-king as was Shah Ayub who later sought shelter in Lahore and was granted an allowance of rupees one thousand a month and a jagir. Even after he was plundered by Ranjit Singh the ex-king had still in his possession jewels whose sale proceeds yielded him a very considerable amount at Ludhiana and enabled him later to embark on his ambitious ventures.

Ranjit's rapacious treatment of Shah Shuja after the Koh-i-noor seizure has been sought to be justified on the charge of the intrigues of the Shah and his companions but it scandalised even Ranjit Singh's own courtiers. We find in a letter dated 10th September, 1813—"The Noble Sarkar told Nihal Singh, Mith Singh Bharania, Bhai Gurbaksh Singh individually in privacy that Shuja-ul-Mulk had with him one saddle, beset with jewels worth 28 Lakhs of rupees, one big bedstead of turquoise fixed upon four legs, each of which was studded with one big diamond and he said he proposed demanding these articles for himself. They said that the Noble Sarkar could do whatever he thought fit but that already he had suffered a great deal of disrepute in his seizing the Koh-i-noor gem from him and these things could not be secured without inflicting further hardship, unpleasantness and humiliation. The Noble Sarkar might show him kind attention, consideration, patronage and encouragement." It is not difficult to understand Ranjit's design to detain Shah Shuja as a prisoner and to make use of his name for purposes of his own. This also explains the anxiety of the Shah to escape from his clutches. Ranjit was eager to secure his jewels and other valuables and deprive him of the means of independent endeavour. But he was not unwilling to supply him money if he was really

in need of it. On the 19th September, 1813, he sent Shah Shuja 1,000 rupees for his expenses and the Shah accepted it. On the 27th October, 1814, the Shah was paid Rs. 2,000. There are other entries (*Events at the Court of Ranjit Singh*). The ex-king could not, however, like such dependence on the Lahore chief for his daily expenses. With his jagir resumed, his jewels seized, his pension of no fixed amount, the Shah felt that his position was intolerable and he wanted to escape. But it is interesting to note that even after he was repeatedly despoiled, we find Shah Shuja trying to secure Ranjit's help while at Lahore to fight Fateh Khan. Ranjit's reply was that the best policy was that of delay. Sadi Khan Kotwal was appointed to guard Shah Shuja. When the Shah protested, the Lahore Chief replied that he was not a prisoner but had only a guard of honour (*Zafarnama*, 1815).

In spite of the shabby treatment at Lahore, the Shah being always guided by political considerations and not by a sense of personal injury and personal wrongs was always eager to approach him for help even from Ludhiana and at times Ranjit responded to his appeal. In 1830, Shah Shuja sent complimentary presents to Ranjit Singh. In 1831 he wrote to Ranjit Singh 'that whatever had happened to him in the past he considered as proceeding from adverse fate and not from His Highness' (Wade to Prinsep, Nov. 21, 1831 quoted in *The Lahore Durbar*). In the *Catalogue of Khalsa Durbar Records*, II, p. 192, under the heading *Madid Kharch* we find that Ranjit supplied to the ex-king between 5th Bhadon 1890 and 19th Baisakh 1891 (1833-34 A.D.) a sum of Rs. 14,500 for his Qandahar expedition. But the *Umdat-ut-Tawarikh's* figure is one lakh twenty-five thousand. If the Shah could forget his personal wrongs so soon and approach him for help and later make him an ally, the historian has no right to expatiate on these personal wrongs in spite of the very unfavourable impression created by Ranjit's shabby treatment of the fugitive monarch in his distress.

## APPENDIX B

### A CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

#### *Persian Sources:*

I. *Umdat-ut-Tawarikh*.—A Diary of Ranjit Singh, a "Roznamcha", written by Sohanlal, the *Akhbar Nawis* of Ranjit Singh, published by his son in 1885. I consulted the copy in the Buhar Library, Calcutta. Captain Wade's remark as to the value of this book is worth quoting. "As a record of dates and chronicle of events tested by a minute comparison with other authorities and my own personal investigations . . . I am able to pronounce it in these two respects as a true and faithful narrative of Ranjit Singh's eventful life." It goes into very minute details. It is not overlaudatory though as a mere chronicle we must not expect it to be critical. Many of the details of the *nazranas*, the rewards, whatever might have been their interest to a contemporary, are useless from a historical point of view.

II. *Zafarnama-i-Ranjit Singh*—of *Dewan Amarnath*, edited by Sita Ram Kohli. It comes down to 1836. There is a translation of a part of it in the *Calcutta Review*, 1858. This translation comes down to 1820. But the translator in the *Calcutta Review* has so interwoven his own reflections with his translation as to damage the historical value of his work. The author was for some time a paymaster of the irregular cavalry forces of the *Khalsa Durbar*. His father was the finance minister of Ranjit Singh. This book is of first rate importance for the political history of the Sikhs. It was used by Latif.

III. *Tarikh-i-Sikhan*—Kushwaqt Rai Ms., transcribed for me by the research department of Khalsa College, Amritsar.

Kushwaqt Rai wrote this "at the instance of Nawab Nasir-ud-Daula Mata-mud-ul-Mulk Wafadar Khan Colonel Akhtar Luni Sahib Bahadur Zafar Jang" in 1811. An excellent contemporary source for the early history of Ranjit Singh. For the period extending from 1797-1811, I regard the Kushwaqt Rai Ms. as more important than that of Sohanlal.

IV. *News of Ranjit Singh's Court*.—Written in Persian, translated in English—author unknown, date 1825. It is a 'Roznamcha'—a day to day account of the Court proceedings. It gives us a graphic picture of business transactions in the Sikh Court. It is valuable so far as the history of the year 1825 is concerned, also as regards Ranjit's relations with Sada Kaur after her incarceration and his relations with his Muhammadan subjects. The document is in the Persian Section of the Imperial Record Department.

V. *Manuscript No. 622, Khuda Baksh Library (Hisabnama Fouj-i-Ranjit Singh)*—author unknown; date early nineteenth century. It is a beautiful manuscript relating to the military system of Ranjit Singh. It is divided into three sections . . . cavalry, infantry and artillery. It gives a very good view of Ranjit Singh's military system in all its three branches. It is specially interesting as showing the percentage of Muhammadan soldiers and officers.

VI. *Tarikh-i-Shah Shuja, Br. Mus. Ms. or. 1796*—extends from 1216 to 1241 A.H. (1801-1826). This autobiography of Shah Shuja is a very reliable source of information for the career of the ex-king from 1810-1815. For his later life-history after 1826 ample evidence is available in British records.

VII. *Punjab Government Record Office Publication—Monograph No. 17—Events at the Court of Ranjit Singh (1810-1817)*, translated into English and edited by Garrett and Chopra—Newsletters in Persian contained in 193 loose sheets preserved in the

Alienation Office, Poona—most probably written for the benefit of some Maratha chief, possibly the Peshwa, at Poona. The name and identity of the writer is not to be found in the letters. In the letters of the first two years a Khushal Singh is mentioned as the informant, identified by the editors with Khushal Singh Jamadar. In three letters of 1817 the sender's seal is that of 'Azimulla', who remains unidentified. There are large gaps in these letters. There was no Peshwa after 1818, but there is a letter of 1822. The editors have not been able to explain how this letter of 1822 finds its place in this series. In this volume of letters we get authentic and detailed history, personal as also administrative and political, for the period 1810-1817. In spite of the gaps we get a very full picture of life in the Lahore Durbar during the period covered by these news-letters. I have seen the original letters in the Alienation Office, Poona. The handwriting is execrable. Even the best expert in Ms. reading must find the greatest difficulty in deciphering even undamaged portions of the letters. Let us hope that the Persian translators at Lahore did their work with absolute accuracy. The letters are of a type familiar to students of Maratha history of the 18th century. The Maratha Government was not like the British Government of India, a Government by writing. But the Marathas possessed excellent historical sense. Letters of this type are too few, alas, in Sikh History.

I have not attached any importance to Kanheya Lal's *Zafarnama-i-Ranjit Singh*, *Ranjitnama* (1876) and Bute Shah's *Twarikh-i-Punjab* (1848)—The *Ranjitnama* has got all the defects of a bad chronicle—a mixture of memory, imagination and design, a general prolixity and redundancy. Bakht Mal's *Khalsanama* (Br. Mus. Pers. Add. 24033), written in 1814, does not enlighten us much about Ranjit Singh. To quote H. A. L. Fisher, "a good history will emerge from a few first class authorities clearly interpreted than from a vast and exhausting miscellany of unequal value. There is a fallacy in the assumption



that the more man reads the more nearly he approaches the truth. There is no such relation between the thing that was and the number of words which has been written about it"—I confess I have not read Kanheya Lal's *Ranjitnama*, Bute Shah's *Twarikh* and the *Gulabnama* with the care they perhaps deserved from the orthodox standpoint because they are not really indispensable primary sources.

Mohan Singh's *Waqaya-i-Holkar* gives nothing that we do not know about Holkar's relations with Ranjit Singh from other sources. The Persian Ms. *Akhbarat-i-Sindhia*—Br. Mus. Add. 24,086—has only two entries relating to Ranjit and they are misleading. In one (4396) we read "Maha Singh Dalewal is dead, his sons are fighting among themselves"—in another, 4776, we find "Letters from Ranjit Singh, Grandson of Maha Singh"—such a source cannot be helpful in any way.

#### *English Sources:*

Records in the Imperial Record Department, Foreign Political Proceedings, 1808-1839.

Records in the Imperial Record Department, Foreign Miscellaneous, 1809-1839.\*

\*Wade—*On the Punjab and Adjacent Provinces.*

Malcolm—*On the Invasion of India by Russia.*

Elliot—*On the Revenue and Resources of the Punjab.*

*Report of the Board of Administration at Lahore.*

*Report of the Settlement of the Districts of the Jullundhur Doab.*

Lieutenant Pottinger's *Memoir on Sindh.*

Burnes—*Report on Countries between India and Russia,*  
No. 206.



*Indian Papers*, Punjab, 1845-1849.

*Parliamentary Papers*.

These records are most important contemporary British official sources of information as distinguished from the non-official records of the European travellers. So far as Anglo-Sikh, Sikh-Afghan, and Anglo-Afghan relations are concerned, they are both elaborate and valuable. We should not forget that the French traveller Jacquemont gathered the impression that India was governed by stationery. The English official point of view is not always correct, as we know. Even within the records there are official evidences contradicting official conclusions. A discriminating eye can discern the truth. We should, however, keep in mind the warning of Peter Cunningham that "even state papers have been altered to suit the temporary views of political warfare or abridged out of mistaken regard for the tender feeling of the survivors." Through newswriters the British agency at Ludhiana kept itself informed of the happenings in the Sikh country and informed the Central Government. Further, of the records in the Miscellaneous section, the report of Wade and Pottinger's *Memoir on Sind* serve as good supplementary sources of information. The reports of the Board of Administration and on the revenues and resources of the Punjab as also the *Punjab papers* and *Parliamentary papers*, 1845-1849, refer to a period much later than the period under review. But in them there are references to the Sikh administrative system of the previous period.

*Poona Residency Correspondence*—Vol. VIII, Daulat Rao Sindhia and North Indian affairs, 1794-1799.

*Poona Residency Correspondence*—Vol. IX, Daulat Rao Sindhia and North Indian affairs, 1800-1803.

*Poona Residency Correspondence*—Vol. XI, Daulat Rao Sindhia's affairs, 1804-1809.

For facts relating to Ranjit Singh's rise up to 1809, this correspondence gives excellent corroborative evidence and at times evidence that starts a new line of investigation.

I also consulted old records of the N. W. Frontier province in the custody of the Imperial Record Department. I did not find in these records anything of value to me for my present purpose. There are, however, some passages of strategic importance which were withheld from me. I could not therefore incorporate these passages in my chapter on the N. W. frontier.

The contemporary newspaper, *The Englishman*, has some corroborative value. News-service in those days was not very efficient but partisanship was not also as blatant as in modern times.

Barr, W.—*Journal of March from Delhi to Peshawar, 1844*—It is of some importance for its valuable comments on the army of Ranjit Singh.

Burnes—*Travels into Bokhara*, in three volumes, 1834. A diplomat, adventurer and explorer, he supplies very valuable information regarding Ranjit Singh's relations with Afghanistan. He had an admirable opportunity of acquiring a knowledge of the history of the Sikhs at first hand as the frequent mention of his name in the *Umdat-ut-Tawarikh* proves. Incidentally, we have some references to Ranjit's civil administration in the account of Burnes. In the case of all foreign travellers, Burnes not excepted, we must make a distinction between what they probably saw and knew and what they heard and guessed. Burnes was not a bad observer, or he would not have been such an able diplomat. Later in Afghanistan, however, he failed to perceive the first premonitions of trouble which were quite apparent to many of his subordinate colleagues. We must, in order to avoid pitfalls, note that there are inaccuracies in his book.

Eden—*Up the Country*, London, 1866, also her *Letters*, London, 1844. She was a sister of Lord Auckland and she accompanied the Governor-General in his visit to Ranjit. She describes things very vividly. The approach is journalistic.

Elphinstone—*An Account of the Kingdom of Kabul*, London, 1839, Vol. II, is useful. It contains an account of the tribes as also a history of Afghanistan.

Fane—*Five Years in India*, London, 1842. As an aide-de-camp to Lord Auckland he accompanied Lord Auckland to the camp of Ranjit Singh. His account is superficial though interesting.

Forster—*Journey from Bengal to England* through the Punjab, Afghanistan and Persia; London, 1708. Like Malcolm's *Sketch* it is also one of the oldest and also one of the best sources. It is also very valuable as a very early description of the country and its people by a contemporary foreign traveller. Malcolm and Forster give us some very admirable descriptions of the state of things before the rise of the Sikh military monarchy.

Gardner, *Memoirs*—The book is edited by Pearse, London, 1898. He was a Colonel of artillery in the Sikh service. His account of the European officers in the Sikh service is useful. But he was a great liar, deliberately passing off as his the adventures of other men.

Harlan—*A Memoir of India and Afghanistan*, 1842—*Personal Narrative*, 1823-'41, Ed. by F. E. Ross.

Hugel, Von: *Travels*, translated from German by Major Jervis, London, 1845—This German scientist makes incidental references to Sikh politics and history. But a foreign traveller, ignorant of the language, is always very gullible unless he is a very keen and critical observer.

Jacquemont, Victor—*Letters from India*, London, 1835, Trs. Macmillan—Jacquemont was sent on a scientific mission by the authorities of the Paris Museum of Natural History. The letters are dated 1831. A scientist's power of observation is entitled to respect; he is refreshing in his candour, but in his sweeping generalisations, especially about Ranjit's army, Jacquemont does not always display discernment.

Lawrence, II—*Some Passages in the Life of an Adventurer in the Punjab*, London, 1846. It is a readable novel that incidentally describes the court and the administration. He criticises the military system of Ranjit Singh. The information, the observation and the criticism supplied under the guise of fiction are valuable.

Malcolm—*Sketch of the Sikhs*, 1812. It is one of the earliest accounts of the Sikhs and one of the best. But for the Ranjit Singh period it does not supply much information.

Masson—*Narrative of Various Journeys*—London, 1858. The information supplied by him is to be carefully used as in the case of all foreign travellers. The further difficulty is that he gives us no dates. He is also at times fanciful.

McGregor—An army doctor, wrote the history of the Sikhs in two volumes, London, 1846. It is valuable so far as the period of the Sikh wars is concerned. For the period ending in 1839 it is not of much value.

Mohanlal—*Journey of a Tour* through the Punjab and Afghanistan in the Company of Lt. Burnes, Calcutta, 1834. It is important because it comes from the pen of an Indian who was one of the first products of English education in India. Accounts of Indian travellers are very important as a set-off against the narrative of the European travellers.

Moorcroft and Trebeck—*Travels in the Himalayan Provinces*, 1819-25, John Murray, London, 1837. It is, as a writer in the *Calcutta Review* notes, "a thing of shreds and patches". The compiler Horace Wilson has not been able to make it intelligible at all places. In the *Asiatic Journal*, 1835, 1836, we have an account of travels written by Gholam Hyder Khan who accompanied Moorcroft in his journey. This account of Gholam Hyder is edited with notes by Major Hearsey. Some of the letters of Moorcroft have also been published in the *Asiatic Journal*. Moorcroft gives us much valuable information on Lahore-Ladak relations and on Ranjit's rule in Kashmir. In the *Journal of the Punjab Historical Society*, Vol. II, part I, an important and interesting letter of Moorcroft to Ochterlony has been published. The letter is dated May 12, 1820.

Osborne—*The Court and the Camp of Ranjit Singh*, London, 1840. It is the picture of a very able British official observer. As a description of the manners of the Chief, the characteristics of the different men, it is excellent. The introduction is based on Prinsep and Murray.

*Punjab Government Records* (Published)—The Ludhiana Agency Volume, 1808-1815, is helpful. It shows the mutual doubts and suspicions of the English and Sikh Governments during 1809-1812.

Prinsep, H. T.—*Origin of the Sikh Power*, 1834. Based on a report by Captain Murray, who collected his materials while he was Ochterlony's Assistant at Ludhiana. As a compiler Prinsep had also before him some reports of Wade and other Indian agents and intelligencers of the British Government. It narrates political history as also customs and manners.

Shahamat Ali—*The Sikhs and the Afghans*, John Murray, 1847. He was in the Punjab immediately before and after the death of Ranjit Singh. He was a school-fellow of Mohanlal.



He is one of those very rare writers of Sikh history who have attempted, however briefly, to give an account of Sikh civil administration.

Smyth, Carmichael—*A History of the Reigning Family of Lahore*, London, 1847. May be valuable in some details. But he records bazar rumours. His reliance on uncorroborated hearsay evidence makes him undependable.

Steinbach—*The Punjab*, London, 1846—He was in the Sikh service and as such had an opportunity of looking into things. But his account is much too brief to be of value.

Vigne—*A Personal Narrative of a Visit to Ghazni, Kabul, Afghanistan*, London, 1840. As a book of travels it is delightful reading. But he had all the limitations of a foreign traveller ignorant of the manners and customs of the country. We must be very discriminating in the information we obtain from him.

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# INDEX

## A

Abdus Samad Khan, 33.  
 Abid Khan, Khwaja, 9.  
 Afghanistan, Ranjit's relations with,  
 10-13, 43-53, 59, 61-63, 82-87,  
 93-102, App. A.  
 Ahluwalia Misl, 2n.  
 Ahmadabad, 16.  
 Ahmad Khan, Jhang, 15.  
 Ahmad Khan Shahanchi, 10.  
 Ahmad Shah Abdali, 1, 6, 9, 10, 33,  
 106, 172.  
 Akalgarh, 9, 14.  
 Akalis, 137-138, 154.  
 Allard, 160, 161.  
 Amarnath, 54, 65, App. B.  
 Amar Singh Kalan, 107.  
 Amarpura, 133n.  
 Amar Singh Thapa, 37, 38, 129;  
 Son of, 128.  
 Ambala, 3n, 22, 23, 78.  
 Amb, 53.  
 Amir Khan, 18, 20.  
 Amirs of Sind, Br. relations with,  
 80-82, 120.  
 Ranjit's relations with, 82,  
 117-123.  
 Amritsar, 2n, 16, 137, 187.  
 Anroodh Chand, 38.  
 Ata Muhammad Khan, 44, 45, 47,  
 48, App. A.  
 Attar Singh, 107.  
 Attock, annexed, 48, 49; bridge, 108,  
 111; battle, 50.  
 Auckland, Lord, 83, 86.  
 Aus Kaur, 22.  
 Avitabile, 112, 140, 146, 164, 165, 169.  
 Ayub Shah, 155.  
 Azim Khan, 53, 54, 59, 61, 62, 63,  
 93, 119.  
 Azizuddin, 148, 149, 150, 182, 183;  
 his diplomacy, 29, 48, 98.

## B

Bahawalpur, 35, 60, 97, 116-117.  
 Bahawal Khan, 94.  
 Bajore, 99, 107.  
 Banda, 1.  
 Bannu, 43, 63, 98, 112, 113, 142.  
 Baramgola, 54.  
 Baramulla, 59.

Basoli, 35.  
 Barr, W., 205.  
 Battles:—

Chilianwala, 172.  
 Church, 49-52.  
 Firuz Suhur, 171.  
 Gujrat, 172.  
 Jamrud, 100-101.  
 Mahal Mori, 37.  
 Neemla, 43, App. A.  
 Nowshera, 62, 63.  
 Sobraon, 171.  
 Tibbi, 116.  
 Bedi Saheb Singh, 26.  
 Beli Ram, 140, 184.  
 Bhag Singh, Jind, 19, 21, 22, 23.  
 Bhagail Singh, 39.  
 Bhangi Misl, 2n, 13, 16.  
 Bhasin, 13, 14.  
 Bhimbur, 48, 59.  
 Bhopal Singh Thapa, 128.  
 Bhowani Das, 57, 139, 184.  
 Bourquin, 19.  
 British, the, claim sovereignty over  
 cis-Sutlej states, 23, 30; Treaty  
 with Ranjit, 31; relations with  
 Amirs of Sind, 80, 81, 120-122;  
 with Dost Muhammad, 82-88.  
 Budh Singh Fyzullapur, 64.  
 Burnes, 8, 82, 83, 138, 154n, App. B.

## C

Carmichael Smyth, 8, 160, 169, 209.  
 Chamba, 35.  
 Chharat Singh, 2n, 9, 11.  
 Chet Singh, 13.  
 Chiloundhi, 3n.  
 Chilianwala, 172.  
 China, War with Sikhs, 127.  
 Chiniot, 15.  
 Cis-Sutlej country, 5, 19-21, 28-31,  
 32.  
 Civil Administration; Central Govt.,  
 139; diplomatic service, 148-149;  
 districts, 140; defects, 150-151;  
 estimate of, 149; excise and cus-  
 toms, 143; financial administra-  
 tion, 141-142; judicial administra-  
 tion, 147-148; land tax, 142-143;  
 limited absolutism, 137-139; local  
 govt., 141.

## D

- Dajil, 118.  
 Dallewala Misl, 3n, 39.  
 Darband, 53, 60, 111.  
 Daulat Rao Sindhia, 5, 19, 160.  
 Desa (Dehsa) Singh Majithia, 140, 184.  
 Dera Ghazi Khan, 43, 63, 106, 107, 114.  
 Dera Ismail Khan, 43, 60, 99, 100, 106, 107, 142.  
 Derajat, 107, 114, 117, 121.  
 Dewan Chand, 57, 58, 59, 60, 175-176, 191.  
 Dhana, 15.  
 Dhanna Singh Malwai, 130-131.  
 Dhian Singh, see Jammu Brothers.  
 Dia Kaur, Rani, 23.  
 Dina (Deena) Nath, 140, 143, 183, 184.  
 Dogras, 179-181.  
 Dost Muhammad Khan, 47-50, 83-84, 93-102, 105, 112, 121.  
 Dul Singh of Akalgarh, 14.  
 Duni Beg Khan, 49.  
 Daya (Dya) Singh, 48.

## E

- Eden, App. B.  
*Englishman*, the, App. B.  
 European officer, disliked in the post-Ranjit period, 165-166; forward policy, 165; introduced by Ranjit, 160-161; nationalities, 163; service, 164-165.

## F

- Falconer, Dr., 126, 127.  
 Fane, 206.  
 Faridkot, 26, 30.  
 Fateh Khan, Wazir, 44-53, 58, 61, 63.  
 Fateh Singh Ahluwalia, 14, 15, 17, 23, 35, 67, 68.  
 Fateh Singh Kalianwala, 14, 35.  
 Feroz Khan, Khattak Chief, 58.  
 Ferozepore, 73, 76, 77, 78.  
 Ford, 165.  
 Forster, 206.  
 Forts:—  
   Attock, 111.  
   Darna, 111.  
   Jahangira, 111.

- Jamrud, 111.  
 Hajipur, 64.  
 Haripur, 110.  
 Kangra, 36-38.  
 Khairabad, 58.  
 Kron, 111.  
 Kushangarh, 111.  
 Machin, 111.  
 Manglanpur, 64.  
 Multan, 56-58.  
 Nara, 111.  
 Philour, 71.  
 Rahon, 39.  
 Shubkudur, 101, 111.  
 Foulkes, 165.  
 Fyzullapuria Misl, 3n.

## G

- Ganga Ram, 140, 184.  
 Gardner's Account, 206.  
*Geeapo* or King of Ladak, 123.  
 Gobind Singh, Guru, 1, 137, 189.  
 Gordon, 161.  
 Govindgarh, 149.  
 Govind Ram, 130, 140.  
 Gujranwala, 2n, 9, 10.  
 Gujrat, 14, 64.  
*Gulabnama*, 179, 203.  
 Gulab Singh Bhangi, 13.  
 Gurbaksh Singh Kanheya, 7.  
 Gurdit Singh, 16, 40.  
 Gurkhas, 4, 36-39, 56, 79.  
 Guru, 1, 137.  
 Gurmukh Singh, 52, 53.

## H

- Hafiz Rahmat Khan, 108.  
 Haripur, 54.  
 Hari Singh Nalwa, 62, 95, 100-103, 105, 109-111, 121, 140, 141, 152, 176-178.  
 Harlan, 98, 164.  
 Harrand, 118.  
 Hearsey, 208.  
 Henderson, Dr., 125.  
*Hisabnama Fouj-i-Ranjit Singh*, 201.  
 Honigberger, 164.  
 Hoshiarpur, 16.  
 Hugel, 206.

## I

- Imam Bux, 147.  
 Imamuddin, 64, 149, 182.  
 Iskardu, 125-127.  
 Islamgarh, 64.

J

Jacquemont, Victor, 207.  
 Jackson, 38.  
 Jahandad Khan; 44, 48, 59.  
 Jaimal Singh, 64.  
 Jai Singh Kanheya, 3.  
 Jalandhar, 3n.  
 Jalalpur, 64.  
 James, 160.  
 Jammu, 3, 9, 14, 17, 139.  
 Jammu brothers, 139, 179-181.  
 Jamrud, 100-101.  
 Jasrota, 35.  
 Jassa Singh Ramgarhia, 13, 16.  
 Jhang, 15, 17, 52, 69.  
 Jind, 3n.  
 Jiwan Singh, of Sialkot, 35.  
 Jodh Singh Ramgarhia, 16, 40, 64, 65.  
 Jodh Singh, Wazirabad, 14, 64.

K

Kamaluddin, Shaikh, 16.  
 Kangra, 14, 36-38.  
 Kanheyalal, 202.  
 Kanheya Misl., 2n.  
 Kapur Singh Fyzullapur, 2n.  
 Karbar Singh, 128-129.  
*Kardars*, 141-148.  
 Karm Singh, 15, 26.  
 Kashmir, 1, 4, 43-47, 53, 54-56, 59, 145-146, 152-153. (Cashmere, 140).  
 Kasur, 13, 17, 21, 34, 35, 39, 77.  
 Katoch, 4, 36-37.  
*Khalsa*, 1, 34, 88, 136-137, 191.  
 —*Sarbat*, 18.  
 —*Sarkar*, 137.  
 Kharak Singh, 45, 57, 59, 66, 143, 150, 165, 162, 166, 195.  
 Khurchutna, a Saltmine, 144.  
 Khusab, 16, 17, 44.  
 Khusal Singh, 60, 140, 146, 169, 178-179.  
 Kishtwar, 195.  
 Kohat, 43, 106, 110.  
 Kohinoor, 45, 193-194, 197, 198.  
 Kutbuddin, 34, 35.  
 Kythal, 22, 23.

L

Lahore, 9-17, 139, 141, 148.  
 Lake, Lord, 18, 20, 21, 26, 37.  
 Lakhpat Rai, Dewan, 7-9.

Lawrence, Sir H. 207.  
 Leah, 60.  
 Ludhiana, 22, 30, 77.

M

Maha Singh, 2n, 7.  
 Mahtab Kaur, 7.  
 Makraj, a Saltmine, 142.  
 Malcolm, 207.  
 Maler Kotla, 23.  
 Manglanpur, 64.  
 Malladari System, 141.  
 Mankera, 60.  
 Marathas, 20-21, 52.  
 Massinissa, 60, 90.  
 Masson, 207, quoted, 148, 187.  
 Mazaris, 121.  
 McGregor, 207.  
 Metcalfe, Sir Charles, 23-35, 52, 80, 88.  
 Mian Singh, General, 153.  
 Military System of Ranjit, 15, compared with Maratha system, 169-170.  
 European officer, 160-168, Generals, 169, Irregular Cavalry, 158, Regular Army, 157-160.  
 Mirza Bagun Beg, 150.  
 Misls, 2-3n.  
 Misr Beli Ram, 140.  
 Mohanlal, 207.  
 Moorcroft, 208.  
 Motabir Singh, 129-130.  
 Moti Ram Dewan, 59.  
 Muhammad Azim Khan, op. cit.  
 Muhammad Khan, Sultan, 83, 98.  
 Muhammad Shah Mufti, 149.  
 Mohkam Chand, 22-23, 31-32, 37, 38, 39, 46-55, 59, 64, 71, 73, 174-175, 191.  
 Multan, 15, 17, 34, 56-58, 121, 140, 142, 146, 181.  
 Muranpur, 162.  
 Murray, 72, 77, 78, 208 quoted, 8, 69.  
 Muzaffargarh, 57.

N

Nabha, 3n.  
 Nadir Shah, 1.  
 Nakkai Misl., 2n, 64.  
 Nau Nihal Singh, 95, 121, 191.  
 Naraingarh, 22, 39.

Nepal, 4, 89, 128-132.  
*News of Ranjit Singh's Court*, 201.  
 Nishanwala Misl., 3n.  
 Nizamuddin, 13, 15, 34.  
 Noor Muhammad, 120.  
 North-West Frontier Problem, 103-114.  
 Nuruddin, 149, 182, 183.

## O

Ochterlony, Sir David, 30, 74.  
 Osborne, 84, 208.

## P

Parliamentary papers, 204.  
 Pathankot, 35.  
 Patiala, 3n, 20-23, 26.  
 Patti, 2n, 64.  
 Perron, 1, 9, 20.  
 Peshawar, 44, 59, 62, 63, 80, 82, 83, 95, 96, 106-114, 140, 146, 148.  
 Philour, 71.  
 Phulkias, 3n.  
 Pind Dadan Khan, 140.  
 Pir Panjal, 46.  
 Pottinger, Col., 81.  
 Prinsep, H. T., 208.  
 Punch, 54.

## R

Raj Kaur, 7, 40.  
 Rajori, 46, 55, 56.  
 Ramanand, 139.  
 Ram Dayal, 54, 55, 57, 107, 110, 175.  
 Ramgarhia Misl., 3n.  
 Ram Kaur, 40.  
 Ram Singh, 55, 64, 140.  
*Ranjitnama*, 202.  
 Ranjit Singh, absorbs trans-Sutlej misls, 13, 15, 16, 39-40, 64-67, alleged matricide, 8, 9, as a conqueror, 68-69, birth, 7, courtiers, 174-185, civil administration, op. cit., claims cis-Sutlej states, 21, cis-Sutlej expeditions, 21-23, 26, compared with Massinissa, 90, 191, conquests of—Akalgah, 14, Ambala, 26, Amritsar, 16, Chiniot, 15, Dallewala territories, 39, Dera Ghazi Khan, 106, Dera Ismail Khan, 106, Fyzullapuria possessions, 64, Gujrat, 64, Hajipur, 64, Islamgarh,

64, Jalalpur, 64, Kangra, 38, Kanheya territory, 64, Kashmir, 59, Kasur, 34-35, Lahore, 13, Maler Kotla, 26, Mankera, 60, Mirowal, 14, Narwal, 14, Multan, 58, Nakai territory, 64-65, Pathankot, 35, Peshawar, 63, 106-107, Ramgarhia territory, 65, Sahiwal, 16, Sialkot, 35, Nazirabad, 64.  
 Ranjit Singh, contrasted with Lincoln and Bismarck, 34, early years of, 7-9, failure, causes of, 190-192, friendship with Fateh Singh, 14, 15, 40, 67-68, military administration, op. cit., parentage, 7, personality, 187-188, place of, in Indian history, 189-190, secures the Kohinoor, App. A., 'tip and run policy' of, 109, toleration of, 149-150, treaties with 31, 68, 81, 84-86.  
 Rooper, 120.

## S

Sabzalkot, 118.  
 Sada Kaur, 7, 13-15, 40-41, 55, 65-67.  
 Sadhu Singh Akali, 58.  
 Saheb Singh of Gujrat, 14, 15, 64, 69.  
 Sahids and Nihangs, 3n.  
 Sahiwal, 16, 44.  
 Sansar Chand, 4, 14, 15, 36, 38.  
 Sawan Mal, 58, 121, 140, 142, 181, 182, 184.  
 Shahmat Ali, 208.  
 Shah Shuja, 18, 43-45, 47, 48, 84-88, 93-95, App. A.  
 Shah Zaman (Zaman Shah), 10-13, 44.  
 Shikarpur, 6, 18, 81, 94, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122.  
 Sialkot, 35.  
 Sind, 80-82, 94, 117-123.  
 Sirhind, 33.  
 Sohanlal, ref. 8, 10, 48, 200.  
 Steinbach, 209, quoted 161.  
 Sukerchukia Misl, 2n, 7.  
 Sultan Khan Bhimbur, 69.  
 Sultan Muhammad Khan, 83, 98, 107, 108.  
 Syad (Sayyid) Ahmad, 80, 107, 108-109.

## T

Tank, 106, 108, 113, 142.  
Tara Singh Gheba, 39.  
Thakurias, *Bara, Athara*, 36.

## Treaties :—

Bassein, 20, Amritsar, 31, 71,  
Finkenstein, 25, 'Friendship and  
Amity', 67, Navigation, 81, Tri-  
partite, 84-85, 87.

## U

*Umdat-ut-Tawarikh*, 45, 46, 48, 122,  
185, 200.

## V

Ventura, 117, 118, 146, 160, 162,  
163, 165, 166.

Vickovich (Vitkevich), 83, 84.  
Vigne, 209.

## W

Wade, 11, quoted, 16, ref. 78, 80, 86,  
88, 105, 114, 124, 132, 146, 203.  
Wadni, 74-76.  
Wafa Begam, 45, 197.

## Y

Yar Muhammad Khan, 93, 107, 108.  
Yusuf Ali, 12, 13.  
Yusufzais, 108.

## Z

*Zafarnama-i-Ranjit Singh*, 45, 200.  
Zain Khan, 33.  
Zira, 23.  
Zorawar Singh, 127.

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